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ABSTRACT 
 
Extracting the Truth: How Coexisting with the Black Gold Reshapes Lives and Livelihoods 
in 21st Century Colombia 
By  
Felicia Christine Graham 
There have been many pitfalls resultant from our current civilization’s dependence 
on oil and gas, though none has been more ignored than the impacts of hydrocarbon 
production on our fellow human beings. This thesis has three primary aims: (1) to make 
clear the theoretical frameworks that have led these human impacts to be ignored, including 
Resource Curse Theory, and to propose Political Ecology as a new framework for 
understanding the challenges that resource extraction levies on individuals and communities; 
(2) to detail, document, and highlight the widespread, complex, and generative impacts that 
resource extraction itself produces in order to begin seeking real solutions; and (3) to bring 
to the fore the struggles of the Colombian people in relation to hydrocarbon production and 
resource extraction. As shall be seen, Colombia is a unique though entirely ignored case 
study of rapidly expanding hydrocarbon production. While thought to be a ‘success’ in the 
eyes of many, this thesis shows the true nature of oil and gas production by focusing in on 
the deep structural changes that the southern community of Puerto Gaitan has endured since 
the arrival of Canadian oil company Pacific Rubiales, and explaining how these deeper 
problems are reproduced in other extractive areas across Latin America and the world.  
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I. Introduction: Balancing Peace & Development with the Continuities of Conflict 
 
“Oil and gas is fueling and financing the economic development of the country. It is a 
success story and we want more exploration and more production”  
- Former Vice Minister of Energy, Orlando Cabrales, 2013 
  
1.0. ‘Colombia Entering Modernity’? A Tale of Two Developments 
Throughout the 20th century Colombia’s overall development and relations with 
neighboring countries were strained and hampered by fifty years of internal conflict with the 
leftist FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), leaving Colombia closed for 
business both politically and economically. At the height of Colombia’s conflict in 2006-
2008 violence was at one of the highest levels in the conflict’s history. A report released by 
the Geneva Declaration in 2011 found that between 2004-2009 Colombia had the fifth 
highest violent death1 rate in the world, with some 43 deaths per 100,000 people – not a far 
behind El Salvador and Iraq each with 60 deaths per 100,0002. The violence in Colombia was 
extensive and manifested in multiple aspects of social and political life. To further illustrate, 
around the same time the International labor Organization (ILO) reported that in the year 
2002 approximately 184 trade unionists were assassinated in Colombia alone – or put 
otherwise, roughly 85% of the world’s total violence against labor leaders took place in 
                                                
1 Violent death: refers to intentional harm or death being done to another human being. These can 
include deaths related to direct conflict or intentional homicide.  
 
2 Boyd, Alice, “Colombia is 5th most dangerous country on earth: Study,” Colombia Reports, October 
27, 2011, http://colombiareports.co/colombia-is-5th-most-dangerous-place-on-earth-study 
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Colombia3. These pieces of information serve to perpetuate and reinforce Colombia’s legacy 
as a lawless and drug ridden frontier, which no traveller or diplomat dare touch. Yet in 2015, 
things look drastically different, as the country has seemingly undergone a sweeping 
metamorphosis.   
2012 marked a true landmark in the country’s history: an unprecedented invitation to 
join the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) – a traditional 
indication in international affairs of international acceptance and successful development. 
And with a reduction in overall violence since 2010, paired with remarkably high growth 
rates, the invitation seems warranted. After decades of violent conflict that slowed the 
economy to a frighteningly sluggish pace, Colombia finally appears to be surfacing and on 
the fast track to a long hoped-for development.  
According to Colombia’s Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas, the OECD invitation 
signals acknowledgement of Colombia’s progress by developed countries - and a survey of 
recent headlines shows consensus among the conventional choir praising Colombia’s 
astonishing development: Forbes asks, ‘Is Colombia the Indonesia of Latin America?’4; a 
special report by the Financial Times reads, ‘The New Colombia: peace and prosperity in 
sight, the country comes of age’5; even U.S. Vice President Joe Biden praised Colombia’s 
                                                
3 Noam Chomsky, “On Colombia,” Introduction to America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia, 
December, 2004, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/200412--.htm. 
 
4 Heather West, “Is Colombia the Indonesia of Latin America?,” Forbes Magazine, June 3, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2013/06/03/is-colombia-the-indonesia-of-latin-america/. 
 
5 “The New Colombia: peace and prosperity in sight, the country comes of age,” The Financial Times, 
June 4, 2013, http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/24a2ca0e-c74b-11e2-8a36-00144feab7de.pdf. 
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“remarkable progress”6 – a view authenticated by the signing of a Free Trade Agreement 
with the U.S. in 20127. But more importantly, the OECD invitation represents an 
unprecedented ‘entrance into modernity’ – as put by Minister Mauricio Cardenas8. An 
examination of the numbers adds fuel to the fervor. 
In 2013 Colombia overtook Argentina to become the third largest economy in Latin 
America – worth $369 billion – behind Brazil and Mexico. Business Insider reports that in 
2013 Colombia saw another year of unprecedented FDI into the country – registering $13.3 
billion, more than nine times greater than FDI investment a decade prior ($1.7 billion in 
2003)9. Additionally, Colombia’s GDP has steadily grown at an average of 4 percent per 
annum, a glaring achievement in light of U.S. and Europe’s struggling economies10. The 
graphs below further illustrate this.  
Figure 1. Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia 2004-1012 (U.S. BN)  
                                                
6 Tom Kludt, “Biden Praises Colombia’s ‘Remarkable Progress’,” Talking Points Memo, May 28, 
2013, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/biden-praises-colombia-s-remarkable-progress. 
 
7 “U.S. – Colombia Trade Agreement: Increasing American Competitiveness,” Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 2013, http://www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa. 
  
8 Johnny Crisp, “OECD invitation “shows Colombia entering modernity,” Colombia Reports, May 30, 
2013, http://colombiareports.co/oecd-invitation-shows-colombia-is-entering-modernity-colombia-govt/. 
 
9 Jens Erick Gould, “Colombia has Become Latin America’s Unexpected Economic Star,” Business 
Insider, March 26, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/colombia-latams-economic-surprise-2014-3#!CbdE1. 
 
10 ibid. 
  
4 
 
Source: The World Bank  
 
 
Figure 2. Colombia Gross Domestic Product (U.S. BN) 
 
Source. The World Bank 
 
The steady and positive economic growth indicators have not only brought Colombia 
renewed prestige as a ‘modern’ country with successful development initiatives, but earned 
the country praise for its ‘sound economic policy’ leading it to be viewed by many as a 
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model for the region11. Thus, the Colombian state and economy are now viewed as a 
“resilient, market-based, mixed economy where manufacturing, mineral extraction, 
agriculture, and services combine to create a healthy, growth-oriented system”12.  As Jens 
Erick Gould of Business Insider explains, “It’s quite a turnaround for a country that was so 
violent just a few decades ago that investors wouldn’t touch it”13.  Yet, while Colombia’s 
success is obviously the result of a multiplicity of factors, the centrality of the oil and gas 
sector is of unparalleled importance. 
 
1.1. Oil and Gas Driving Modernity 
Though FDI into Colombia as a whole continues to reach new heights – $16.8 billion 
USD in 201314 - hydrocarbons (particularly oil and gas, but also coal) have become a 
consciously embraced cornerstone of the Colombian economy, with FDI into oil and gas 
multiplying exponentially since 2010 and financing almost all of the country’s recent 
progress15. In 2012 FDI into Colombia totaled $5.3; one year later in 2013 this number 
                                                
11 Jens Erick Gould, “Colombia has Become Latin America’s Unexpected Economic Star,” Business 
Insider, March 26, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/colombia-latams-economic-surprise-2014-3#!CbdE1. 
 
12 Michael Mejía and Germán LaRosa, Colombia: A Concise Contemporary History (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2013).  
 
13 Jens Erick Gould, “Colombia has Become Latin America’s Unexpected Economic Star,” Business 
Insider, March 26, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/colombia-latams-economic-surprise-2014-3#!CbdE1. 
 
14 “U.S.-Colombia Economics and Trade,” Embassy of the United States, Bogota, 2014, 
http://bogota.usembassy.gov/topics_of_interest/economicstrade.html. 
  
15 See FDI flows in Annex I, image 2 and 3 
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doubled to $13.3 billion – accounting for a record 81.6 percent of total FDI invested for 
201316.  
  Investors continue to flock into the country due in particular to its success in meeting 
oil production targets. In 2013 – a record year not only in FDI inflow, but crude production 
as well – Colombia reached its production target of one million barrels per day (mbd). 
Although 1 mbd may seem arbitrary, when viewed within a global perspective it becomes 
significant. Taking into consideration Figure 3 below, in comparison to the world’s top oil 
producers of 2012, Colombia is far down on the list – clocking in at number 23, far below 
Saudi Arabia’s 11.5 mbd, or even war-torn Iraq’s 2.9 mbd. In fact, Colombia produces just 
under Indonesia. But looking at the production amount in comparison to other countries in 
this range, at Colombia’s current rate it could be producing at relatively significant levels 
comparable to Qatar, Kazakhstan, Norway, or even eventually Venezuela within five, ten, or 
fifteen years. 
 
Figure 3. Global Oil Producers 2012 (thbd) 
                                                
16 ibid.   
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Source: EIA, graph compiled by author 
 
Then, in comparison to regional producers within Latin America, illustrated in Figure 
4 below, Colombia’s increase in oil production places it fourth behind Mexico, Brazil, and 
Venezuela – and far ahead of Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru. Regionally, then Colombia 
stands out as a glaring success story, also leading the country to be touted as a model for 
producing neighbors, and a powerhouse for regional integration. 
Figure 4. Top Oil Producers Latin America 2012 (thbd) 
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Source: EIA, graph compiled by author 
   
The marker of the million barrels is generally regarded as Colombia’s move to 
preeminence as an important geopolitical actor on the regional and global stage. The increase 
of its production capacity in combination with international recognition means more global 
awareness, more demand, more investment, more development, and – as Colombia’s Finance 
Minister Mauricio Cardenas emphasizes – the country’s ‘entrance into modernity’. Thus, for 
Colombia the expansion of hydrocarbons translates into economic growth; economic growth 
translates to economic success in the eyes of the international community; which translates 
back into more investment, more growth, etc. – a positive feedback loop of sorts. Because of 
this, Colombia has tremendous incentive to invest and develop its oil and gas industry, with 
no end in sight: “We want more,” former Vice Minister of Energy, Orlando Cabrales 
explained at a 2013 conference; oil and gas is “fueling and financing the economic 
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development of the country. It is a success story and we want more exploration and more 
production”17.  
 
1.2. Reinforcing the Rhetoric of Success    
This confluence of meeting ever-increasing production targets, the chimes of 
international acclaim, and the mushrooming of increased FDI flows, equips Colombia’s 
political leaders with the evidence they need to continue extractive development projects 
within the hydrocarbons industry, and allows the country on a macro-level to further embrace 
the petro-development paradigm. This, in combination with a reduction in violence and 
poverty reinforces the belief in the efficacy of ‘trickle-down’ economics – ie. when the 
country economically prospers (pointing to indicators like FDI), it is assumed that populous 
automatically benefits as well – a residual assumption leftover from the neoliberal 
development projects of the 90’s and early 2000’s.  
In 2015 many in the development field know better than to take single economic 
indicators as anything more than just that – a snap shot of the economy that needs to be 
supplemented with other snap shots such as the human development index or gross national 
happiness, which creates a more accurate portrait and measure of the ‘success’ of 
development initiatives.  
The political and economic rhetoric associated with Colombia’s politics and 
extractive industries, both from within Colombia and from abroad, however, continue to give 
                                                
17 Orlando Cabrales. “Keynote Address,” Proc. Of La Jolla Energy Conference. The Hilton at Torrey 
Pines, La Jolla, California, May 2013.  
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the impression of ‘success’ by pointing to narrow economic indicators such as FDI flows and 
meeting hydrocarbon production targets, among other things. However, this success narrative 
is subverted with concurrent reports of continued violence, displacement, and human rights 
abuses in congruence with the conflict from previous decades; congruent in the sense that the 
same disadvantaged populations seem to be experiencing compounded abuses, but different 
in that this time the causes seem to be more linked with the state’s extractive projects than 
solely guerilla and paramilitary violence. Therefore, those of us in the development field are 
left questioning which narrative is reflective of the reality for the majority of Colombians – is 
Colombia’s extractive-led development trajectory successfully improving both the country as 
a whole and local populations, or do extractive projects contribute to experiences of violence, 
displacement, and further human rights abuses?  
Colombia’s political voices, at least those behind the extractive industry, routinely 
emphasize a correlation between extractive industries and an improved quality of life, 
arguing that extractive projects not only bring much needed jobs to market, but improve 
living conditions for families in the process. For example, during the inaugural address at the 
Naturgas XVIII Conference in Medellin during April of 2015, President Santos himself 
illustrated this connection with the following anecdote: 
“Recuerdo que alguna vez, durante la inauguración de unas instalaciones de gas 
natural en unas casas rurales, una señora se me acercó y me dijo que yo le había salvado el 
matrimonio. Me contó que su marido se levantaba todos los días a las 4:30 de la mañana 
para ir a cortar leña y que regresaba muy cansado y no le prestaba atención. Según ella, con 
la instalación de gas en su casa, su marido no tendría la necesidad de salir a cortar leña y 
estarían más tiempo junto” [I remember one time, during the inauguration of natural gas 
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facilities in a rural residential area, a lady approached me and said I had saved her marriage. 
She told me that her husband got up every day at 4:30 in the morning to cut wood and 
returning very tired and was not paying attention to her. According to her, with the 
installation of gas at home, her husband would not need to go out and chop wood and they 
had more time together" 18. 
This quote from Santos illustrates quite clearly the connection that is made between 
the extractive industry, in this case natural gas, and the well-being of the people: “The 
president said that this everyday story represents the importance of natural gas for the welfare 
of its citizens and praised the work done by the industry to improve the quality of life of the 
inhabitants”19.. And in many cases this is true, especially when one considers the phenomena 
of energy-poverty and the limitations it imposes on simple daily living functions20. However, 
given the dual existence of a ‘successful’ extractive industry alongside narratives of violence 
and poverty that persist, it is prudent to question the extent to which the extractive industry, 
specifically hydrocarbons, is helping or hindering the plight of the Colombian population, 
already recovering from decades of violence and entrenched poverty. Indeed there is a 
multitude of evidence that paints a portrait contradicting Santos’ remarks, and the ‘success’ 
narrative.   
 
1.3. Alternate Experiences: Contradictions to the Success Narrative & Tenuous Peace 
                                                
18  “Santos: Colombia necessita un sector energético fuerte,” Cámara Boliviana de Hidrocarburos y 
Energía, April 29, 2015, http://www.cbhe.org.bo/noticias/2272-santos-colombia-necesita-un-sector-energetico-
fuerte. 
 
19 Ibid.  
 
20  Antoine Halff et al., Energy Poverty: Global Challenges and Local Solutions. Oxford University 
Press. 2015.  
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The ‘success’ narrative bolstered by increased production, increased FDI, and other 
economic indicators continues to provide Colombia’s political leaders with the tools to 
continue large-scale extractive projects, particularly in oil, gas, and coal. But this narrative is 
anything but invariable or representative of a certain future, though many had hoped that the 
peace talks would bring an end to the familiar cycle of violence. But this most recent spat 
highlights the tenuous nature of Colombia’s peace, and how hydrocarbons (specifically) oil is 
used as a tool within the ongoing conflict.  At the time of this writing, peace talks between 
the Santos administration and the FARC had been ongoing since 2012, but in May 2015 the 
FARC announced an end to the unilateral ceasefire21, followed by several large attacks on oil 
facilities throughout the country22, prompting retaliatory air raids from the Santos 
administration23. Yet regardless of this major hiccup in peace talks, when taken together 
social discontent and the continuities of violence have continued to pervade the country in 
various forms throughout the entirety of the peace talks, dispelling the successful 
development narrative propagated by the government and international financiers. The most 
common of these include the continuation of organized criminal groups, the persistence of 
poverty, and social discontent – many of which identify grievances clearly related to the 
aperatura economica and the expansion of the hydrocarbons industry, what amounts to a 
perceived as a lack of concern for the wellbeing of the people. 
                                                
21 Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Farc ends ceasefire after air raid kills 26 leftist rebels in Colombia attack,” The 
Guardian, May 22, 2015,  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/22/colombia-farc-suspends-cease-fire-
air-raid-kills-leftist-rebels. 
 
22 Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Farc rebels bomb new section of Colombian oil pipeline,” The Guardian, June 
29, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/29/colombia-farc-rebels-bomb-oil-pipeline. 
 
23 John Vizcaino, “Colombia’s Santos orders halt to air raids on FARC rebels,” Reuters, July 26, 2015, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/26/uk-colombia-rebels-idUKKCN0Q001520150726. 
 
  
13 
  
1.3.1 From Paramilitaries to Bandas Criminales  
Former paramilitary members, for example, without the employment provided by the 
government’s offensive against the FARC have turned to other venues of operation 
independent of any formal organization – referred to now as bandas criminales [criminal 
bands, or gangs], nicknamed BACRIM for short24. In September of 2012 a Colombian think 
tank, Indepaz, released a report outlining the emergence of the BACRIM, highlighting a 
dozen new narco-paramilitary groups made up of some 3,550 members, specifically from the 
former paramilitary Autodefencas Unidas de Colombia [United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia], or AUC25. The report also declared its findings that the BACRIM are now 
responsible for more violence then the FARC26. In line with these findings, the Colombian 
government under President Manuel Santos has stated that it now regards the BACRIM as 
Colombia’s largest security threat27. Thus while the oil-for-development narrative paints a 
portrait of success, the realities of a post-conflict Colombia contradict this portrayal. 
 
1.3.2. The Persistence of Poverty 
Additional considerations that contradict the successful development narrative 
include the continued prevalence of poverty throughout the country, which is proving 
                                                
24 June S. Beittel, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Serivice, 
December 8, 2014. 
 
25 “Informe Sobre Grupos Narcoparamilitares,”  Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz, 
August 27, 2013.  
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Anastasia Moloney, “War-scarred Colombia bets on land reform to foster peace,” Thomas Reuters 
Foundation, June 9, 2014, http://www.trust.org/item/20140609133023-mzy2n/. 
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resilient in the face of the economic awakening in 2011. At the height of Colombia’s conflict 
in 2008 those living below the international poverty line hovered between 40-50%28. In 2015 
that number has been reduced to 30% - undoubtedly a significant decrease in only six years, 
but still very high leaving Colombia with the 48th highest poverty rate in the world behind 
Benin and the Gaza Strip29.  Thus, while Colombia has taken in huge revenues from the oil 
industry, it is safe to say that the benefits of the oil boom have not necessarily gone to those 
most in need. 
 
1.3.3. Social Discontent: A New Urban Coalition 
And finally, a true marker of social discontent, protests in Colombia pop up 
remarkably frequently without the constraint of violence. Since the peace process began in 
2011 Colombia has been rocked by massive protests on a yearly basis. Beginning in October 
of that year, some 20-30,000 student demonstrators took to the streets of Bogota to protest 
the privatization of Colombia’s public university system, then linked to the pending Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S., with tens of thousands more marching in other major 
cities30. While Colombia does have a tradition of student activism the protest was one of the 
largest the country had seen in years, and because of its connection to the FTA, it marked the 
beginning of a wider coalition of those dissatisfied with the realities of Colombia’s social and 
economic development. These common concerns materialized in October of 2012 when 
                                                
28 “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population),” The World Bank, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/CO?display=graph. 
 
29 “Country Comparison: Population Below Poverty Line,” Index Mundi, 2014.  
 
30 “Bogota clashes amid Colombian student protests,” British Broadcasting Corporation, October 13, 
2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15288505. 
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30,000 student demonstrators, in conjunction with farmers and indigenous activists, 
descended for a week of protest across major cities to bring attention to social inequality and 
demand an end to government corruption31. Aptly entitled the “Week of Indignation,” the 
protests - which were resumed in December 2012, August 2013, and May 2014 - indicate a 
new era of cooperation between dissatisfied segments of Colombian society. While student 
demonstrations characterized the 2011 and 2012 protests, the 2013 and 2014 protests were 
led by disgruntled farmers, but included wide swaths of different groups including farmers, 
truckers, miners, indigenous activists, students, and teachers, and were some of the largest 
demonstrations in the country’s history32.  
 
1.3.4. Indigenous and Rural Discontentment  
Even outside of the main cities, regular protests by indigenous communities and 
activists are substantial and frequent. A month of protest in 2011 in the department of Meta – 
home to the country’s highest producing fields, nearly a quarter of total output – effectively 
halted oil production by blocking transit routes33. 2014 saw similar protests in the 
Northeastern department of Norte de Santander following the FARC’s bombing of the Caño 
Limon Pipeline, which accounts for roughly one fifth of Colombia’s total production34. After 
                                                
31 “Colombian police disperse ‘indignant’ potesters with tear gas,” Russia Today, October 13, 2012, 
http://www.rt.com/news/protest-clash-police-colombia-335/. 
 
32 Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Colombia braced for nationwide protests,” The Guardian, August 29, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/29/colombia-major-national-protests-farmers. 
 
33 John Otis, “Violent Protests Threaten Colombia’s Oil Boom,” Time Magazine, September 24, 2011, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2094758,00.html. 
 
34 Dan Molinski, “Colombian Rebels’ Attacks  Set Back Nation,” The Wall Street Journal, November 
7, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/colombian-rebel-attacks-set-back-nation-1415399080. 
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the pipeline was shut down U’Wa indigenous community activists surrounded the pipeline 
for one month preventing repairs and costing the government more than $130 million, 
bringing international attention to what they identified as repeated environmental degradation 
through oil spills and a lack of accountability on behalf of the operating company – Canada 
based Occidental Petroleum35. While these two indigenous movements successfully 
surpassed the confines of local and national media, smaller scale protests and demonstrations 
occur on a regular basis in areas immediately adjacent to oil production activities, though 
they fail to generate the same level of attention. Taken together, these strings of protests 
illustrate very clearly how widespread dissatisfaction with Colombia’s social and economic 
development is felt throughout the country – not only students & teachers, but also many 
strands of agricultural workers, miners, truckers, and of course indigenous communities – 
and not just in a moment, but continuously and until the present time.   
What, then, do these discussions – the emergence of the BACRIM, the persistence of 
poverty, and emergence of vocally disgruntled public - indicate about Colombia’s success 
narrative? Cumulatively, these factors demonstrate the tenuous nature of Colombia’s peace, 
and the apparent failure of oil-led development and economic growth to effectively address 
the plethora of post-conflict challenges that define the reality for large swaths of the 
Colombian populous. Yet, as discussed before, the success narrative has led international 
investors and free-market advocates to declare Colombia a success story, and the justification 
to continue developing large-scale extractive projects based on free-market, trickle-down 
economic growth rationale. Given the continued challenges outlined above, however, one 
should exercise a degree of suspicion in accepting the success narrative, and as previously 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
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mentioned – it is prudent to question to what extent the extractive industry, specifically 
hydrocarbons, is helping or hindering the plight of the Colombian population. Additionally, 
not only does this discussion serve to briefly illustrate the superficial nature of the ‘success’ 
narrative, but more importantly it more accurately places this research within the social-
political context of present day Colombia – one characterized by monumental economic 
transitions and budding social movements. As we continue the discussion below it should be 
remembered that the expansion of the hydrocarbons industry and its impacts on local 
populations takes place simultaneously and with full awareness of the social-political issues 
discussed above. Collectively, there is much ado about Colombia’s development trajectory.  
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II. Chapter Two: Thesis Overview & Methods 
 
2.1. Thesis Focus and Outline  
In order to deconstruct the contradictions inherent in Colombia’s development saga, 
this thesis first endeavors to situate Colombia’s extractive-led development of hydrocarbons 
within the relevant academic discourse. By doing this, the thesis brings to light the world-
views, frameworks, and anachronistic paradigms operating in the shadows of Colombia’s 
development. 
Indeed the contradictions outlined in the previous chapter is not without warrant, and 
has been called into question regularly within various academic discourses, including 
primarily development theory and to a slightly lesser degree political economy. Now, while 
this thesis does draw on these bodies of literature, it is appropriate to note at this junction that 
it is outside the scope and purpose of this thesis to asses the entire body of development 
theory and political economy in relation to the Colombian context and the ‘success’ of its 
growing hydrocarbons industry. Instead, this thesis is situated within a related branch of 
research concerning development and energy politics – what is referred to as Resource Curse 
Theory (RCT).  
Chapter 3 is concerned primarily with assessing these academic discourses, and how 
they play out in the Colombian context. The chapter argues that RCT is a potentially useful 
tool for understanding both the practicality of resource extraction as a development 
mechanism and the pitfalls of resource extraction. Resource Curse Theory is an ideal point to 
assess here given that it is one of the most commonly pointed to arguments against ambitious 
and large-scale extractive development projects, as its main tenet posits that countries with 
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abundant natural resources actually suffer as a result of their wealth, as opposed to flourish.  I 
argue, however, that while useful for understanding the drawbacks of resource extraction on 
a macro-economic scale, Resource Curse Theory’s roots in the Eruocentric conception of 
Modernity and its linkages with neoliberal development theory continue to inhibit a 
comprehensive understanding of the full scope of impacts that extractive industries exert on 
local communities.  
While operating solely from the perspective of Resource Curse Theory various 
questions remain unanswered - chief among them: what is it about Resource Curse theory 
that has failed to allow for an effective solution to the myriad of problems, such as corruption 
and transparency, that plague resource-rich developing countries like Colombia? As shall be 
demonstrated, corruption and transparency, particularly in post-conflict states often are 
generative of other more immediate and pressing problems, such as the ones listed previously 
including violence, poverty, and human rights abuses, all of which are manifest in the 
Colombian context.  
 I argue that in order to address the unique nexus of social, political, economic, and 
environmental problems that are generated and/or reinforced by resource extraction, what is 
required is an entirely new framework for understanding and interpreting the depth and scope 
of impacts that resource extraction yield – not only on a macro level, but more importantly 
on a local level. To do this I draw on the framework of Political Ecology to show that by 
understanding resource extractive problems at interrelated, dependent, and generative of one 
another more practical and effective solutions are made evident. Furthermore, the importance 
and centrality of locally focused, bottom-up development efforts is made clear, as opposed to 
strictly top-down initiatives.  
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Thus, in order to evaluate the true nature of Colombia’s oil-led development track; to 
give credence to the contradictions inherent in Colombia’s ‘successful’ development 
narrative; and to determine the true impacts that the oil industry’s expansion has had on local 
populations, this thesis aims to use a Political Ecology framework to deconstruct the ways in 
which development post-2011 has manifested on the ground in one of Colombia’s most 
successful oil production frontiers – Los Llanos, and in doing so clarify the contradiction 
discussed above and extract the truth of Colombian oil saga.  
To achieve this, Chapter 4 continues by exploring the history of political and social 
conflict in Colombia – specifically the 50-year conflict with the FARC and its connection to 
both territorial conquest, and what is referred to as the aperetura economica, or economic 
opening – a desire open the country to foreign investment and link with the globalizing 
economy. In Colombia, these two histories are intimately interrelated and play out as one in 
the extraction of hydrocarbon resources due to the physicality of hydrocarbon extraction – ie. 
territorial control is an essential prerequisite for the exploration and production of oil, gas, 
and coal. In this way, the history of Colombia’s conflict with the FARC cannot be separated 
from the present day narrative of success based on expansion of the hydrocarbons industry, 
and the problems it produces. This portion of the thesis also emphasizes the continuities and 
legacies of this history, its dynamics, and how Colombia’s unique history of territorial 
conquest has become embedded in the ideological rhetoric of neoliberalism and plays out 
through the management and structure of the hydrocarbons industry.  
While Chapter 4 serves as historical and institutional background, Chapter 5 delves 
into  the case study of Los Llanos, and illustrates how Colombia’s history intersects with the 
present day expansion of the hydrocarbons industry in a localized context. This discussion is 
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crucial to the primary aim of the thesis: to deconstruct Colombia’s ‘success’ narrative and 
make clear the ways in which the expansion and development of the hydrocarbons industry 
(what was previously referred to as the extractive-led development track) actually produces 
and reproduces social, political, economic, and ecological problems. This section, thus, 
highlights the impacts of oil exploration and production on local families, detailing the ways 
in which expansion of the industry affects different social groups in various ways, often 
times negatively, though occasionally positively. This portion of the thesis also uses the case 
study of Los Llanos to return to the theoretical argument for Political Ecology, as the 
testimonies and experiences illustrated here bolster the utilization of Political Ecology as a 
framework for understanding and addressing the challenges that arise in local communities.  
From here the thesis concludes by tying together Colombia’s historical and 
institutional background with the evidence from the localized context to support the initial 
proposition that  
Political Ecology offers a more comprehensive and effective framework for 
understanding the pitfalls of extractive-led development, specifically with hydrocarbons, as 
opposed to macro and distinctly economic interpretations like Resource Curse Theory. By 
better understanding the deeply embedded and often hidden problems that result from 
resource extraction, we presumably can better address these problems, both in the immediate 
and long term. Thus, not only does the conclusion highlight the theoretical implications, but 
it also the implications for Los Llanos in Colombia, and other communities confronted with 
similar extractive projects across the world.  
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2.2. Research Questions  
Given the various components of this thesis outlined above, this study aims to answer 
address two levels of specific research questions, both theoretical and particular.  
On a theoretical level, this thesis asks: what is it about Resource Curse theory that has 
failed to allow for an effective solution to the myriad of problems, such as corruption and 
transparency, that plague resource-rich developing countries like Colombia? What are the 
limitations of RCT, and how can more interdisciplinary frameworks such as Political 
Ecology offer insight into the complex social, political, economic, and ecological set of 
problems that arise in extractive contexts?   
Then, in the case of Colombia in particular this thesis asks: What is the true nature of 
Colombia’s oil-led development given the discrepancy between the ‘successful’ development 
narrative of the hydrocarbons industry and the political figures in support of it, and those who 
continue to experience violence, poverty, displacement, and human rights abuses in relation 
to extractive project? What does developmental “success” actually look like on the ground in 
an area greatly impacted by the physicalities and economics of the oil industry? Furthermore, 
beyond the economic impacts of resource extraction, what are the different ways in which the 
expansion of the oil industry in the Colombian South has impacted local populations and 
environments, and how are these impacts interpreted and viewed by local residents?  And 
lastly, how can negative impacts be mitigated and positive impacts be enhanced and 
replicated, both in the specific context of Los Llanos, in other parts of Colombia, and 
potentially communities in other extractive countries? 
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2.3. Research Methods  
In answering these questions and collecting data I used a multi-method strategy 
involving, extensive secondary research, case study, observation and participant observation, 
and formal and informal interviews. While research was conducted primarily in Puerto 
Gaitan, Colombia, formal interviews were also carried out in Bogota, Colombia, while 
secondary research was conducted during time spent at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara and across California.  
 
2.3.1. Secondary Research 
  The basis for this research project has a long history, and specific interest in 
Colombia’s oil development was born out of my regular attendance at the annual La Jolla 
Energy Conference in San Diego. Throughout several years beginning in 2010 Colombia 
occupied a point of great attention and interest at the conferences, and some of the 
fundamental views and arguments present in this research were made through formal 
interviews that I conducted at these conferences. During my time at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara, most it not all of my courses and research papers were thus 
devoted to further researching the unique developmental case of Colombia and its rapidly 
expanding hydrocarbons industry. The University is where the vast majority of secondary 
research took place, with guidance from various professors with previous experience with 
and knowledge of development theory and practice.  
 
2.3.2. Case Study  
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A case study research method was utilized during this research. This method is 
particularly useful in explicating the impacts associated with oil production in Colombia. 
While there are many areas in Colombia that are undergoing oil exploration or related 
activities – including, but not limited to La Guajira in the North; Norte de Santander, Arauca, 
and Casanare in the East; and Cauca, Nariño in the South West – the department of Meta and 
the town of Puerto Gaitan provides a optimal case study for a multiplicity of reasons.  
First of all, between 2006-2008 the department of Meta received the largest amount 
of royalties generated from the oil industry – increasing 270 percent in just two years. 
Because of this, the department of Meta is a prime example of how effective, or not, oil 
revenue injected into local development initiatives can be.  
Secondly, in 1999 the Colombian government passed a law mandating that all 
extractive industries seeking to establish operations in Colombia must undergo a consultation 
processes with indigenous and local communities in affected areas, referred to as Consulta 
Previa [Previous Consultation]36. While there are about thirty-three Consulta Previa cases 
being undertaken at present (2013-14), the vast majority of consultation processes across the 
country are stalled as a result of indigenous opposition to extractive projects37. Contrarily, the 
consultation process in Meta – specifically Puerto Gaitan – was concluded relatively quickly 
and without much opposition from local and indigenous communities. While this is widely 
pointed to as yet another success for the region and the industry in the wider narrative, for the 
same reason it also provides a unique case study in a country where opposition to extractive 
industries is frequent.  
                                                
36  Roque Roldan et al., Mineria en Territorios Indigenas de Colombia, Peru, Y Venezuela. (Bogota: 
Disloque Editores, 1999), 37.   
 
37 Confidential interview by author, Bogota Colombia, November 2013.  
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And lastly, while Colombia’s civil war touched upon all facets and geographies of the 
country, the southern departments, including Meta, were notable for the exceptionally heavy 
presence of FARC. Because of this, during the government’s offensive against the FARC via 
both paramilitaries and national troops, the southern departments also saw a disproportionate 
amount of violence during the height of the conflict in 2006-2008. How this recent traumatic 
history has played out in the lives of local residents during what can essentially be considered 
an oil-funded period of reconstruction also provides for a unique insight into the 
effectiveness of government outreach and development, in particular in assisting those 
adversely impacted by both the war and oil production activities.  
Furthermore, Meta is a unique case that has not be explored in the academic 
literature, while other communities and areas, such as the Wayuu in La Guajira and the Bari 
in Norte de Santander, have been highlighted in both local Colombian and American studies. 
Yet the newness of oil development in the south has escaped the international eye of scrutiny. 
It is for this reason, in addition to the reasons outlined above, that Puerto Gaitan, Meta was 
selected as an exemplar case study. 
 
2.3.3. Observation & Participation Observation 
Because the nature of the inquiries of this study may be considered by local residents 
to be a of a sensitive or politically inflammatory nature, the methods of observation and 
participant observation were employed to a great extent. During my time spent in Puerto 
Gaitan I went through great efforts to explore every facet of local life. This included, but by 
no means was limited to: local development projects, local transit areas, local slums, 
indigenous reserves, community spaces, political spaces, and oil extraction sites. Casual 
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conversations, people watching, and local events also factor into this method of study. As 
such observation and participant observation research plays a key role in the findings of this 
study and serves to piece together a unique portrait in time of tremendous transformation.  
 
2.3.4. Formal & Informal Interviews 
Formal and informal interviews also make up a substantial portion of this study. The 
primary formal interviews that were conducted during time spent in Bogota included 
extensive conversations with high-level representatives and officials from both the 
Colombian and American government, as well as leadership of the national oil company – 
EcoPetrol. Private industry consultants specializing in everything from security, to Consulta 
Previa, and international investment, were also interviewed on a number of occasions. These 
interviews provide an important industry and governmental perspective, which 
counterbalances the observation and participant observation research conducted later.  
Additionally, on the streets and in the cafes of Bogota, and throughout a month long 
Spanish course in Bogota, a great number of informal interviews were had in which the 
general attitude towards Colombia’s oil development was discussed. These perspectives also 
provide an uniquely urban vantage and important counterbalance to the observational 
research conducted in the more rural areas.  
However, formal and informal interviews were also conducted during time spent in 
Puerto Gaitan. Here, extensive interviews were undertaken with local government 
representatives, oil industry representatives, community leaders, community service 
providers and healthcare workers, and indigenous community members and leaders. Informal 
interviews were used to a lesser extent, but together the formal and informal interviews 
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conducted in Bogota and Puerto Gaitan paint a more complete image that compliment both 
each other, and other research methods.  
 
2.3.5. Data Analysis 
Formal and informal interviews, both written and audio recorded, and observational 
and participant observation notes collected in both Bogota and Puerto Gaitan were generated, 
transcribed, collected, and then coded into various groups depending on subject matter and 
industry, or social role. All interviews while initially hand written were transcribed and input 
onto a computer in both Word and Excel documents to allow for easy cross comparison and 
analysis. These documents and files were saved on an encrypted file on the researcher’s 
personal external hard drive to allow for maximum security.  
The following work is the result of nearly three years of research conducted by the 
author. While the introduction prior to this section introduces the contradictory nature of 
Colombia’s recent ‘entrance into modernity’, the remainder of this project aims to 
deconstruct and analyze this ‘success’ narrative and its implications in the more specific 
context of Puerto Gaitan, Colombia.  The following section begins this by offering a 
thorough and critical assessment of Colombia’s ongoing development trajectory by 
amalgamating critiques of both modernity and resource extraction from scholars the world 
over.  
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III. Chapter 3: Modernity as Development Objective and Resource Extraction as 
Development Mechanism  
 
3.1 Critique: Eurocentrism, Coloniality, and Economy  
 
Chapter One clearly highlights the rhetoric and narrative that casts Colombia as a 
successfully modernizing state, most notably in Cabrales’ speech pointing out how 
hydrocarbons are fueling and funding Colombias ‘entrance into modernity’38. It is a difficult 
thing to pin, as it isn’t something that's stated plainly, but Colombia’s embracement of the 
petro-development paradigm, illustrated by the notably privatized structure of the industry 
which is designed to prioritize rapid exploration, production, and financial gains, are not only 
emblematic of the residual of a neoliberal development trajectory, but also deeply 
representative of the country’s larger objective: the attainment of modernity. Thus it is this 
wider objective that this first portion of the literature review seeks to shed light upon.  
Modernity as a concept has evolved substantially in the post WWII era, contending 
with discrepancies between classical modernization theory and the variety of realities 
actually produced. Classical modernization theory is premised on the assumption of 
convergence, which posits that, “the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern 
Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take 
over in all modernizing and modern societies”39. The produced reality demonstrated much 
                                                
38 Orlando Cabrales. “Keynote Address,” Proc. Of La Jolla Energy Conference. The Hilton at Torrey 
Pines, La Jolla, California, May 2013. 
 
39 S.N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Deadalus, Volume 129, No. 1, Winter 2000, 3.  
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more divergence, however, as modern societies “refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic 
assumptions of this Western program of modernity,” and “structural differentiation 
developed across a wide range of institutions in most of these societies”40. Classical 
modernization theory was thus discredited and the theory of multiple modernities, or variety 
of modernities came to the fore41. This was an important turn with huge implications in 
development thinking. But what is important to note here, regarding Colombia, is that the 
idealization and manifestation of Eurocentric or Western modernity that initially made up 
classical modernization theory still persists, not least through the neoliberal development 
model, but through other manifestations as well. Thus, in critiquing Colombia’s ‘entrance 
into modernity’- led by industrial hydrocarbon production – it is necessary to bring into the 
conversation critiques of Western or Eurocentric modernity since that is very much the path 
Colombia has embarked on.  
To begin with, Sociologist Anthony Giddens offers a general interpretation of 
modernity as “modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the 
17th century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their 
influence”42. Thus, Modernity is notably a Eurocentric construct in that the very concept is 
based upon a uniquely European experience with European models, understandings, 
knowledges, values, etc.. These experiences, achievements, and lessons from Europe’s own 
development were and continue to be replicated the world over, resting on the assumption 
that the European experience epitomizes the highest level of human social achievement, “as 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
 
41 S.N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Deadalus, Volume 129, No. 1, Winter 2000, 1. 
 
42 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990, 1.  
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if development and democracy are virtues that the West chanced upon first and only”43. 
Vivian Schelling expands on the history and definition of modernity, particularly 20th century 
modernity, as follows: 
“In the form of academic ‘modernization theory’ a narrow, evolutionary 
understanding of the ‘transition to modernity’ in Europe was exported as a model to 
be followed by the ‘developing world’ in order to overcome poverty and reach 
comparable standards of living… [advocating] the transfer of Western technology and 
the dissemination of an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and a scientific-instrumental 
rationality in order to unleash the forces promoting ‘development’”44.  
 
The concept of modernity, then, brings the world into a hierarchical and linear 
progressive order in terms of development – there are those that are modern and those that 
are not, and a clear value judgment is assigned to each. Jan Nederveen Pieterse expands on 
this explaining how “centrism means that, consciously or unconsciously, we measure 
modernity and capitalism in relation to European and western standards and models”45. 
When this modernity yardstick is applied to Latin American or other developing countries an 
image emerges of what Pieterse describes as ‘truncated modernity’ - “a term used to describe 
social conditions in Latin America, [meaning] truncated in size and scope by comparison, to 
modernity in Europe,” highlighting how “other cultures [lack] the European commitment to 
                                                
43 Jan N. Pieterse, “Rethinking Modernity and Capitalism: add context and stir,” Sociopedia Colloquium, 
2014, 2.  
 
44 Vivian Schelling, Through the Kaleidoscope: The Experience of Modernity in Latin America, Verso: UK, 
2000, 6.  
 
45 Jan N. Pieterse, “Rethinking Modernity and Capitalism: add context and stir,” Sociopedia Colloquium, 
2014, 2.   
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enterprise and accumulation”, two of the most central characteristics of European 
modernity46. 
 The elements that Shelling and Pieterse highlight above makeup some of the key 
constituents of a ‘modern’ country – Western technology, the entrepreneurial spirit, 
rationality, enterprise, and accumulation. In the process of ‘entering modernity’ via 
expansion of the hydrocarbons industry, such as in Colombia, these characteristics are 
reflected in institutional structures and laws, though in the process other cultural values tend 
to be pushed aside. In Colombia, modern Western or Eurocentric values and local values are 
in constant tension. This was illustrated in Chapter One’s discussion of the contradictions to 
the ‘success’ narrative highlighting social unrest, and will be further elaborated on in 
subsequent chapters. Suffice to say here, however, in Colombia there is a very tangible 
culture that has developed that does seem to idealize the modern and the Western, reflected 
most evidently in flourishing high-rise cities like Bogota and Medellin where Western dress, 
cafes, and shops are embraced and flaunted; and reflected most subversively in the power 
structures of the hydrocarbons industry and its development projects.  
But Eurocentrism is just one of the many dynamics intrinsic to modernity. Not only is 
modernity Eurocentric in that is acts as a measurement of development by arbitrary European 
standards, but because modernity as a concept came out of Europe it carries with it other 
aspects of the European experience too, such as colonialism. Indeed, when this dynamic 
plays out in actuality this is the point where Eurocentrism takes an ugly turn as alternative 
                                                
46 Jan N. Pieterse, “Rethinking Modernity and Capitalism: add context and stir,” Sociopedia Colloquium, 
2014, 2. 
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values, knowledges, and systems transition from coexisting with the Western, to being 
subjected, disenfranchised, and actively discouraged or mocked.  
Anibal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and Arturo Escobar constitute some of the most 
articulate critics of modernity, particularly within the Latin American context. Quijano was 
the first to radically critique the classical conception of modernity by positioning it within the 
larger framework of what he calls coloniality, or the legacy of colonial power dynamics. For 
Quijano, modernity does not exist on its own, it is very much a product of and embedded 
within the hierarchical colonial power dynamics that persist into the 21st century institutions, 
politics, and social dynamics of Latin America: “Western modernity is inseparable from the 
logic of coloniality; Coloniality is constitutive of modernity – there is no modernity without 
coloniality”47. 
In order to explain how coloniality asserts itself through modernity Quijano 
conceived of the colonial matrix of power, which he describes as “four interrelated domains: 
control of the economy, of authority, of gender and sexuality, and of knowledge and 
subjectivity,” with nature as a potential fifth domain48. These four “interrelated spheres of 
management” are supported by the “two ‘legs’ that is the racial and patriarchal foundation”49.  
 
                                                
47 Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity, Duke University Press: London, 2011, 24.  
 
48 Ibid.  
 
49 Ibid.  
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Figure 5. Patron Colonial de Poder / Colonial Matrix of Power  
 
Source. Based on Quijano & Mignolo, table constructed by author 
 
The table above serves as a visual representation of the Colonial Matrix of Power, 
and illustrates the venues in which colonial power dynamics play out in terms of binaries 
within developing societies. When the qualities listed in the first row gain preeminence and a 
dominant role within a state or society the collective is then considered modern by 
conventional standards. In other words, for a society to consider itself modern and to be 
considered modern it takes on unconsciously prescribed characteristics: those with social 
power are male Caucasians or fairer skinned; the market is efficiently capitalist, which in the 
21st century also requires an intimate linking with the global economy and adherence to 
neoliberal principles; authority is controlled and sanctioned solely by the state; 
heterosexuality is the norm; businesses, government, and society generally follow rational 
logic bolstered by scientific fact, not religious values; and nature is placed within the 
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hierarchy of evolutionary life below and subjected to the will and priorities of mankind.  
  Thus, the Colonial Matrix of Power represents what is modern, but more importantly 
it brings to light what is not, and it is these precise tensions that are exacerbated during 
processes of modernization. Arturo Escobar explains that, “it is impossible to understand 
modernity without taking into account the ‘colonial difference’ or the ‘coloniality of power’ 
that has been its inevitable underside. These concepts point at the double project of cultural 
and economic control of subaltern groups and subaltern knowledge that accompanied the 
implantation of modernity in Latin America from independence until today”50. Thus, the 
power dynamics and binaries outlined above by Quijano allows us to gain a better 
understanding of the tensions that arise in seeking a modern development end, where the 
“picture that emerges then is of a modernity characterized by heterogeneity and tension 
between a vast array of disparate forces”51. 
  In addition to modernity’s Eurocentric and colonial nature, however, there is third 
fundamental characteristic: modernity also implies a strong and efficient economy that 
demonstrates its progress through sustained growth. This perception emerged at the end of 
the Cold War, and solidified the hierarchical classification of economic organization in 
which capitalism came to epitomize modernity, as opposed to Socialism or other forms of 
economic organization which are viewed as backwards, primitive, and un-modern. Pieterse 
alludes to this when he explains how “we measure modernity and capitalism in relation to 
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European and western standards and models”52. Thus modernity has not only become a 
cultural project, but an economic project as well53. If an economy is inefficient and does not 
demonstrate growth, it is considered less modern. The preeminence of the economy as a 
central component of modernity comes from the idealization of Western experiences with 
“three industrial revolutions that have led to the modern economies of the developed world” 
54 – a phenomena that Samuel Huntington described as the Great Divergence and Eric Jones 
referred to as the European Miracle55. 
It is in this sense that Colombia’s ‘success’ narrative bolstered by expansion of the 
hydrocarbons industry can be viewed as in compliance with modernity as understood by 
Mignolo and Quijano. Embracement of the petro-paradigm has one distinct end: to produce 
financial gains and fund the development (broadly understood) of the economy and the 
country. If we recall, it is the growth of the economy that sparked the choir of international 
praise for Colombia in 2012, and what prompted its invitation to join the OECD – considered 
to be by conventional standards a real feather in the cap. What can be additionally 
emphasized in the discussion here, is that throughout Colombia – in both urban Bogota and 
the rural Llanos instead modernity manifesting a ‘cultural project’ separate from an 
‘economic project’, in the 21st century’s modernity economic prosperity has become the 
wide-spread cultural project – ie. knowledge of, employment and success in the economy has 
become the dominant or preferred culture, much as in the United States and Europe, further 
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illustrating the Eurocentricity of Colombia’s ‘entrance into modernity’. This is especially true 
in communities directly impacted by resource extraction where individuals or social groups 
who can work with and benefit from the industry tend to gain more social and political 
power.  
  Moving on, now - there are endless reasons why robust free market Capitalism is an, 
at best, misleading and, at worst, disastrous prescription for attaining modernity and 
development, which has been criticized extensively. But for our purposes suffice to say that 
in seeking to replicate the ‘modern economies of the developed world’ is where developing 
countries get sucked into the allure of economic growth and modernity as the be all and end 
all of development, and end up neglecting other aspects of development, such as quality of 
growth, human capital, and social cohesion. The idea that economic growth will ‘trickle 
down’ and benefit all segments of society relegates social and human development to the 
market, but is ineffective in alleviating inequality, poverty, and general human suffering. 
What is important to note from this discussion is that this same logic, reasoning, and rhetoric 
is universally applied to the hydrocarbons industry, which in Colombia is evidenced by 
President Santos’ description of hydrocarbons as the locomotora minero energética, or 
‘engine of growth’. 
  And herein lies the significance of hydrocarbons. For developing countries seeking to 
expand resource extractive industries, hydrocarbons represent the nexus of economic growth, 
development, and modernity in that hydrocarbons are viewed as one of the most powerful 
tools in fostering economic growth, which in turn spurs development of the country, for the 
attainment of a modern development end. But this recipe (hydrocarbons = economic growth 
= development = modernity) is fraught with pitfalls at every turn. We have already alluded to 
  
37 
some of these dangers - as Pieterse writes, “there is something deceptive about Eurocentric-
as-policy,” which maintains that “Western economic development logic is the route to attain 
the elusive modern state”56. But here we are not so much concerned with focusing on the 
Eurocentricity of development logics, though it is important. Rather, the rest of this paper is 
devoted to bringing to light the profound consequences that oil and gas production carries, 
which are frequently underestimated or overlooked altogether, both in mainstream 
discussions and in academic discourse.  
  As will be seen as we continue the discussion, because of the nature of industrial 
scaled resource extraction, expansion of the hydrocarbons industry further amplifies the 
tensions between dominant systems, groups, and knowledges, and those that are placed into 
subordinate roles – as illustrated in the Colonial Power Matrix. Arturo Escobar explains to us 
that the coloniality inherent within modernity entails “the control not only of resources and 
labour, but of the very cultures and knowledge of the subaltern. Modernity, then, should 
always be understood as a double process of modernity/coloniality… of the simultaneous 
control of labour and culture,” which is exacerbated with resource extraction and 
hydrocarbon production. In fact, gathering from the evidence it is reasonable to say that 
‘modernizing’ societies, in the sense that we have discussed here, that embrace hydrocarbons 
as a means to development and modernity experience intensified social impacts as a result.  
 Activists the world over, who like Quijano, Escobar, and Mignolo, identify extractive 
projects as not only dangerously foreign (ie. Western) and malevolent, are bringing attention 
to the ways in which these power dynamics – specifically the ones outlined in the Colonial 
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Power Matrix – are causing horrific violence, suffering, and injustice in contexts of resource 
extraction. In April of 2015 Latin American Historian Greg Grandin brought attention to the 
increased violence against peasant and environmental activists working against extractive 
projects – “In 2010 the number was 96. In 2011 106. Last year [2014], 116 were murdered 
defending their farms, community, or livelihood in land, logging, dam, or mining disputes 
according to a new report out just in time for Earth Day by Global Witness”57. According to 
the report Brazil and Colombia maintained the highest numbers of people killed – 29 and 25 
respectively - in what is identified as ‘resource wars’58. As such, the discussions surrounding 
modernity and eurocentricity cannot be taken lightly, nor can they remain in the shadows of 
academia. Particularly in the 21st century there are very real consequences to the power 
dynamics outlined in these theories, and as shall be seen, they are frighteningly frequently in 
the Colombian context.  
  These tensions and impacts have been acknowledged, spoken of, and churned over in 
various arenas at various levels and with a multitude of focal points. Sorting out the impacts 
of hydrocarbon production in ‘modernizing’ societies like Colombia is what this paper now 
turns to, and in doing illustrates the multi level and multi dimension challenges confronting 
resource rich developing countries.  
 
 3.2. Critique: Resource Extraction as Development Mechanism, Or Not? 
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Working against Western neo-imperial or neo-colonial international relations after 
WWII a string of countries radically nationalized their extractive industries, particularly 
major oil and gas producing countries, such as Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Nigeria, 
Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, and Russia. The idea was to harness the wealth of natural 
resources from the international market and direct those funds to support development. But 
by the 1990s scholars and researchers began to notice a mostly uniform phenomena: despite 
the vast wealth brought by natural resources “resource-poor economies often vastly 
outperform resource-rich economies in economic growth”59. Put otherwise, countries without 
any natural resources such as Switzerland, and more recently East Asian countries like 
Singapore, Taiwan and Japan, economically eclipse flailing Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, and 
the like. Then in 1993 British economist Richard Auty put forth an idea explaining the 
paradox of resource-rich countries, which he described as a Resource Curse – an idea which 
became the principle theory critiquing resource extraction, and remains so to this day.  
 
3.2.1  Resource Curse Theory  
Auty’s book Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse 
Thesis (1993) draws on evidence from six developing countries suggesting that, “not only 
may countries fail to benefit from a favorable [resource] endowment, they may actually 
preform worse than less-well endowed countries”60. He argues simply that, “unless resource 
rich countries can diversify their economies, they are doomed to suffer boom-bust cycles that 
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are extremely destructive”61. Auty’s work, which examines mineral producers and exporters 
served to supplement a similar study by Gelb (1988), which showed similar results for 
hydrocarbon producers and exporters. But Auty was the first to amalgamate the two and his 
book lays the foundations for Resource Curse Theory further, as he points out the various 
dynamics internal to hydrocarbon and mineral producers that generate stagnant economic 
growth and development.  
One of the primary factors Auty identifies is the entrenchment of rent-seeking 
behaviors, where “powerful vested interests that benefited from the rents (return in excess of 
normal profits)… were created by the protection of more and more industrial sectors from 
international competition”62. Rent-seeking in relation to hydrocarbon or mineral industries 
involves a specific interest group trying to appropriate more wealth from the industry using 
political or social manipulation - legally via lobbying, or illegally via bribery, corruption, or 
smuggling – without increasing actual productivity or generating more wealth63. This is 
where the argument that resource-rich developing countries are more prone to corruption, 
especially in the face of weak regulatory institutions, comes from. In other words, along with 
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significant wealth generation those with social or political clout may attempt to increase their 
‘share of the pie without making the pie bigger’64.  
A second important factor Auty points to in the Resource Curse Theory he describes 
as “the imprudent domestic absorption of mining sector rents,” which renders “agricultural 
and manufacturing activity internationally uncompetitive”65. This idea, referred to as the 
Dutch Disease, emerged in the 1960s and was further developed by Corden and Neary in the 
1980s. The phenomena occurs when an influx of foreign currency, usually from a large 
discovery of natural resources, triggers currency appreciation and makes other sectors like 
agriculture or manufacturing less competitive on the international market. A crisis ensues 
when international prices for primary commodities drops with the dual impacts of 1) 
decreasing government revenue from mining or energy, leaving the country bankrupt or in 
financial crises as other sectors are too weak to carry the country, and 2) impacting 
agricultural or manufacturing workers who may loose their jobs as industries shrink, and 
consumers who are forced to pay more for imported products as opposed to cheaper 
domestically produced products.  
A third component of Resource Curse Theory has to do with the mining sector’s 
“production function… domestic linkages, and deployment of mineral rents”66. Put simply, 
the very nature of extractive industries limits their generative impacts, and thus precludes 
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their ability to spur comprehensive economic growth. In terms of ‘production function’ Auty 
explains that most extractive industries are highly capital intensive and rely on a very select 
group of technically trained professionals, and as such is not an effective mechanism for 
strengthening the national workforce: “mineral production is strongly capital intensive and 
employs a very small fraction of the total national workforce with large inputs of capital from 
foreign sources”67. A related point, domestic or local linkages refers to the fact that extractive 
industries require few local factories to process hydrocarbons prior to export – thus further 
limiting the benefits the industry brings to local communities. The third point regarding the 
deployment of mineral rents pertains to the fact that more often than not extractive industries 
display “low revenue retention since a large portion of export earnings flow immediately 
oversees to service the foreign capital investment”68. As such, extractive industries are also 
detrimental as countries and communities may serve as more of a conduit for capital than an 
actual destination.  
The Resource Curse Theory can be summarized by explaining that extractive 
industries tend to promote corruption or an opaque political-financial environment, weaken 
or push out other sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing, and do not contribute to the 
development of local economies. Cumulatively the Resource Curse Theory is offered as an 
explanation of why resource-rich countries typically preform worse than resource-poor 
countries. 
Auty’s Resource Curse Theory spurred a slew of studies that sought to mostly to 
confirm the existence of a Resource Curse, and resulted in a host of new policy prescriptions 
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for fledgling extractive economies. Renowned economist Jeffery Sachs became one of the 
leading voices supporting Resource Curse Theory, who in subsequent years released a series 
of studies developing the idea of a Resource Curse, and was contracted by development 
institutions to address the myriad of problems wrought by resource endowment.   
In 1997 Sachs and Warner released the results of a cross-country study involving 97 
developing countries that empirically proved Resource Curse Theory by showing “an inverse 
association between natural resource intensity and per-capital growth between 1970 and 
1990” where per capita GDP actually uniformly decreased in extractive economies compared 
to other non-producing developing countries69. It was the most expansive and empirically 
comprehensive study of its kind at the time. With the Resource Curse Theory articulated, 
Sachs’ subsequent work sought to further unbundle how the Resource Curse works and how 
it could be overcome: “What the studies based on the post-war experience have argued is that 
the curse of natural resources is a demonstrable empirical fact... Since so many poorer 
countries still have abundant natural resources, it is important to better understand the roots 
of failure in natural resource-led development”70.  
One of Sachs’ attempts to do this draws on Big Push Theory, which “stresses that 
poor economies need some sort of large demand expansion, to increase the size of the 
market, so that entrepreneurs will find it profitable to incur the fixed costs of 
industrialization. In the big-push logic, “anything that stimulates demand will do, whether a 
large public spending program, foreign aid, discovery of minerals, or a rise in the world price 
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of a natural resource”71. Under this scenario Sachs posits that, “natural resource booms can 
be potentially important catalysts for growth and development”72. He does this by showing 
that some countries experienced positive long-lasting growth rates in terms of GDP per 
capita even after resource booms end, although by and large the opposite occurs: “We show 
that in this setting, natural resource booms can stimulate industrialization, as in the big push 
story”73.  
This proposition reemerged during and after the 2003-2009 commodities super cycle 
– one of the longest in history. The super cycle witnessed oil prices reach record price levels, 
from roughly $25 per barrel in 2000 to $147 in 200874. Since then, commodities prices have 
decreased again, with oil leveling out at roughly $100 between 2010-2014, though still at 
least double the 2000 price averaging $50 in 2015. The high cost of oil led some in the 
development field to reconsider the validity of Resource Curse Theory in the 21st century. 
Raphael Kaplinsky, for example, contends in a 2011 working paper for the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), that sustained higher commodities prices 
may enable low-income resource-dependent countries to overcome the traditional pitfalls 
outlined in the Resource Curse Theory. For example, he notes that, traditionally high 
resource rents during commodity upcycles depresses other industries causing what he refers 
to as a ‘delinking’ of sectors. He argues, however, that if higher prices are sustained, it could 
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theoretically allow for states to ‘re-link’ extractive industries to support other sectors such as 
agricultural and service sectors – which can also flourish given globalization and the 
heightened desire for outsourcing. Kaplinsky writes, “commodity sectors require unique 
inputs and many of these can be used to promote distinct local industrial (and agricultural 
and service) capabilities”75.  
In the case of Colombia, while the country did not benefit from this most recent super 
cycle, as during this period it was still mired in the height of the conflict with the FARC and 
had not yet begun exporting crude at the levels seen today, Colombia is still riding on the 
coat tails of higher oil prices, and even the 2014 price drop is doing little to deter the country 
from further pursuing expansion of the hydrocarbons industry. For example, Colombian 
Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas in a 2015 interview with The Financial Times explains 
that, “We will have to plan for a low price scenario for a while… we are well prepared 
although that does not mean we are absolutely shielded”76. And with growth again projected 
at a near 5% for 4 consecutive years – still twice the regional average - Sñr. Cardenas’ 
optimism may be warranted, pointing to financial boost from annual taxes to be paid out by 
the majority state-owned EcoPetrol, and ongoing peace talks with the FARC which, if a deal 
is reached, could bring the country another $500 million by ending FARC attacks on pipeline 
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that “caused $500m of lost output this year — almost as much as the $550m the government 
estimates has been lost because of lower oil prices”77 
However, even as Colombia appears, at a national level, to be benefiting from the 
super cycle – perhaps validating Kaplinsky’s argument – there are other aspects of Resource 
Curse Theory that Colombia may not be able to overcome. For example, In May of 2012 the 
U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) entered into force, aimed at expanding 
trade between the two countries. With the signing of the agreement 80 percent of duties on 
current U.S. exports to Colombia were eliminated immediately, previously in place to protect 
domestic producers, particularly in agriculture. Indeed evidence that the agricultural sector 
may be contracting is already emerging. As we can see from the graph below, the value-add 
(as a percentage of GDP) of Agriculture in Colombia, although always relatively small, has 
been steadily declining since 2000. In 2000 agriculture represented 8.94% value add of GDP, 
while in 2012 it reached a record low of 6.52%.  
 
Figure 6. Value add (as % of GDP) of Agriculture Sector in Colombia 
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Source. The World Bank 
 
Conversely, if we juxtapose the above agricultural discussion with Colombia’s 
hydrocarbons exports, we can see that the agricultural sector has been progressively 
contracting whilst the hydrocarbons sector has been expanding. In 2006 crude petroleum 
made up only 18.34 percent of Colombia’s total exports. By 2011 that number reached 38 
percent, and in 2013 reached roughly 50 percent of exports78. Further investigation shows 
that the expansion of the hydrocarbons industry, at least in terms of overall exports, has 
coincided with the simultaneous and consistent decline of some of Colombia’s key 
agricultural exports including coffee and sugar between 2006 and 2011. Keeping in mind the 
data listed above, in 2006 coffee represented 5.82 percent of exports, while sugar represented 
2.2 percent of exports. In 2011 coffee represented only 4.64 percent of exports and sugar 
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represented on 1.47 percent79. These data further clarify the central role and dominance of the 
hydrocarbons sector has achieved, and point to evidence of Colombia falling into the dreaded 
resource curse. Thus, even if, as Kaplinsky argues, Colombia is able to boost complimentary 
sectors such as services, the trend seems to be headed more in line with fulfillment of the 
Resource Curse Theory despite the 2003-2009 super cycle and price upswing.  
The resource curse, as such, has proven remarkably difficult to overcome, and there 
would appear to be many more pitfalls than solutions. Since Auty proposed the Resource 
Curse Theory, in fact, there have been far more additions to the theory rather than solutions: 
“Alongside these growth failures are strong associations between resource wealth and the 
likelihood of weak democratic development… corruption… and civil war80…” to name a 
few.  
The question must be posed then, what is it about Resource Curse Theory (and to a 
lesser extent, resource wars/conflict arguments) that has failed to allow for an effective 
solution to the myriad of problems that plague resource-rich countries? Part of the problem is 
that the institutional challenges are structural and deep-seeded where there is often little 
incentive and zero enforcement to tackle things like corruption and violence, which are all 
too frequent characteristics of resource-rich countries, particularly in Africa81. These issues 
often have more to do with transparency and institutional muscle, but there is no magic 
recipe to address these deeply entrenched norms, practices, and structures, and improving 
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regulatory mechanisms in the end is largely the responsibility of those who stand to gain the 
most from inaction. And in the case of Colombia, the financial rewards from the 
hydrocarbons industry provide more incentive for inaction than reform.  
The few theories that do attempt to prescribe solutions to “‘escape’ the resource curse 
include: ‘Publish What You Pay’ (PWYP) and ‘Publish What You Lend’ (PWYL) demands 
to introduce corporate or national social responsibility”82.  Then there are programs and 
processes like, “the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development83, or Extractive 
Industries Review84, or the ongoing Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)”85. 
But these initiatives have been ineffective in eliminating the discrepancy between resource-
rich countries that ‘underperform’ when compared to resource-poor countries because they 
“imagine an impracticable self regulation to improve the existing social mess” and thus have 
had “little impact on the operation style or corporate culture of individual mining 
companies”86.  
Now, to step back a moment. If we consider Kaplinsky’s theory of redirecting 
financial resources gained from the hydrocarbons industry to support job growth in sectors 
in-need, this can perhaps be done more or less at a strictly national level, and a government 
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presence wouldn’t (presumably) be entirely necessary as market prices would in conjunction 
with directing financial resources to the appropriate areas could be done from afar. However, 
this proposition presupposes two important factors: the first being that volatile international 
oil prices remain higher than the historical average, and two transparency and good 
governance at a local level – both of which are generally unreliable, yet the second of which 
is most important in considering the initiatives listed in the paragraph above as well.  
While Kaplinsky’s theory to escape the resource curse requires transparency and 
good governance from the government, initiatives such as PWP and EITI require 
transparency, good governance, and presence not only from governments but from extraction 
companies as well. This challenge not only requires  a degree ‘self-regulation’ on the part of 
both entities, but it also requires the physical presence and watchful eye of the government, 
which in Colombia are also both monumental challenges.  
Colombia is one of the geographically larger countries on the South American 
continent and government presence is primarily limited to the larger cities, where as in rural 
areas the government is more or less absent. Colombia’s geography further compounds this 
issue: the northern and western regions where most major cities are located are, for all 
intensive purposes, completely disconnected from the southern regions – cut off by three 
enormous offshoots from the Andes Mountain Range. Again, because of the physicality of 
the hydrocarbons industry, which is spread throughout the entirety of the country, these 
protective initiatives meant to guard against aspects of the Resource Curse prove difficult to 
execute, track and, enforce without governmental institutions more aptly spread throughout 
the country.  
  
51 
But there is another explanation as to why Resource Curse Theory hasn’t successfully 
been able to address the problems that plague resource-rich countries. Much of the proposed 
solutions discussed above exemplify a characteristic of RTC that I argue fundamentally 
inhibits its ability to substantially address theses issues. And that is because, at its core, 
Resource Curse Theory is inherently economically and institutionally focused at a national 
level, when many of the critical components also take place at a very local and individual 
level. For example, in enforcing PWP or EITI a crucial element is human relationships, 
without which leave the initiatives as substantive frameworks. Similarly, expanding the 
transparent regulatory eye of government to areas where extractive companies operate is just 
as essential. After exploring the hydrocarbons industry both at an institutional level and at a 
local level throughout Colombia, it is clear Resource Curse Theory’s lack of emphasis on the 
practicalities and localized logistics of executing these plans substantially limits the theory 
because it overlooks the human element from the development conversation.  
Now, the Resource Curse Theory is important because it identifies significant barriers 
to holistic development in extractive economies that, although difficult, must be addressed. 
But the institutional blockades are only half the story and it is equally important to note the 
deficiencies of the theory: chief among them that the Resource Curse Theory still tends to 
emphasize macroeconomic and national leveled institutional programs at the helm of 
development when time and again it has proven its inability to manage the localized nuances 
of industrial scaled resource extraction and development.  
 
3.2.2.  Deficiencies of Resource Curse Theory 
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In this way Resource Curse Theory can be considered a product of the modern 
development program discussed earlier. The evidence is in the language. As discussed 
earlier, Resource Curse Theory places great importance on economic management as a 
means of addressing problems like corruption, transparency, and other more complex 
problems that arise as a result of resource extraction, however it overlooks entire dimensions 
necessary to the development conversation. The Dutch Disease is an example of this – the 
concern that extractive industries diminish the strength and size of agricultural or 
manufacturing sectors. Now, of course there is a human element to this scenario, ie. if the 
agriculture industry shrinks farm workers loose their jobs and livelihoods. But under 
Resource Curse Theory the human concern remains in the background, and is a secondary 
consideration in comparison to economic concerns – the human element simply isn’t 
discussed. Thus, at best, Resource Curse Theory is inadequate because of a benign mis-
emphasis. 
However, at worst, Resource Curse Theory could also be considered malevolently 
inadequate if one interprets this mis-emphasis as for the explicit benefit of financial and 
economic stability, and those who directly benefit from such – such as government officials, 
and extractive companies. Proponents of this perspective argue that it would be naïve to 
argue that the economic focus of the Resource Curse Theory has been for the betterment of 
the human population because economic development from resource extraction has clearly 
and consistently had profoundly negative impacts on populations throughout the world. 
According to this interpretation, Resource Curse Theory aligns itself with modernity’s 
prioritization of and obsession with economic efficiency and growth, and as such produces 
the same deficiencies, shortcomings, and negative by products as neoliberalism.  
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   Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt maintains this exact criticism, and much more87, in her article 
“‘May God Give Us Chaos, So That We Can Plunder,” when she writes that “Above all, the 
theories, based upon multiple regression techniques using macro-level data on a global or 
national scale, tend to be used in unqualified ways to [view or assess impacts in a] local 
context”88. In other words, for Resource Curse theorists, it is institutional quality that 
determines the success of natural resource extraction - but “the inherent malevolent nature of 
resource extraction itself” is not discussed, and the authority or “legitimacy of the system of 
resource governance”89 – which we can view as embodying aspects of Quijano’s Colonial 
Power Matrix - remains wholly unquestioned.  
Instead, Lahiri-Dutt explains that: 
“The predominant framework used to explain these conflicts over natural 
resources… propose further prescriptive measures that consolidate the unequal and 
unjust control of mineral resources by corporations and state. These measures fail to 
adjust the existing inequalities in the current ‘governance’ of resources. They do not 
change the transfer of wealth away from the communities and do not ameliorate the 
policy frameworks or reallocate decision-making power. They invite specialists from 
                                                
87 “These theories around natural resources indirectly perpetrate a picture of complete lack of control and 
disorder in the Third World, whose inhabitants, by some irrational logic of nature, have found themselves 
endowed with resources that they cannot or do not know how to deal with in an orderly manner. They envisage 
a paranoid fear about the unruly Third World, a landscape of apprehension, risk and insecurity where conflicts 
could only be resolved for one and all if either state-owned or multinational corporations take over the control 
and ownership of mineral resources, and manage them in a systematic manner, in the process putting their 
profits first and taking over the control of what should rightfully belong to the communities” (Ibid).  
 
88 Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, “May God Give Us Chaos, So That We Can Plunder: A critique of resource curse 
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outside to hand out conflict resolution policies, and propose Corporate Social 
Responsibilities that are rarely heeded”90. 
 
What Resource Curse Theory overlooks specifically is that while a well managed and 
balanced economy that fosters economic growth is important, it is for naught if the nuanced 
structural impacts of industrial scaled resource extraction are not critiqued and managed at a 
local level: “Resource Curse Theory’s sole focus on macroeconomic indicators limits the 
discourse to macroeconomic solutions” – completely disregarding the challenges that local 
populations are faced with91.  
  The problem here, which this thesis is in agreement with, is that Resource Curse 
Theory fundamentally views natural resource extraction from a modern Eurocentric 
development perspective – that is nature is to be used efficiently for the benefit of the human 
population in the form of economic growth and modern development. At its very core, 
Resource Curse Theory does not depart from or critique the means of modern development. 
Instead it retains is macro lens that rationally prioritizes the growth and development of the 
whole as opposed to incorporating the people and communities ‘on the edge of development’ 
who exist on the periphery of the modern, and who in the context of hydrocarbon expansion 
are swept up in a series of profound and deeply structural changes that Resource Curse 
Theory overlooks. These changes brought by hydrocarbons industries often embody the 
tensions found in the Colonial Power Matrix between dominant and subordinated groups, 
systems, and knowledges. If these fundamental challenges are not brought into the discussion 
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and the modern development objective that accepts or enhances these tensions is not called 
into question, the negative consequences of resource extraction will continue to reek havoc 
on both national government and local communities alike.  
  Because of this, Resource Curse Theory has resulted in a profound lack of substantive 
research documenting the real, comprehensive, and often hidden impacts resource extraction 
levies on communities. Now, this is not to say that Resource Curse Theory should be thrown 
out altogether; on the contrary there are important structural problems that Resource Curse 
Theory brings to the fore, but it is only a fraction of the battle and thus requires the 
incorporation of additional frameworks for understanding the variety and depth of impacts 
that resource extraction imposes – and only then can compressive solutions be brought to 
light and implemented.  
Here we have critiqued both traditional modernity and resource extraction as 
interpreted by Resource Curse Theory. These development prescriptions are problematic 
however, because they perpetuate a Eurocentric vision of the world as compartmental: nature 
is separate from man, is separate from politics etc, and there is a hierarchical order in which 
the aspects of life naturally fall into. In order to move past this world view, it is necessary to 
incorporate a new framework for understanding the impacts of resource extraction. By 
making evident the real impacts of resource extraction at a local level the true challenges the 
industry and modernity poses can be addressed.   
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3.3. Political Ecology: A New Framework for Understanding Resource Extraction   
 To begin thinking about a new framework for understanding the negative consequences 
of resource extraction we need to also rethink the nature and dynamics of resource extraction 
beyond the dominant economic paradigm inherent in Resource Curse Theory, that simply 
replicates the modern development prescription. And in doing so the real impacts of resource 
extraction can be illuminated and more accurate solutions to the social ills that plague 
resource extractive communities can be conceived and realized. 
 
3.3.1. Rethinking the Dynamics of Hydrocarbon Production  
 First and foremost, it is important to recognize that the reality of resource extraction is 
one fundamentally “characterized by multiple actors with their multiple voices”92. It is not 
just the state that (typically) manages industrial scaled resource extraction, and it is not just 
the domestic and multinational oil and gas companies that come in to operate – there are also 
families that become employed by the companies, and those that do not; there are migrants 
who come seeking work who bring their entire families; there is the local government; there 
are local shop owners and entrepreneurs; there are historically disadvantaged groups, which 
in Colombia takes the form of indigenous and Afro-Caribbean communities; and there are 
armed actors as well, such as private security forces, paramilitaries, and guerillas.  
 At the local level all of these groups have important roles to play and are impacted in 
some way during the socio-structural reorganization that communities endure with the arrival 
of hydrocarbons industries. Thus, what is required in order to fully understand the dynamics 
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at play and how resource extractions impacts communities is a new framework that focuses 
on and recognizes these multiple actors, and actually listens to their voices, asking questions 
like “who benefits from… resource development and who pays what cost?”93.  
Secondly, and not unrelated, the ways in which the industry structurally shapes 
societies is a direct result of the physicality of natural resources and extraction: “the subsoil 
offers an interesting perspective on the notions of levels, boundaries, and the consequences 
for nature-society when materials cross these boundaries. To speak of the ‘subsoil’ or 
‘subsurface’, by definition, invokes the existence of a boundary defined by the surface of the 
Earth”94. Natural resources are absolutely physical and thus deeply intertwined “in the 
materiality of every day life”95. It is thus critical to understand the venues and ways in which 
“these minerals and hydrocarbons couple with human practices”96. 
Our environments are defined by natural resources, and thus provide an economic 
foundation for communities; this in turn shapes familial and social relations – who works, 
and for how long, and in what capacity. And cumulatively these factors shape both collective 
and individual identities. As such, any physical change to the environment as a result of 
natural resource extraction necessarily and absolutely alters the entire fabric of communal 
life as well, culturally, socially, politically, economically, etc. 
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94 Anthony Bebbington and Jeffery Bury, Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Oil, Mining, and Gas 
in Latin America, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013, 8.  
 
95 Karen Bakker and Gavin Bridge, “Material worlds? Resource geographies and the ‘matter of nature’,” 
Progress in Human Geography, Volume 30, No. 1, February 2006, 1.   
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  This physicality of natural resources also immediately brings into question a very 
rigid authoritarian dynamic, especially when it comes to extraction or control of these 
resources. While Jacques Derrida did not frequently comment on natural resources, he does 
highlight the physical significance of and challenges posed by natural resources when he 
explains that:  
“If oil reserves remain among the rare territories left, among the last non-
virtualizable terrestrial places, one can simply secure the rights to lay down a 
pipeline… [because] the whole techno industrial structure of hegemonic countries 
depend on these resources, so that, however, complex and undetermined it may be, 
the possibility of everything… remains anchored, so to speak, in these non-
replaceable places, these non-deterriritorializable territories. These territories 
continue to belong, by law, in the still solid tradition of international law, to sovereign 
states”97.  
 
Because of the physicality of natural resources, and their inability to be ‘virtualizable’, 
their highly valued presence becomes easily intertwined with issues of authority and 
securitization. The state, thus, enters as an important actor of particular significance as 
subsoil rights are by and large maintained solely by state actors: “The coupling of subsoil 
resources and notions of sovereignty and nation also means that the state and extraction are 
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intimately bundled together,” and it plays an “important role in determining patters of access 
and control” by delineating spaces and places of enclosure and exclusion98.  
On the most basic level the physicality of natural resources and the state’s 
involvement in terms of authority puts it in place of “primary competitive logic in extractive 
industries,” that has the immediate effect of cordoning off “many surface resources that are 
of an equally elemental nature for preexisting livelihoods and sources of well-being among 
those people who lived in or from the same territories”99. In more extreme cases the state’s 
authority over natural resources and extractive rights is translated via violent crackdowns 
against protestors, forced displacement, or assassinations of union activists.  
Regardless, these characteristics of natural resources as involving multiple actors and 
defined by physicality, are critical to understand the layered, expansive, and generative 
impacts that resource extraction levies on local communities. To further understand how 
these characteristics play out in terms of impacts we now turn to the field of Political 
Ecology, in order to explore ‘how the subsoil enters the political economy,’ effects societies, 
and enters the social. 
 
3.3.2. The Political Ecology of Resource Extraction 
 Given these characteristics of natural resources and extraction, outlined above as 
multi-faceted and constrained by physicality, the oft neglected and diverse field of Political 
Ecology provides an ideal framework to understand the complex impacts of resource 
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extraction, which moves well beyond the limits posed by Resource Curse Theory and 
‘resource war’ arguments. It is to this point the discussion now turns.  
In Political Ecology: An Introduction Paul Robbins condenses the field into an easily 
understood arena – explaining how Political Ecology at its core is a field “of critical research 
predicated on the assumption that any tug on the strands of the global web of human-
environment linkages reverberates throughout the system as a whole”100. Political Ecology 
thus seeks to “query the relationship between economics, politics, and nature” with a special 
emphasis on “the condition of the environment and the people who live or work within it” 
and the power relations between them – “with an understanding that there are better, less 
coercive, less exploitative, and more sustainable ways of doing things”101.  
Furthermore, there are three foundational beliefs within Political Ecology that are 
widely accepted, which makes the field an ideal framework for understanding the intricacies 
of natural resource extraction. These foundational beliefs include the acceptance that: 
“costs and benefits associated with environmental change are for the most part 
distributed among actors unequally…  
[which inevitably] reinforces or reduces existing social and economic 
inequalities…  
[which holds] political implications in terms of the altered power of actors in 
relation to other actors”102 
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And while Political Ecology is inclusive of a vast array of issues ranging from 
“starvation, soil erosion, landlessness, biodiversity decline, [and] human health crisis” its 
focus throughout these issues remains dedicated to explicating “the more general pernicious 
conditions where social actors exploit other people and environments for limited gain at 
collective cost”103.  
 This last point is precisely the reason why Political Ecology offers an ideal 
framework for analyzing the impacts of natural resource extraction broadly defined, though 
“the topic has, until very recently, remained relatively marginal to the wider political 
ecological enterprise”104. In fact, “the subsoil has remained fairly hidden from view” and it 
does not the appear in the main Political Ecology texts. 
 The most pioneering work utilizing a political ecology framework to understand the 
impacts of resource extraction, particularly in Latin America, comes from Professor of 
Geography at Clark University, Anthony Bebbington, who’s two most recent books - Social 
Conflict, Economic Development, and Extractive Industry: Evidence from South America 
(2012), and Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin 
America (2014), offer significant new evidence and discussions on this topic.   
 Bebbington’s Social Conflict, Economic Development, and Extractive Industry 
constituted the very beginning of natural resources’ comprehensive integration into Political 
Economy. While it is meant to offer an analysis of social movements related to privatization, 
monopolization, and extraction of natural resources in Andean Latin America, the book gets 
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at something even more important: the collection of essays proffers a radically new 
interpretation of resource related conflicts and their causes. Bebbington demonstrates that 
social conflicts related to resource extraction, specifically in Andean Latin America, are 
rather a response to a series of profound social reorganizations. 
From Bebbington’s compilation: 
“We can surmise that oil production has generative impacts and that in addition to 
the well-known economic and environmental consequences of resource extraction, 
there are also social consequences that are embodied by socio-structural shifts in land 
use, labor, and social relations. Furthermore, resource extraction often leaves 
footprints on individual and community consciousness that are not easily erased and 
become deeply embedded over time. Patterns of distrust emerge and are awakened 
during social movements”105. 
 
A number of essays included in Bebbington’s Social Conflicts compilation, as well as the 
2013 Subterranean Struggles compilation demonstrate the various ways in which resource 
extraction transforms lives and livelihoods. Javier Arellano Yanguas offers a good example 
of how the impacts of resource extraction can be viewed through a political ecology lens – in 
terms of land use, labor, and social relations - in his discussion of the Rio Blanco copper 
project in Pirua, Peru between 2002-2009.  
 
3.3.3.  The Applicability and Inclusivity of a Political Ecology Framework:  
                                                
105 Anthony Bebbington, Social Conflict, Economic Development, and Extractive Industry: Evidence from 
South America, USA: Routledge, 2012, 4. 
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Understanding the Impacts of Resource Extraction Through Land Use, Labor, and Social 
Relations 
The project involved a concession of 16,000 acres (or 25 square mile) for copper 
production, and promised to bring an extra $1 billion in revenue to the government. 
Communities in the local area, however, voted unanimously against the project and protested 
the government’s insistence that the project go through.  Protests erupted in 2004 and 2005, 
in which two people were killed.  
Arellano-Yanguas explains to us that community concerns centered around the 
implications of what we can identify as a transition to an extractive industry – again 
involving shifts in land use, labor and social relations.  
In terms of land use and labor, the Rio Blanco project would “significantly change the 
entire department from one primarily oriented to farming, to an industrialized mining 
region,” according to a report released by Oxfam106. This restructuring could mean an 
inability to continue life based on farming, more dependence on imported goods, and forced 
migration in search of adequate labor. All of these have a direct impact on local communities 
and individuals, and because of the immediate changes in lifestyle it produces, were voiced 
as primary concerns by local communities.  
In terms of a restructuring of social relations, socio-structural shifts are illustrated by 
the move of governments to establish agreements with companies over citizens, leading to a 
complete restructuring of social relationships and expectations. Arellano-Yanguas explains 
how, “people feel that the presence of powerful mining companies erodes their capacity to 
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control the local institutions that have traditionally provide them with stability and 
protection”107. He continues, noting that, “The [Peruvian] state is generally eager to promote 
investment and is therefor reluctant to enforce regulations that can upset the companies…” 
while the “coexistence of conflicting roles within the [Ministry of Energy and Mining] 
arouses the populations suspicions of government deceit and collusion with company 
interests”108. 
Arellano-Yanguas’ discussion draws on two underlying socio-structural shifts: (1) the 
deterioration of a ‘social contract’ between local communities and the government, but also 
(2) emergence of patterns of distrust that contribute to the deterioration of this relationship 
through a perceived lack of concern of the state towards localities.  
 In this way, viewing the impacts of natural resource extraction through a political 
ecology lens in terms of shifts in land use, labor, and social relations allows us to analyze the 
specific changes communities endure, and further our understanding of community 
grievances beyond simplistic environmental or economic explanations.  
 But there are additional benefits to viewing impacts through this lens, in that it allows 
for a wider range of impacts to be incorporated, including psychological or psycho-social 
shifts. For example, though their analyses are traditionally limited to anthropology, Michael 
Taussig’s work in Colombia and June Nash’s in Bolivia become easily understood and 
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incorporated as by-products of resource extraction when viewed from the political ecological 
lens discussed above.  
In We East the Mines and the Mines Eat Us, Nash tells how underground mine 
workers “related to the devil figure, El Tio, giving him offerings to protect their safety and 
ensure their productivity,” while Michael Taussig in The Devil and Commodity Fetishism 
later discussed how this idiom in Colombia “reflected the belief that some workers had 
entered into pacts with the devil, trading wages on earth for an early death, but also and more 
significantly, a recognition among miners and cane cutters that while capitalism might appear 
to produce value, in reality it consumes life and environment and produces poverty”109.   
Incorporating psycho-social dimensions into interpretations of the impacts of resource 
extraction thus offers a more complete portrait of the struggles and deeply personal, but 
silent, changes that some communities experience. 
And although Taussig’s and Nash’s observations are four decades old they remain 
relevant for contemporary discussions of extraction. As Bebbington writes:  
“Extraction’s association with such unprecedented transformations of landscape, 
labor, and social relations should make it unsurprising that it also comes associated 
with cultural idioms that seek to make sense of such transformations in terms of 
hidden bargains and pacts with higher powers. Indeed, beliefs and suspicions about 
such pacts, be they with devils or presidents, are common in areas affected by 
extraction and can have both political consequences and cultural significances that 
become part of every day language and meaning making”110.  
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In countries that are rapidly expanding hydrocarbon production, like Colombia, we can 
expect that the radical remaking of land use, labor, and social relations occurs both in 
communities mobilized against resource extraction, and those that are not. Bebbington 
continues, noting how: 
“Many dimensions of struggle become routinized in every day life; these are not 
just the dramatic armed and organized struggles… but also the mundane but painful 
everyday calculations…. Which seep into all aspects of life… These hidden costs of 
extraction never find their ways into environment and social impact assessments, yet 
are arguably one of the most permanent and irreversible consequences of the irruption 
of extraction into local societies  
The environmental and social consequences of the most recent round of large-
scale extractive operations are of such magnitude that they involve struggles over the 
very existence of landscapes imbued with cultural meaning, quality of life for large 
populations, and entire livelihood systems”111. 
  
It is this political ecological framework focusing on land use, labor, and social relations 
that allows for a clear and critical analysis of various resource extractive contexts. Utilizing 
this framework to understand the deeply embedded and often silent impacts resource 
extraction imposes on communities not only sheds light on important new dynamics of 
resource extraction, but enables critics of resource extraction to unite the experiences of 
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different communities under a common theme. This is much needed as current research 
related to the impacts of resource extraction are incredibly disconnected and uncoordinated, 
making it difficult to gather substantive thematic evidence. But more importantly, uniting 
these experiences under a common framework brings the experiences of silent communities 
to the fore and joins the experiences of different communities across cultures and regions112. 
 
 
3.3.4.  Conclusion 
 Using a Political Ecological framework in terms of land use, labor, and social 
relations in order to better understand the real impacts of resource extraction moves well 
beyond the limits posed by Resource Curse Theory and gets at the heart of the structural 
challenges posed by the move to modernity – which can be understood using Quijano’s 
Colonial Power Matrix.  
 In rapidly modernizing societies, and in particular those that seek to use hydrocarbon 
expansion as a means to attain the modern development end, communities are fundamentally 
altered. The influx of capital into local economies triggers a complete social reorganization 
that reorders social actors and environments into a hierarchical structure: “While the subsoil 
is endogenous to capitalist transformation in general, the types of transformation in which is 
it complicit evidently vary at a national and subnational level”113. The dynamics and tensions 
in the Colonial Power Matrix are compounded in extractive communities, and the arenas of 
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land use labor and social relations get reorganized to mirror the hierarchy under the colonial 
power matrix. By applying a lens that focuses on shifts in land use, labor, and social relations 
it is possible to incorporate all of these changes – physical, economic, cultural, psychological 
etc., and understand how individuals and communities interpret and live with these 
transformations.  
 Now, the following section has two goals: first and foremost, to bring to the fore the 
voices of Colombians impacted by hydrocarbon expansion. Until now, this thesis has focused 
largely on theory and the national-level narrative, however the ultimate goal of this thesis is 
to reframe the debate over Colombia’s natural resource extraction from the vantage of local 
communities who endure the silent but monumental life changes as a result of the industry. 
The second goal of this thesis seeks to show the applicability of the Political Ecology 
framework by applying it to the local narrative. Through this, we can 1) elucidate the real 
social impacts of resource extraction involving land use, labor, and social relations to 
demonstrate the deeply structural changes communities undergo 2) connect the Colombian 
experience with hydrocarbon expansion, which is relatively new, to the experiences of other 
Latin American communities impacted similarly, and 3) begin to shift some of the focus 
away from Colombia’s conflict with the FARC, to an area that will likely characterize 
conflict in 21st century: that of resource extraction – in particular, hydrocarbons.  
 It is also important to highlight the value the Colombian experience brings to the 
wider discussion regarding resource extraction. As previously mentioned, Colombia’s 
aperatura economica does not displace the conflict of the past century; rather the aperatura 
inserted itself within the larger paradigm of political conflict, at times even exacerbating 
these tensions. Oil and gas companies coming into the country, for example, entered in on the 
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side of the state and thus immediately became embedded in the conflict - which persists into 
the present time period, though it takes different forms given the emergence of the BACRIM. 
As Vasquez explains, the underlying dynamics of conflict, particularly around oil and gas, 
are “old, unresolved grievances… [which] if not addressed properly and in a timely 
fashion… can have regional – and sometimes even nationwide – impacts”114.  
 The connection between violence and resource extraction, however, is a phenomena 
that stretches far beyond the Colombian border. As Resource Curse Theory highlights, 
resource extraction is often accompanied by increased conflict – such as the more extreme 
case of Nigeria and Iraq, but also the less audible cases of Chad, Mozambique, Indonesia, 
Peru, Nicaragua and more. Because of Colombia’s long-standing and deeply embedded 
conflict, and resource extraction’s subsequent embedded-ness within this paradigm, the 
Colombian experience and the analysis that follows hint at important implications for 
extractive countries the world over, particularly related to managing the wide-ranging 
structural impacts resource extraction brings with it. While the influx of wealth from the 
industry’s expansion benefits the Colombian economy in the aggregate, there is another story 
to be told. 
 Thus, to begin understanding the real social impacts that Colombian communities – 
indigenous, farmers, women, and children alike – have experienced since the arrival of the 
industry at the turn of the 21st century, this paper now turns to give a history of Colombia 
emphasizing patterns of ideological violence and economic conflicts. Without understanding 
the long history of ideological violence interwoven with economic conflict, the dynamics of  
the hydrocarbons industry in the present day appear as isolated and relatively insignificant. 
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However, taken together with Colombia’s long-standing engagement with modernity and 
neoliberalism in its most violent form, one begins to understand the weight that the 
hydrocarbons industry has brought with it to peoples’ lives. Indeed, as Bebbington discusses 
above “resource extraction often leaves footprints on individual and community 
consciousness that are not easily erased and become deeply embedded over time. Patterns of 
distrust emerge and are awakened during social movements” 115. What he speaks to here is a 
type of historical trauma, and the same phenomena can be said of Colombia’s 50 year 
conflict with the FARC, which was (or is) so deeply entrenched in the Colombian identity 
that any further conflict or injustice made to already historically impacted peoples cannot be 
viewed as separate from their present day experiences. For most peoples, and indeed 
everyone was impacted in one way or another, the social ills produced by resource extraction 
are not even viewed as completely separate from the conflict – many view it as a type of 
continuation. It is for these reasons that this paper now turns to shed light on the plight of the 
Colombian peoples by bringing to the fore a history in relation to ideological violence, 
economic conflict, and resource extraction. 
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IV. Chapter 4: A Brief Contemporary History of Colombia’s Experiences with 
Politics, Economics, Violence, and Resource Extraction 
 
In order to provide a comprehensive portrait of Colombia’s development in the 21st 
century it is necessary to address several important characteristics of Colombian history, as 
well as the politics, economics, and structure of the oil industry. A discussion of this sort not 
only highlights some of the most pressing aspects of present day developing Colombia, but 
also allows for a better understanding of the true impacts of resource extraction to be 
discussed shortly.  
The first aspect that must be addressed is Colombia’s fifty-year conflict with the 
FARC. Although relative peace has been established since peace talks began between the 
Santos administration and the FARC in 2012, the continuities and legacies of violence 
remain a daily factor in the lives of millions of Colombians, particularly those experiencing 
conflicts now with oil development projects, which has the effect of compounding suffering 
over time. It is a factor that cannot be extracted from any legitimate discussion of 
contemporary Colombia.  
The second aspect that will be addressed is the political and economic structure of the 
oil industry itself. While this may appear to be an irrelevant topic, indeed it is not. Several 
restructurings of the oil industry from 2002 onward have had a direct impact on the number 
and rate of extractive activities in the country, as well as the nature of the relationship 
between the government, companies, and local communities.  
These two aspects of Colombia are, furthermore, far from mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
as it shall be seen, the economic characteristics and motivations that have taken hold in 21st 
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century Colombia are actually a modern day branch of the continuities of partisan conflict 
and violence that characterized Colombia’s modern history. In short, the neoliberal economic 
reforms and ideology that allowed Colombia to expand its hydrocarbons industry in the first 
place represents the continuities of decades of deeply entrenched partisan conflict. This 
connection, to be discussed below, will shed a new understanding on the types of conflicts 
that emerge from resource extractive projects. It is to these two points that this thesis now 
turns to.  
 
4.1. Laying the Groundwork for Development: Continuities of Conflict and la Aperatura 
Economica  
For fifty years Colombia’s foreign and domestic policies were constrained and 
dominated by the government’s conflict with the most powerful left wing guerilla 
organization Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Colombia’s current 
entrance into modernity, characterized by a reduction of violence and high growth rates, was 
not achieved overnight but was instead the result of a contentious military offensive against 
the FARC that laid the ground work the present day aperatura economica [economic 
opening] of the hydrocarbons industry and the country’s ‘entrance into modernity’. As will 
be demonstrated this was achieved via an aggressive military offensive that attempted to 
eradicate left wing guerillas and clear Colombian territory for oil exploration and production.  
While the controversial tactics involved in the military offensive, referred to as Plan 
Colombia, against the FARC are by no means acceptable or condonable, it is impossible to 
disregard the centrality of the offensive in the development of the country as a whole – both 
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materially and psychologically; it is fundamental a component that in 2013 led Colombia to 
become the darling of Latin America.  
The objective here is to provide background and context to Colombia’s development 
in the 21st century, but there are several important points to note within this discussion. 
Firstly, this chapter aims to give an overview of the military offensive, highlighting in 
particular how it can, in retrospect, be viewed as a necessary prerequisite that laid the 
groundwork for the development and growth of hydrocarbons industry, and the country as a 
whole. Secondly, this discussion brings attention to the ways in which the aperatura 
economica, development, and ‘entrance into modernity’ are, and likely far into the future will 
remain, deeply embedded in Colombia’s persistent internal conflict.  Indeed, Colombia’s 
history of conflict is inseparable from its present day development. 
 
4.1.1  Continuities of Partisan Conflict 
Since Colombia’s independence in 1819 and the formation of what was then referred 
to as New Granada or Gran Colombia116, the country has experienced successive waves of 
violence deeply rooted in a clash between Conservative and Liberal ideology; historians 
Michael LaRosa and Germán Mejía write, “The First Republic was, at its very inception, 
divided against itself”117. Roughly from 1810 until the present time period Colombia has 
undergone at least 12 distinct periods of sustained conflict, including a number of civil wars 
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throughout the 19th century stemming directly from partisan strife. Many of the conflicts, 
however, during the 19th century were confined to the major cities and political ideologues.  
In the 20th century, however, clashes took on notable undertones of class conflict. By 
1928, after thirty years of conservative centralist rule that opened the country to foreign 
investment, low-wage agricultural workers became “fed up with abusive treatment by foreign 
management, payment in meaningless company scrip, and the subhuman living conditions 
that contrasted so glaringly with the palatial luxury in which the foreign lived”118. In the years 
following, these sentiments extended beyond the urban poor to rural farmers who, due to the 
far-reaching impacts of the Great Depression, saw the crumbling of the coffee market along 
with their livelihoods. The disaffection that emerged among the rural and urban poor can in 
some ways be viewed as a turning point that foretells the emergence of the organized 
resistance that manifested in the 1960s onward with the FARC and ELN (Ejercito Liberacion 
Nacional).  
Previous to the emergence of these groups, however, a period of perpetual 
‘undisciplined’ violence emerged between Liberals and Conservatives throughout the 
country, sweeping up farmers, large-landholders, the poor, and the wealthy into violent 
conflict. With large swaths of the urban and rural poor now acutely aware of the sharp 
division between their own circumstances and the very wealthy, identification with political 
ideologies became widespread and solidified throughout the country. Catherine LeGrand 
writes of this phenomenon, “The political parties were the first supra-local institution which 
the people identified [with]” before the state, and as such political affiliations “became 
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primary, almost hereditary loyalties”119.  As a result many took up arms inspired by the 
Bolshevik and Cuban revolutions, resulting in the fourteen-year period between 1946-1960 
known as la violencia.  
Thus, these deep seeded loyalties produced particularly horrific violence. LaRosa 
describes la violencia as follows: “vengeance killings, cattle theft, and long-standing familial 
and territorial disputes came to define the reality for cast segments of Andean, rural 
Colombia … The violence demonstrated a severe disconnect between urban and rural 
Colombians and between the wealthy and the poor, highlighting the dangers of demonization 
of political adversaries… They destroyed their enemies, their neighbors, through visceral, 
brutal violence, and it took years for the nation’s decision makers to take note and to develop 
a plan of action to stop the violence”120. To add fuel to the fire, throughout this period both 
the Conservative and Liberal parties funded and armed peasant groups to form paramilitaries 
and guerillas, respectively, who would carry out the orders of those in control. Over this 
fourteen-year period at least 250,000 people were killed from every strata of Colombian 
society.  
The transition from la violencia to the emergence of the guerilla warfare that we 
recognize today maintains some degree of historical continuity. LeGrand explains how the 
guerillas and paramilitaries of today emerged:  
“the guerrillas that challenged the political monopoly of Liberals and 
Conservatives emerged directly out of the armed groups of the preceding decade…. 
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from the Colombian Communist Party and radical Liberalism at the end of the first 
violencia… The FARC guerrilla movement originated in these colonization 
movements, and [the] settlement areas of the late violencia became FARC's local 
power bases”121. 
Thus, the present day conflict can be understood as the organization of la violencia 
participants into politically minded factions inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
motivated by the Colombian government’s exclusionary politics and lack of care for the 
people.  
Figure 7. FARC Membership Estimates, 1982-2011 
   
Source: The Council on Foreign Relations, The Economics, The Center for Defense 
Information and the Washington Post (Compiled by Author) 
 
But more importantly, the successful organization, expansion, and strengthening of 
guerilla and paramilitary movements represents the realization of a ‘dangerous precedent’ 
that the preceding century set in place – that political “disagreements would be settled 
through violence – massive violence – rather than through negotiated settlement”; and it 
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marks an acceptance of an ‘unfortunate paradigm’ where political exclusion is almost 
certainly a catalyst for armed conflict122. This is in part due to the long history of violent 
conflict rooted in partisan strife, but it is also due to the consolidation of the Colombian state 
as distinctly conservative and unrelentingly at odds with the radical liberal ideology of the 
FARC or even progressive Liberals.  
 
4.1.2. Plan Colombia 
  In 1999, in an attempt to resolve Colombia’s myriad of problems, including an 
intense economic recession and high unemployment and poverty rates resultant from years of 
conflict, former President Pastrana concocted Plan Colombia  – “a $7.5 billion aid package 
designed to address the country’s interwoven problems of extensive narco-trafficking, civil 
war, and economic underdevelopment”123. The original proposal was, however, very different 
from the reality that it became – focusing mainly on social development: 55 percent of the 
package was originally allocated for military aid, and 45 percent for development aid. The 
proposed narcotic elimination scheme did not involve a heavy military component, but 
instead encouraged production of alternative crops to reduce farmers’ dependence on coca. 
Additionally, the original Plan Colombia involved comprehensive peace talks with the 
FARC, and as such was set to break away from the precedent of violence as a political tool. 
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But both internal dynamics and foreign interests resulted in a substantive revision of Plan 
Colombia by 2002124.  
That same year the dogmatically conservative and hardline Álvaro Uribe was elected 
president with near universal support, running on a platform of bringing peace and security 
via eradication of the FARC. At the time there was widespread disillusionment in the country 
as the three-year peace process under Pastrana had failed and that the FARC was stronger 
than it had been in its 40 year existence. Uribe’s own father had been killed some years 
earlier in a botched FARC kidnapping, which is believed to have fueled his uncompromising 
stance against the FARC. This melded remarkably well with U.S. interests and resulted in a 
complete overhaul of the original Plan Colombia.  
In creating the Plan, Pastrana originally intended to seek U.S. financial support. But 
in soliciting the U.S. – whom Colombia had a long-standing relationship with – the social 
development aspect was immediately pushed aside to incorporate U.S. security concerns. 
Then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics, Rand Beers, commented 
for example that, “Colombia stands at a critical crossroads with considerable dangers for US 
interests”125. The result was a significant shift from an emphasis on “rural development and 
civil society building, to the aggressive militarization of Colombia’s southern regions where 
the FARC were strongest due to their historical ties to the peasantry”126.  
The revised Plan Colombia became dominated by the military component to eradicate 
both coca production and the leftist FARC, whom both the U.S. and Uribe identified as 
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terrorists and narco-guerillas127. Between 2000 and 2008 the U.S. invested $7 billion into 
strengthening both the Colombian military and police force to fight the perceived terrorists128. 
And while economic development was propagated as an integral ingredient of Plan 
Colombia, over 80 percent of funding went to the Colombian military leaving a measly $1.3 
billion for alternative development programs over a period of eight years129. For a country 
with 82 percent of people – or 32 million - living below the poverty line in 2004 this equates 
to an average of $5 USD per person (living below the poverty line) every year from 2000-
2008130.  
The disproportionate emphasis on military activity not only allowed the Colombian 
and U.S. government to neglect economic and social development, but actually worsened the 
situation for millions of Colombians displaced from coca fumigation and threats or attacks 
from paramilitary, military, and guerilla forces. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported that from 2001-2002 forced displacement increased by 100 
percent131. By 2008 Colombia became the country with the highest number of internally 
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displaced people (IDP) in the world - peaking at roughly 1.4 million people who remain 
displaced to this day132. 
 
4.1.3  Territorial Conquest: Counter Insurgency Tactics and  Displacement 
With this in mind, Plan Colombia received immediate and heavy criticism from non-
governmental organizations, and even from within the U.S. government, as well as from 
Colombian union and rights workers133. For the purposes of this discussion it is not necessary 
to go into great detail on this point. One notable critique worth mentioning, however, comes 
from International Relations Professor and critic, Doug Stokes. In his book America’s Other 
War (2005) he draws an intriguing parallel between the U.S. devised social and economic 
policies of Plan Colombia to a distinct counter insurgency doctrine that emerged immediately 
after September 11th - both focused on displacement. Stokes writes that the economic 
development logic of Plan Colombia often encouraged “coca-growers to move away from 
Putomayo [rural areas], preferably to town centers” where they would be more likely to find 
‘legitimate’ work.  
Stokes then compares this to U.S. counter insurgency (CI) tactics by noting that:  
“The social and economic component of Plan Colombia thus closely resembles 
standard CI doctrine of displacing target populations considered potentially pro-
insurgency, and concentrating them in controllable (often urban) areas… For 
example, it is reminiscent of the call to relocate ‘entire hamlets or villages [of] 
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suspected individuals and families to unfamiliar neighborhoods so as to isolate the 
people from potential insurgents”134.  
With Stokes’ interpretation, the hidden policy objective of forced displacement that Plan 
Colombia embodied becomes clear. Indeed, despite the atrocious human rights violations, 
massive displacement, and pervasive violence that resulted from Plan Colombia, there was 
another effect: the southern territories - the former stronghold of the FARC – were safe and 
open for business. Namely, the arrival of the oil industry.  
 
4.1.4.  Territorial Conquest: Clearing the Southern Territories for State-
Sanctioned Development Projects 
 Now, proving that Plan Colombia was a conscious coordination meant to clear the 
southern territories to allow oil companies to move in and penetrate is beyond the scope of 
this research project – but it is a conspicuous and important series of events that deserves 
further consideration. After all, it is widely accepted among critics of state extractive projects 
that, “Beyond any doubt, the control of vital resources such as oil, biodiversity, water and 
even oxygen—the  forms of ‘gold’—depends on territorial control”135. With the clearing of 
the Southern territories the U.S. could maintain access to Colombian oil, while investors and 
firms would benefit from new exploration and production (E&P) ventures; royalties from 
increased mining and oil would increase revenue for the Colombian state, boosting economic 
growth. Thus, both parties had immense incentive to embark on this policy of territorial 
conquest under the guise of Plan Colombia. To illustrate this, the maps below compare the 
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following: areas under FARC control, which is where government offensives were 
concentrated; areas that experienced the highest levels of internal displacement; and areas 
where oil and gas fields and facilities are also concentrated. As one can see from this 
juxtaposition, while these are phenomenon spread throughout the country, the southern 
Llanos and adjacent territories all appear to have experienced high internal displacement 
paired with high (or rather, concentrated) oil production.  
Figure 8. Areas Under FARC    Figure 9. Map Internally Displaced  
Influence or Control 2002/2013   Peoples January-June 2008  
        
  
Source: The Washington Post    Source: Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centere 
 
 
Figure 10. Map of [oil and gas] Basins, Colombia 
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 Source: Agencia Nacional Hidrocarburos  
Figure 11. Colombia’s Oil Production and Transportation Infrastructure
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Source: Ecopetrol  
 
 Moreover, given Stokes’ analysis, it is abundantly evident that the economic 
development logic inherent within Plan Colombia was not one that prioritized the creation of 
an alternative local economy to accommodate local needs and develop the country as a 
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whole, but a logic in line with the neoliberal development state that emphasizes integration 
with the global marketplace by allowing foreign companies easy access to local markets and 
resources, where the responsibility to adapt and integrate into the new socio-economic 
structure rests with the local community, despite a history of violence, exclusion, and 
subjugation. In the unique case of Colombia this is exactly what happened, as will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters. But in order to fully understand the nature of Colombia’s 
development there are several important take away points that must be extrapolated from this 
discussion. 
 
4.1.5. Historical Summary 
To summarize: Since its inception Colombia has been engulfed in conflict rooted 
between classical Liberal and Conservative ideology. This was manifested in the 
disorganized and undisciplined period of la violencia, and continued into the period of 
organized guerilla warfare we are familiar with today. Until recently these conflicts have 
very much impeded the economic and social development of the country. This changed in 
2002 with the implementation of Plan Colombia that cleared the southern territories and 
facilitated the aperatura economica of the country, particularly the entrance of major foreign 
oil and gas companies. But it is important to view the aperatura of the 21st century not as 
displacing the conflict of the past century or bringing peace; instead, the aperatura, marked 
by an aggressive implementation of neoliberal ideology, inserted itself within the larger 
paradigm of the partisan politics and conflict, frequently exacerbating tensions.  Oil and gas 
companies coming into the country, for example, entered in on the side of the state and thus 
immediately became embedded in the conflict which persists simultaneously along with the 
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myth of Colombia as the Emerald City of peace and development: “The violence with which 
these regions have had to live is, in short, the result of modern expansionist economics”136. 
This also explains why one of the main campaigns of the leftist FARC is aimed at targeting 
oil pipelines and transportation mechanisms137.  
 What Ossa describes as ‘modern expansionist economics’ can be more specifically 
identified as an aggressive move to incorporate neoliberal ideology into Colombia’s 
development trajectory. Given Uribe’s ideological alignment with the U.S. in terms of 
opening up industries to foreign investment and competition, economic development was 
viewed as a crucial component in bringing peace and stability to the country. Thus, at the 
same time as Uribe was overseeing the clearing of the South militarily, he was also 
facilitating a widespread transition to neoliberalism that would eventually permeate multiple 
facets of Colombian society, politics, and economics – including an unprecedented overhaul 
of the Colombian hydrocarbon industry to make the country more attractive to foreign 
investors and companies. The ways in which this was achieved and manifests to day, within 
the paradigm of continued conflict, shall be discussed in the following section.  
 
4.2. Continuities of Conflict Part 2: The Move to Pervasive Neoliberal Ideology in 
Colombia 
“One of the greatest paradoxes of the contemporary Colombian economy… [is that] 
despite the alarming figures of economic inequality, which permits approximately half the 
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population to survive at or below the poverty level, Colombia is viewed by classically trained 
Western economists as a stable, modern, prudently managed economy”  
- Doug Stokes 
 
 To reiterate: it is impossible to conceive of any aspect of Colombia separately from 
its history of conflict, particularly partisan conflict, if anything because nearly every 
population has been impacted by the conflict in one way or another. Likewise, 
conceptualizing Colombia’s economic growth and development within the context of 
continued conflict – though peaceful at the moment – is helpful in elucidating the nature of 
Colombia’s recent development, which if viewed in the longue durée begins to make much 
more sense as certain patterns begin to emerge. In essence, one might consider the 21st 
century’s move towards neoliberalism as a pendulum shift in the direction towards long 
standing conservative ideology, of which the state is the primary representative with the 
hydrocarbons industry serving as the mechanism through which neoliberal and conservative 
ideology are implemented.  
In this discussion three points are identified that illustrate Colombia’s shift to neoliberal 
ideology, which is no longer limited to strictly an economic sphere, but permeates multiple 
facets of Colombian society, politics, culture, as well – what Damien Cahill terms a 
pervasive ‘neoliberal ideology’. These include (1) the prioritization of neoliberal criteria 
proposed by other countries and conformed to by Colombia itself; (2) the structure of the oil 
industry itself as facilitating and fulfilling neoliberal priorities; and (3), a notable lack of 
management over development projects, particularly in mining areas, replicating a neoliberal 
interpretation of the state’s role’s and responsibilities. In identifying these three criteria not 
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only is Colombia established as a thoroughly neoliberal entity, but additionally the metric by 
which Colombia’s successful development narrative is measured is exposed as ‘successful’ 
in terms of neoliberal, or as we discussed earlier ‘modern’ and ‘western’, development 
standards. Furthermore, the discussion to follow offers valuable insight into the ways in 
which the continuities of conflict are both maintained and exacerbated by the neoliberal state, 
and affected through the hydrocarbons industry, though this will become more evident in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
4.2.1. Neoliberlism as Metric for Successful Development 
Firstly, to return to evidence of Colombia’s successful development narrative, as 
advocated by its proponents: the Colombian state and economy are now viewed as a 
“resilient, market-based, mixed economy where manufacturing, mineral extraction, 
agriculture, and services combine to create a healthy, growth-oriented system”138. Proponents 
of this view point to increased foreign direct investment, steady economic growth rates 
between 2001-2007 and 2010-2013 that outpaced both the global average and western 
economies, Colombia’s move to the third largest economy in Latin America, and of course 
an overall reduction in violence and increased security for both foreign and local businesses 
operating in the country. Cumulatively these criteria substantiate neoliberal interpretations of 
what constitutes a successful economy and successful development at the country level.  
  
4.2.2. Defining 21st Century Neoliberalism  
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Neoliberal economics can be generally described as follows: 
“… Neoliberalism, as theory of political economic practices, suggests that human 
wellbeing can be better achieved through liberating individual entrepreneurship by 
institutionalizing and protecting private property rights within a free market… [that 
emphasizes] unfettered world markets for goods and capital; pared down state 
responsibilities for social welfare of its citizens; opposition to conflictive and 
inefficient collective entitlements, epitomized by labor rights; resolution of social 
problem through the application of quasi-market principles revolving around the 
primacy of the individual…”139. 
The World Health Organization maintains this definition, though slightly pared down as 
follows: 
“[1] Economic growth is paramount: corporations and their agents need to be free 
to pursue whatever gives them an economic advantage and, in consequence, internal 
and global markets must be free to operate with little government constraint or 
regulation. 
[2] Free trade benefits all nations – rich or poor – because every nation has a 
comparative advantage. 
[3]Government spending creates inefficiency and waste: although most 
neoliberals agree that not all public expenditure is wasteful, many argue that it can be 
reduced. 
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[4] In the distribution of economic goods, individual responsibility replaces the 
concepts of public goods and community”140  
Here, the primary considerations which I wish to focus on include the emphasis on 
establishment of a “free market [with] minimum barriers to the flow of goods, services, and 
capital… which argues for a separation of politics and economics” and the belief that markets 
should be “free from interference of government” – outlined above as state relegation of 
social welfare and service provisions to market entities or individual responsibilities141.  
Originally promulgated by Chicago School economists Milton Friedman and 
Frederick von Hayek, neoliberal manifestations today are not only in line with their original 
theories, but have been exported and applied throughout the world through “a transatlantic 
network of sympathetic business founders and ideological entrepreneurs who ran think tanks, 
and through the popularization of neoliberal ideas by journalists and politicians”142. The most 
notable transatlantic adoptees of neoliberal theory of course includes Ronald Regan and 
Margaret Thatcher who, embroiled in the ideological battles of the cold war, began exporting 
neoliberal doctrine; the result of which is that neoliberalism now embodies “the dominant 
global political economic trend”143, or what Foucault termed the dominant international 
‘regime of truth’144. Thus, neoliberalism, which began as a national project, by the end of the 
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twentieth century, dominated both international relations and the development paradigm for 
both developing and developed countries, of which Colombia is no exception.  
 
4.2.3. The Spirit of Neoliberalism Endures 
It should be noted however, that in the first decade of the 21st century, particularly 
after the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe, neoliberal economics has largely been 
debunked145. Robert McChesney writes of the effects of neoliberalism, “The economic 
consequences of these policies have been the same just about everywhere, and exactly what 
one would expect: a massive increase in social and economic inequality, a marked increase in 
severe deprivation for the poorest nations and peoples of the world, a disastrous global 
environment, an unstable global economy, and an unprecedented bonanza for the 
wealthy”146. In 2015 this observation is neither new nor novel, and does not require further 
explanation as it has been churned over in the discourse to great extent.  
However, though neoliberalism is no longer openly declared the be-all and end-all of 
development, the practical application of neoliberal economic policies has endured.  Damien 
Cahill explains, “Neoliberalism, moreover, appears to be alive and well as states respond to 
the ongoing crisis with privatization, austerity programs and attacks upon the rights of 
labor… [consequently] neoliberalism is embedded in three distinct, but related social 
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spheres: class relations, institutions, and ideological norms”147. Cahill uses the phrase 
‘always embedded neoliberalism’ to emphasize that, “while embedded neoliberalism is beset 
with internal contradictions that ultimately provided the preconditions for the current global 
financial crisis, the socially embedded nature of the neoliberal policy regime has made it 
highly resistant to retrenchment”148. This helps to explain its persistence throughout the 
world, again as can be witnessed in Colombia.  
One of the ways that the practical application of neoliberal economic policies has 
endured is through the prioritization of economic growth above all, with GDP remaining the 
venerated metric of successful development: 
 “The central objective [of neoliberalism], economic growth, is to be achieved 
through deregulation, liberalization, privatization – which are to roll back government 
and reduce market-distorting interventions and in effect annul ‘development’. In other 
words, this retains one of the conventional core meanings of ‘development’, 
economic growth, while the ‘how to’ and agency of development switch from state to 
market. Accordingly, neoliberalism is an anti-development perspective, not in terms 
of goals but in terms of means”149. 
Here Pieterse emphasizes how the metric of economic growth– the core of neoliberal 
economic theory – remains the predominant channel through which development is thought 
about, with GDP remaining the most important consideration. Thus, globally the legacy of 
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neoliberalism is alive and well, both ideologically and in practice – particularly via the 
explicit and widespread prioritization of economic growth via the GDP metric.  
Much more can and indeed has been said regarding neoliberalism, but for the 
purposes of this thesis the subsequent inquiry must move to address the resultant observation: 
what are the ways in which Colombian politics and economics conform to these neoliberal 
criteria? And how does its neoliberal nature both utilize the hydrocarbons industry, and 
maintain the continuities of partisan strife and conflict? 
 
4.2.3.   Colombia’s Neoliberalism 
At this juncture we can identify three pieces of evidence that point towards 
confirmation of Colombia as adopting and embodying neoliberal development ideology: 
firstly, the prioritization of neoliberal criteria proposed by other countries and conformed to 
by Colombia itself; secondly, the structure of the oil industry itself; and thirdly, a notable 
lack of management over development projects, particularly in mining areas.  
 
4.2.3.1.  Colombia’s Neoliberal Development Prescription: FTA  
At face value it is entirely clear that neoliberalism has penetrated and endured in the 
Colombian context, both in how Colombia’s success is measured from an outside 
perspective, and how Colombia’s own economic policies replicate the neoliberal ideology 
outlined above.  
International observers – magazines, journalists, think tanks, etc., even other 
countries, emphasize Colombia’s economic growth above all, and in doing so Colombia is 
thus largely viewed through and approved via neoliberal lenses. However, Colombia’s 2012 
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adoption of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S. corroborates Colombia’s neoliberal 
inclinations.  
In May of 2012 the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) entered into 
force, with advocates claiming that the agreement would expand trade between the two 
countries. On the Colombian side, it is argued that the CTPA would allow Colombia access 
to U.S. markets, increase the attractiveness of investing in Colombia in terms of boosting 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country, and strengthen Colombia’s governing 
institutions150. Overall it is believed that the CTPA would ‘level the playing field’ both ways, 
allowing U.S. companies access to new markets and allowing a growing middle class in 
Colombia access to a wider range of cheaper quality good and services151. Now while one 
should exercise caution in writing off the FTA as altogether neoliberal, certain points are 
notably in line with neoliberal economic theory.  
For example, Colombia initially had a ‘price-band’ duty system on certain 
agricultural imports including corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, pork, cheese, and powdered milk, 
set up to protect these industries from an influx of cheap foreign imports, and to ensure that 
domestic prices stay within an established range. The implementation of the CTPA, however, 
immediately disbanded the price band system, wherein about 77 percent of duties on 
agricultural imports were removed immediately upon signing.  
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This policy represents one facet of the deregulation of Colombia’s economy, 
particularly in regards to the agricultural sector, where previously state-sponsored protective 
mechanisms for agricultural producers is removed in order to boost trade via specific 
industries. For example, while sugar and dairy exports from Colombia to the U.S. are likely 
to increase and hence fulfill the goal of increasing trade and economic growth, most 
agricultural sectors are predicted to see a decrease – notably corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, 
pork, cheese, and powdered milk152. 
The negative impacts of the FTA were almost immediately substantiated by an 
August 2013 protest in which coffee growers, diary farmers, and other agricultural workers 
in Colombia expressed their indignation that the CTPA is “undermining local food 
production and putting small farmers out of business”153. A 2006 study by the Institute for 
International Economics (IIE) assessing the overall effects of the CTPA corroborated 
agricultural workers’ concerns, showing that in the medium-term Colombia would see losses 
around $63 million USD, reflecting domestic industry contractions from cheap new 
imports154. In this way, the dynamics of Colombia’s FTA with the U.S. can be considered 
neoliberal for its prioritization of economic growth via the most useful – or competitive – 
sectors, to the detriment of less profitable industries. This is a classical neoliberal policy 
recommendation, where countries are encouraged to focus on developing specific industries 
to export goods to the global marketplace, instead of creating a balance economy that serves 
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the needs of the local population first and foremost. It is clear, as illustrated by the 
agricultural workers’ strike, that this is the case.  
A second way the U.S.-Colombia CPTA can be viewed as evidence of Colombia’s 
neoliberal inclinations involves the explicit desire to increase FDI coming into the country, 
primarily to the hydrocarbons sector. In 2013 more than 50 percent of FDI entering 
Colombia was directed at oil, gas, and mining projects155. Over the next ten years the 
industry is set to see another series of massive expansions, with an area half the size of 
California to be auctioned off in 2011-16 for oil and gas exploration and production (See the 
map in Annex I). While the CTPA does not directly impact the hydrocarbons sector as it does 
agriculture and manufacturing, what the CTPA does do for hydrocarbons is better facilitate 
and safeguard an increased inflow of both FDI and foreign workers, which will likely bolster 
the expansion of the hydrocarbons industry in the coming years – all of which is for export  
Though by no means comprehensive, these policies serve as one node of evidence 
pointing towards Colombia’s neoliberal inclinations.  
 
4.2.3.2. Regulatory Reform & Privatization of the Hydrocarbons Industry 
A second point of evidence illustrating Colombia’s neoliberal development 
inclinations lies in the restructuring of Colombia’s oil industry to allow for less state control 
and more opportunities for private companies desiring to set up operations in the country.  
When former President Álvaro Uribe came to office in 2002 one if his primary 
objectives was “an immediate macroeconomic and fiscal stabilization plan” to regain the 
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support of the public and reverse Colombia’s standing as a near failed state. Motivated by the 
global commodities boom of 2001, Uribe turned to Colombia’s hydrocarbons sector to meet 
his objective. The industry, however, had been stagnant for years and demanded renovation. 
Colombia’s first major oil discovery in 1974 spurred a production boom and led the then 
Colombian government to believe the new fields would sustain the country’s growth in the 
long term, and the government adjusted the regulatory laws accordingly. Walking the fine 
line of nationalization the government increased the royalties companies should pay to the 
state in exchange for production rights. The result was that foreign companies left Colombia 
in favor of the more promising projects in the former Soviet States, which were opening for 
business at the time, and Colombia’s industry expansion was effectively halted. Since then 
Colombia faced diminishing production.  
Former Colombian Vice Minister of Energy, Manuel Maiguashca, explains further 
noting that, “the minister thought we were swimming in oil… We had some production, there 
was an inheritance from what we had found, but we were not finding any more oil”156. By the 
turn of the century it was projected that Colombia would face a production deficit and would 
need to “buy oil for its refineries, and in some other years it should begin to import oil. So 
there had to be a change”157. Upon taking office Uribe enacted these changes immediately, 
constituting a series of regulatory reforms between 2002-05 based on the implementation of 
market-oriented policies aimed at fostering competition.  
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The first major industry reform targeted the royalty/tax concession laws, which were 
adjusted to increase company take-away, making projects more attractive to foreign firms. 
Colombia previously operated under a 50/50 contractual framework, but under the new law 
this number was reduced to 30 percent, making it so that that the Colombia’s national oil 
company – EcoPetrol - would “assume 30% of investment… own 30% of the acquired assets 
until the expiration of contract…and obtain an initial 30% share of hydrocarbons 
production,” while private companies would manage and pocket the rest158. Additionally, 
further modification to the royalty scheme allowed for a variable royalty rate paid to the state 
between 8 and 20 percent depending on the size of the field and production levels. Thus, if 
companies operate smaller fields or do not produce the expected amount they pay less in 
royalties.   
The second reform involved a restructuring of Colombia’s national oil company 
itself, Ecopetrol.  Previously the government-run Ecopetrol oversaw the entire production 
process, including the creation and enforcement of the regulatory framework, but in the 
2000s the entity was broken up into three separate agencies with different responsibilities: 
the Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (National Hydrocarbons Agency, or ANH) and the 
Sociedad Promotora de Energía de Colombia S.A. (Colombian Society for Energy Propotion 
S.A., or SPEC), and a portion remained as Ecopetrol. The ANH will be discussed below, but 
SPEC was created in order to “participate or invest in companies whose corporate purpose is 
related or complimentary to activities in the energy sector,” thus creating a competitive 
environment in which Colombia could partake and allowing foreign oil and gas companies to 
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play a larger role in production processes159. Ecopetrol on the other hand, was charged with 
“promoting industrial and trade activities owned by the state” and now operates as an 
independent oil and gas company competing with foreign firms. And while before Ecopetrol 
was controlled completely by the state, today almost 50 percent of its board members are 
from the private sector160.  
The third major reformation, stemming from the former discussion, is the creation of 
the ANH as an independent regulatory and legal entity to handle the newly competitive 
industry – “The ANH is a special administrative unit belonging to the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy… with its own legal personality, equity, administrative and financial self-
government; its main role is that of global manager of state-owned hydrocarbon reserves,” 
including implementation of bidding rounds and contracts161. The ANH, based in Bogota, is 
now a central figure in the hydrocarbons industry, responsible for granting exploration and 
production contracts and largely determining the flow of oil and gas companies into the 
country.  
The cumulative effects of these institutional restructurings to the hydrocarbon 
industry have been monumental. Not only has the more business-friendly royalty and tax 
laws attracted foreign interest in the country, but the actual number of contracts, operators, 
and projects increased exponentially in the years following the reforms, facilitated by a series 
of bid rounds auctioning off further blocks for exploration and production. Thus, beginning 
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with Uribe, “Colombia’s oil industry experienced a remarkable turnaround,” and is now “the 
main source of foreign exchange and, together with mining, one of Colombia’s key ‘engines 
of growth’”162.  
Furthermore, these reformations mark an explicit adherence to neoliberal economic 
theories and policies, where not only has financial incentive to private companies been 
multiplied with the goal of increasing the number of foreign operators in the country, but 
additionally, with the creation of the ANH, all effective regulatory responsibilities have been 
taken almost completely out of the hands of the state and entrusted completely to the ANH. 
Now, even though the ANH technically operates under the Ministry of Mines and Energy – a 
government agency in itself, the make-up of the ANH’s governing infrastructure imply 
otherwise, where the vast majority of ANH leadership positions are filled by executives 
coming from oil, banking, and telecommunication companies. The same can be said for 
roughly a quarter of ANH management and support staff, though the remainder is made up of 
people from other government ministries and bodies. The fact remains, however, that 
oversight over Colombia’s entire oil industry is largely in the hands of individuals with a 
history in, connections to, and presumably primary consideration for private corporate 
interests and ethics, which tend to prioritize efficiency and productivity above all else. As 
such, the most recent round of restructurings of the oil industry mirrors the neoliberal criteria 
that, “Economic growth is paramount: corporations and their agents need to be free to pursue 
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whatever gives them an economic advantage and, in consequence, internal and global 
markets must be free to operate with little government constraint or regulation”163. 
The discussion above is notable as the minimal government regulation over the 
hydrocarbons sector, to some extent, is indicative of a general trend of the rolling back of 
state intervention measures in favor of market-guided regulations. This makes up the second 
point illustrating Colombia’s affinity for neoliberal economic policy, which segues directly 
into the following discussion.  
4.2.4.3. The Absent State: Lack of Government Management Over Development 
Projects in Extractive Areas 
Another important issue to bring attention to, not just for our discussion here 
regarding neoliberalism, but in order to provide further context into Colombia’s 
development, is the process by which oil production takes place and the relationships, 
responsibilities, and roles of those involved. This includes the Colombian government (both 
local and federal), primary operating companies, and local communities. It should be no 
surprise that these parties are frequently at odds, which will be elaborated upon in subsequent 
chapters, but suffice to say here that local communities clash with operating companies and 
government interests over issues such as displacement, human rights abuses, and 
compensation, among others. On the surface these dynamics appear relatively 
straightforward, however, under closer examination another image comes into view – one 
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which further illustrates the Colombian state’s tendency towards neoliberal ideology, 
evidenced by its blatant lack of management over development projects in extractive areas.  
A neoliberal ideology, according to Cahill is the transition from a purely economic 
methodology, to a “pervasive ideological framework” akin to a “common sense policy 
approach among political elites” where neoliberal ideas are drawn upon in more than just the 
economic sphere, but also class relations, and institutions as a basis for all policy 
decisions164. This may involve, as can be considered in the case of Colombia, limiting 
government responsibilities and leaving the provision of public goods and community 
services up to private companies and the market165, though Cahill emphasizes that this does 
not necessarily mean the disappearance of the state altogether, but merely “a new [state] 
institutional architecture as part of the ‘roll-out’ of new neoliberal forms of regulation, even 
as they ‘roll back’ older forms of social protective regulations”166. In the context of 
hydrocarbons in Colombia, this scenario is remarkably accurate, though further explanation 
first requires some background. 
 
4.2.4.4. Consulta Previa & the Absent State  
To begin, in 1989 the International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted Convention 
169 – the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention – “a binding international treaty that 
establishes the right of Indigenous and tribal peoples to be consulted when a policy or project 
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affects their culture,” heritage, or wellbeing167.  In 2015 twenty countries have ratified the 
convention, the majority in Latin America and including Colombia in 1991.  
 
That same year the Colombian Constitutional Court ratified the new Colombian 
Constitution, replacing the 1886 version. The 1991 constitution was notable for many 
reasons, not least for its recognition of indigenous rights to Consulta Previa [previous 
consultation] – which serves as a constitutional framework guaranteeing the rights outlined in 
ILO Convention 169. Consulta Previa is a particularly unique constitutional framework in 
that it guarantees indigenous and tribal communities “the right to decide their own priorities 
for the process of development, in so far as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions, and 
spiritual well-being, and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and control, to the extent 
possible, their own economic, social, and cultural development. In addition the right of these 
peoples to participate in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of plans and 
programs for national and regional development which affect them directly”168. Countries 
party to the ILO convention are bound “to put those regulations [Consulta Previa] into effect 
before granting concessions for extractive or infrastructure projects,” and furthermore 
consent to “accept the jurisdiction of international supervisory bodies” in monitoring and 
scrutinizing adherence to these principles169.  Oxfam international has praised Colombia’s 
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Consulta Previa framework for its thoroughness and progressive establishment of rights for 
indigenous communities: 
“The constitutional jurisprudence, moreover, has extensively developed the 
content and scope of the individual and collective rights of these peoples and has 
established that prior consultation is a fundamental right with constitutional rank… In 
its extensive jurisprudence, the Court has established, among other rules, that 
consultation must precede the granting of an environmental license; that simply 
providing information or notification to an indigenous community about a natural 
resource exploration or exploitation project does not constitute prior consultation; and 
that prior consultation must include communication and understanding characterized 
by mutual respect and good faith between communities and the government 
authorities”170. 
Thus, within Colombia there is a strong constitutional framework guaranteeing the legal 
rights of not only indigenous communities, but Afro-descendant communities as well, in 
extractive or development projects.  
There is a caveat, however, one common to such frameworks: enforcement. Though 
Colombia is praised for its pioneering constitutional efforts, implementation and adherence to 
the framework has yet to be fully realized, a pervasive problem in Colombia which Oxfam is 
quick to identify:  
“The report reveals a paradoxical situation in Colombia, where a highly 
developed normative and jurisprudential foundation stands in stark contrast to the 
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reality of disregard for the right to prior consultation… Full enjoyment of the right to 
prior consultation remains unfinished business in Colombia. The country faces the 
challenge of translating the progress made in terms of normative and jurisprudential 
development, and the institutional resources in place, into a reality in which prior 
consultation is the centerpiece of the State’s relations with indigenous and Afro-
descendent peoples. Similarly, Colombia faces the challenge of enacting a law—
drafted in conjunction with indigenous peoples—to regulate consultation procedures 
and establish a legal and practical framework for them”171. 
In other words, although Colombia has instituted an advanced constitutional framework 
protecting the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, the specific laws and governing bodies 
enforcing the rights are notably lacking. While Oxfam outlines a number of reasons and 
factors contributing to Colombia’s regulatory deficiency, one of the primary barriers 
identified was also notably common in interviews conducted throughout the course of this 
research, with varies groups and individuals corroborating the findings of the Oxfam report.  
For example, in an interview with a Managing Director of an energy consulting 
service agency operating in Colombia, the following was explained: 
“The government is all talk… When you go into the field the government is 
nowhere to be found. The government has absolutely no connection with local 
communities. The peace process itself and the process of Consulta Previa cannot 
succeed because it [the government] is not doing anything, [but] you have to have 
good governance! This is the government pushing off responsibility [to develop local 
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communities, provide services, etc.]. It is a way to push off development initiatives 
onto the companies”172.  
Here the consultant begins to echo the concern of the Oxfam report, in that the 
government is not being proactive in regulating or intervening in the actual process of 
Consulta Previa in a localized context. He continues: 
“Then the company has to promise to give employment and other things [to the 
local community in lieu of the government], but it is between a rock and a hard place 
because it still needs the government to give permits, which it can’t do without 
community appeasement. And the local people and local communities don’t trust the 
local or national government; they hear there is a big oil boom, they see the 
multinationals, and then ask for something in return, but there is no one watching the 
process.”173 
In his explanation above, the representative emphasizes the absence of the national 
government in the process, and how this then forces oil companies to work to appease the 
community they are working with. But the lack of oversight means that there is no 
formalized consultation process, which means that pretty much anything goes. This point is 
elaborated on further in an interview with former Vice Minister of Energy, Manuel 
Maiguashca. In our conversations he states: 
“There is a conflict with the communities who feel like they are not getting an 
equal share [of royalties from oil production]. And the rule [Consulta Previa] is not 
clear. These consultations can last very long, because there is no set time frame. And 
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furthermore, with Consulta Previa you never know how much they [the communities] 
can ask for…A community can talk about whatever they want, bring any grievance. 
And a community will ask you to give you all the state has given you in the past 500 
years. And furthermore, there is also no inventory of the community. Communities 
can appear. They appear everywhere, they are nomads. Here it is different than in 
Peru or Ecuador, here we have ten cities with more than one million people, here you 
have people all over the place, but there is no way to know who is really living in 
these areas [to determine who the companies should negotiate with]. The local 
authorities should come up with rules to have boundaries in all these things. 
Community consultation, okay. But about what? When? Time frame? What issues 
can they go on? And what issues can’t they? I mean put in boundaries so all the 
people know what to expect”174. 
Maiguashca in this statement reiterates the concerns that the consultant mentioned earlier. 
Both are highly concerned, even frustrated, at the government’s lack of oversight and 
regulation regarding Consulta Previa. And even though they are both coming from very 
different perspectives, their concerns are nearly identical: the government is pushing off the 
responsibility for local development to oil companies, who are then obliged to provide all of 
the services and financing that the community asks for, without any oversight. In practical 
terms this translates into exceedingly long negotiation processes, where both companies and 
local communities feel the inadequacy of the Consulta Previa process: companies feel as 
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though they are being taken advantage of, and communities feel as though their rights and 
livelihoods are perpetually at risk.   
There is one initiative in the beginning stages of implementation - the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). One U.S. Embassy representative in Bogota 
explains the goal of the EITI as, “a mapping system that says how much each department has 
received in royalties, and which projects in these departments are underway through the 
National Planning Department”175. The overall goal of the initiative is to “promote openness 
and accountable management of resources” by “strengthening government and company 
systems, informing public debate, and enhancing trust” by disclosing fully just how much 
extractive companies are paying to the state176. The process has been slow, however, and the 
at the time of this interview little had been accomplished to implement the program, which is 
the only one of its kind in the country. In light of this continued deficiency, the U.S. Embassy 
representative reiterated the same concerns as both the consultant and Maiguashca: 
“The lack of government presence means that communities don’t see the 
government, they only see the companies and blame the companies, [especially] after 
being present for so many years but without any development. The companies often 
volunteer to contribute to the community in order to improve the image in the 
communities, done through social programs – such as afterschool programs or micro 
credit loans.  
The Consultation process is very complicated though. The company has a 
dialogue with the community, and they can ask for appropriate compensation, but the 
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company is not legally bound to abide by the community’s request, though it is easier 
just to accept the terms. There is a real problem though, because there are no 
standards to resolve disagreements between the two, for example – no one has been 
able to explain what happens when companies disagree with the community”177 
Here the U.S. Embassy representative reiterates the exact same concerns as the two 
former interviewees: that the government is not present or involved in the process of 
Consulta Previa, that there are no regulations or specific guidelines to facilitate negotiations 
between the parties, and there is no proper recourse for when disagreements emerge. As shall 
be illustrated later in this thesis, this often leads to social uprisings, protests, and sometimes 
even violence, which the Oxfam report also emphasizes.  
Returning to our discussion of neoliberalism then, from the statements above it is 
abundantly clear that there is a significant degree of neoliberal ideology present, 
demonstrated by the government’s actions (or inaction) in not only extractive processes, but 
community developments and negotiations as well. If we remember, neoliberal economic 
theory advocates for the rolling back of state interventions and services - particularly social 
services, leaving such provisions to be provided by the market (aka. private companies). In 
the case of Consulta Previa in Colombia, this is precisely what has transpired: the 
government has relegated the regulation, monitoring, and provision of services entirely to the 
oil companies, who are then responsible for providing a range of services and compensations 
to local communities. As shall be discussed more in depth later, this is particularly 
complicated due to a long history of violence, discrimination, and exclusion of indigenous 
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and Afro-Colombian communities, who then turn to extractive companies to provide 
reparations not only for present day extractive projects, but for all that they have been denied 
throughout the generations. In sum, this equates to what Damien Cahill calls the neoliberal 
ideology, which he emphasizes, constitutes the ‘common sense’ application of neoliberal 
principles to a vast array of social, cultural, and political spheres of interaction, where the 
roles and responsibilities of the state is reduced substantially.   
4.2.4.5. Summary: Implications of Colombia’s Neoliberal Ideology  
In sum, what is the significance or purpose of this discussion? Here we have reviewed 
three ways in which the Colombian state can be considered overtly neoliberal. The first piece 
of evidence is Colombia’s adherence to the neoliberal preference and prioritization of free 
and open markets. This was illustrated via the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement 
between the U.S. and Colombia, which constitutes a conspicuous prioritization of economic 
growth via increased trade of industries that have a competitive advantage, at the expense of 
other industries and sectors – replicating neoliberalism’s emphasis on the strength of a single 
industry to generate wealth by export, instead of a holistic balanced economy to meet 
domestic needs.   
The second example is Colombia’s restructured oil industry – which significantly 
withdrew the state’s regulatory oversight of the oil industry, reduced the amount of royalties 
companies should pay to national governments, and brought in an enormous amount of 
foreign companies operating in the country. Cumulatively this is also in line with 
neoliberalism’s emphasis on allowing as little government oversight as possible over private 
companies in order to maximize competitiveness, efficiency, and productivity.  
  
111 
Thirdly, our final example also points to this same neoliberal component, exemplified 
by the lack of state regulation and oversight over the Consulta Previa process. Furthermore, 
here neoliberal ideology is exceptionally evident in the state’s reliance on private extractive 
companies to provide services and compensation for local communities.  
This discussion, though obviously incomplete, points to a characterization of Colombia 
as markedly neoliberal. This conclusion has identified by other scholars of Colombia as well, 
notably Ferrero-Botero who identifies the same tendencies as outline above. He writes that: 
“In the economic realm, the so-called ‘neoliberal package’ includes policies that 
move away from protectionism, reduces the state’s size (but my no means influence), 
and engages in fiscal discipline in order to favor a free market economy. To carry this 
out, governments create policies and a political context supporting privatization of 
social services and businesses, heavy foreign investment, decentralization of power, 
and tightening of social spending while the role become that of protecting, even if 
through military violence, these liberties. In Colombia, neoliberalism is enacted, 
among other forms, through neo-extractivist policies, which support large-scale 
mining and energy resource exploitation by multinational and transnational 
corporations. This is exemplified locomotora minero energética (mining-energy 
locomotive), and his push to modify the código minero (mining code), which enforces 
effective protections and a supportive political-economic climate to these 
corporations”178. 
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Thus Colombia can be considered a neoliberal state, where the legacy of neoliberal 
structures and ideologies not only continues, but permeate a wider set of social, cultural, 
political, and institutional relations.  
Now, taken apart from each other, each of the components discussed above illustrate 
in their own right the neoliberal inclinations of the Colombian state. However, taken together 
the scale and degree of neoliberal dynamics become much more discernible. The CPTA and 
restructuring of the hydrocarbons industry together has the effect of facilitating a massive 
influx of both financing and foreign companies operating in Colombia. This is then paired 
with a widespread lack of management over extractive projects and company relations with 
local communities. Together, though not explicitly outlined in the characteristics of 
neoliberalism, these patterns point to not only a very much neoliberal state, but also one in 
accordance with our discussion on traditional interpretations of Eurocentric Modernity.  
The general character of the Colombian state can then be summarized as follows. 
Because of Colombia’s prioritization and expansion of the extractive industry over vast 
swaths of territory; its tactic of displacement of peoples from areas targeted for extraction; its 
preference to export products and integration into the global economy; its ardent attempts to 
attract inflows of FDI as well as foreign companies; the lack of government regulation over 
the extractive industry’s rate of development and trajectory; the lack of government 
management and oversight over development projects in indigenous territories; and the 
government’s repeated unwillingness to enforce indigenous and tribal rights, Colombia not 
only qualifies as a markedly neoliberal entity, but also one that is following the classical 
recipe for Modernity characterized by economic growth, industrial development for export, 
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and disregard for environmental and social aspects and concerns – all of which are illustrated 
as well in Mignolo’s Colonial Matrix of Power. 
Furthermore, assuming Colombia to be a neoliberal entity in the 21st century, as 
mentioned previously, cannot be considered apart from the wider history of Colombian 
partisan conflict and violence. Here I would argue that the most recent wave of overt and 
expansive neoliberal ideological manifestations represents – to some degree, and for now -  
the triumph of the politically conservative branch of Colombians, and a realization of a 
decades long competition. However, the apparent victory is not without consequence. As 
discussed previously, and as will be illustrated shortly, there are still those who vehemently 
oppose the trajectory of Colombia’s development for its exclusionary nature.  
For example, those who disagree with, refuse, or are unable to conform to the new 
ideological structures in Colombia are again excluded from the benefits of development. This 
may include: present and former paramilitaries, guerillas, and bandas criminales who do not 
see alternative economic ventures other than drug trafficking or crime; a vast majority of 
agricultural workers who may be pushed out of the market with an influx of cheap imports; 
many students and urban poor who are unable to pull themselves out of near-poverty without 
more substantial government interventions; and of course – most of those whose lives are 
lived in symbiosis with extractive industries. For these populations renewed exclusion from 
the benefits of developments only serves to compound the struggles of previous generations.  
This is particularly true for extractive communities, and as they make up the focus of 
this research endeavor, we may at present expand on their circumstances in this regard. For 
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example, the long history of conflict is also evident in the conflicts and attitudes that pervade 
local extractive communities, where the presence of extractive companies and enormous 
wealth stands in stark contrast to underdevelopment, inequality, poverty, lack of services, and 
exclusion from development. While these problems that will be shown to emerge out of the 
arrival of extractive industries do in one sense represent a unique set of new social issues, 
these social issues also serve to exacerbate, replicate, and compound a history of struggle, 
where the conflicts that emerge are not perceived as isolated or new – they are to the contrary 
perceived as a continuation of suffering from previous decades. With these structures, 
dynamics, and histories in mind we can now take an in depth look at how extractive 
industries truly impact Colombian lives and livelihoods in the 21st century.  
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Chapter 5. Research Findings: How Coexisting with the Black Gold re-Shapes Lives 
and Livelihoods in 21st Century Colombia 
 For some time now Colombia has been considered a successful development case, 
with many thanks to the hydrocarbons industry for its contribution. This thesis has sought 
thus far to refute these claims by pointing out the contradictions inherent in the metrics used 
to measure this success. At this juncture, I wish to continue with this aim, though by different 
means. In order to fully deconstruct the nature of Colombia’s oil-led development track, and 
to assess the true impacts that the oil industry’s expansion has had on local populations, from 
here on out this thesis aims to deconstruct the ways in which development post-2011 has 
manifested on the ground in one of Colombia’s most successful oil production frontiers – Los 
Llanos, and in doing so clarify the contradictions illustrated throughout this discussion and 
extract the truth of the Colombian oil saga.  
In choosing Puerto Gaitan, Meta this study aims to answer the following questions: 
What is the true nature of Colombia’s oil development? What does developmental “success” 
look like on the ground in an area greatly impacted by the physicalities and economics of the 
oil industry? Furthermore, what are the different ways in which the expansion of the oil 
industry in the Colombian South has impacted local populations and environments? How do 
local residents view these impacts? If Puerto Gaitan has undergone a positive social and 
economic transformation as a result of the oil industry, how can this experience become a 
model for cooperative agreements and development initiatives in other parts of the country 
where oil development is being undertaken? Or, if Meta has not undergone positive 
transformations as a result of the industry’s arrival, and indeed circumstances have worsened 
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for residents as a result of the industry, what can be done to ensure that oil-led development 
initiatives in Meta and other parts of the country yield effective and beneficial results for the 
majority?  
To the best of my knowledge very few studies has been undertaken in this regard in 
Colombia to date, especially given the relatively new state of peace and equally recent arrival 
of the oil industry into southern Colombia. Yet it is a prime example for multiple reasons. 
Not only does most of Colombia’s oil production come out of the Pacific Rubiales field, 
home to Meta, but the region is also pointed to as a national example of successful 
development – including everything from the Consulta Previa negotiation process, to the 
distribution of royalties to local communities, and environmental protection. Yet knowing 
well that one tale is never the whole story, here it is hoped that the reality of extractive 
industries can be fully elucidated. 
 
5.1. Puerto Gaitan: Oil Capital of the Colombian Llanos 
Situated nearly 200 miles south of Bogota lies the unassuming town of Puerto Gaitan 
in the department of Meta. Resting atop some of Colombia’s largest proven oil reserves, 
Meta and Puerto Gaitan exist in an area known as los Llanos, or the planes. Geographically, 
los Llanos is also referred to as the Orinoquia region, which makes up part of the Oronico oil 
belt that runs from Venezuela, through Colombia to Ecuador. But it is also cattle ranching 
country, the equivalent of what can be thought of as a Colombian Texas. People here 
generally refer to themselves as llaneros, or cowboys, connoting a rugged and industrious 
ethic. And like Texas, los Llanos is home to the country’s most successful and largest 
producing oil field – The Pacific Rubiales block – that accounts for more than 50 percent of 
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the country’s total oil production. The maps below offer a visual representation of these 
areas.  
Figure 12. Overview of Colombia’s Llanos Area and the Rubiales Oil Field 
 
And while most Metenses reside in the larger municipalities – such as the capital 
Villavicencio - Puerto Gaitan is without a doubt the oil capital. It is the town where the oil 
workers, local and national government officials, and communities converge. It is a rest area 
for those making the six to twelve hour journey south-eastward to the Pacific Rubiales block. 
And it is the transit route for hundreds of oil tank trucks transporting the black gold from the 
southern fields to the refineries and terminals in the north.  
The department itself is vast: the plains stretch for miles. But the towns are dense and 
developing. Banners sporting the Pacific Rubiales and EcoPetrol logos - the petro-giants of 
the country - decorate Puerto Gaitan’s new library and various buildings around town, while 
a never-ending procession of oil tank trunks inundate the roads and ensure a constant flow of 
people coming and going – oil workers and migrants alike. 
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In 2005, for example, the population of Puerto Gaitan was recorded at about 17,200 - 
miniscule in comparison to the 47 million that make up the rest of the country179. In just six 
years, however, the population nearly doubled to 30,000, and in 2013 was estimated to be 
closer to 40,000 when transient workers and migrants are taken into account – people not 
included in the official census180.  
Furthermore, the department of Meta has received a huge amount of royalties 
generated from the oil industry, increasing 270 percent between 2006-2008. These funds are 
primarily directed at smaller municipalities, of which Puerto Gaitan receives the most in the 
entire country: approximately $140 million dollars between 2007 and 2011181.  
Where ten years ago there was nothing but dirt roads, the freshly paved streets, lush 
manicured lawns, and modern government buildings are widely accredited to the influx of 
plata [wealth] and people the industry has brought with it, spurring an unprecedented level of 
local development. And Puerto Gaitan’s transformation has not gone unnoticed.  
Figure 13. Puerto Gaitan Mayor’s Office     Figure 14. Puerto Gaitan Library 
 
                                                
179 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2014 
 
180 Ibid.  
 
181 Juan Montoya and Luz Adriana Acevedo, “Una cadena de conflictos: Errores y aprendizajes de la 
actividad empresarial en Puerto Gaian,” Centro de Recursos Para El Análisis De Conflictos, 2013.  
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Source: Photos taken by Author 
Figure 15. Puerto Gaitan Panorama  
 
Source: Puertogaitan-meta.gov.co 
 
Indeed, in the eyes of the major national publications, the success of Meta and Puerto 
Gaitan mirrors the successful growth and development narrative that the country as a whole 
is projecting. A few lines from a special edition of the popular Revista Semana (2013) read as 
follows: 
“Meta: Entre el cielo y la sierra – el departamento motor de la economía 
regional se extiende, lleno de oportunidades…” [Meta: Between the sky and the 
mountains – the departmental motor of the regional economy extends, full of 
opportunities…] 
“El llano no es el future, es el presente” [The Llanos is not the future, it is the 
present] 
La Metamorfosis de Gaitan: En 20 anos, Puerto Gaitan paso de ser un caserio 
distante e inviable a considerarse la capital de la Altillanura. Su transformacion, que 
aun no termina, ha generado nuevas dinamicas sociales y economicas que, a su vez, 
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han cambiado el paisaje” [The metamorphosis of Gaitan: In 20 years Puerto Gaitan 
went form being a distant hamlet impossible of being considered the capital of the 
Altillanura. Its transformation, that has still not ended, has generated new social and 
economic dynamics that, in turn, have changed the landscape] 
Much, if not all, of these praises are accredited to the generosity of the oil industry: 
“Desde cuando el concepto de sostenibilidad fue aplicado a la industria petrolera, 
sus zonas de influencia reciben un mayor impulse al desarollo. Con base en él, las 
empresas promueven proyectos productivos, protegen los ecosistemas, garantizan la 
seguridad de sus trabjajadores e impulsan la competitividad de las regions, incluso en 
territories donde no hay presencia del Estado” [From when the concept of 
sustainability was first applied to the oil industry, the areas in which the industry had 
influence received a great boost to development. Based on this, the companies 
promote productive projects, protect ecosystems, ensure security of workers, and 
boost the competitiveness of the regions, including territories where the State is not 
present]182. 
 
“Lograremos educacion y oportunidades para todos con ayuda del desarrollo 
petroleo, pero sin depender de él, gracias a un plan maestro de sostenibilidad regido 
por 14 principios como la inclusion, tecnologia, educacion, derechos humanos, y 
participacion institucional” [We will achieve education and opportunities for all with 
the help of oil development, but without dependence on it, thanks to a master plan of 
                                                
182 Juan Pablo Machada, “Entre el cielo y la sierra,” Revista Semana, March 17, 2013: 144-197. Print. 
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sustainability guided by 14 principles, such as inclusion, technology, education, 
human rights, and institutional participation]183. 
To add to the narrative of success, a well established echo chamber of comments and 
numbers circulate in the mainstream media praising the generosity of the companies via 
investments in local communities: 
“El milagro del ‘oro negro’: más de 8.000 millones de pesos invirtió en proyectos 
sociales en 2010. Para este año, la cifra llegará a los 18.000 millones de pesos….” 
[The miracle of ‘black gold’: more than 8,000 million pesos were invested into social 
projects in 2010. For this year [2012], the figure has arrived at 18,000 million pesos] 
 
“Pacific Rubiales invirtió 67,7 millones de dólares en regiones y comunidades en 
2013  [Pacific Rubiales invested 67.7 million dollars in regions and communities in 
2013]”184. 
 
In this way, Puerto Gaitan is also being implicitly portrayed as ‘entering modernity’, 
echoing Colombia’s narrative of success. And these narratives of success support the oil 
companies’ declarations that, “Estamos comprometidos con el desarrollo de Colombia” [We 
are committed to the development of Colombia”185; “Trabajamos por el país, cuidando el 
                                                
183 Juan Pablo Machada, “Entre el cielo y la sierra,” Revista Semana, March 17, 2013: 144-197. Print. 
 
184 “Pacific Rubiales invirtió 67,7 millones de dólares en regions y comunidades en 2013,” El Espectador, 
March 26, 2013, http://www.elespectador.com/tomalapalabra/pacific-rubiales/pacific-rubiales-invirtio-677-
millones-de-214-articulo.  
 
185 Pacific Rubiales, 2012 
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planeta” [We work for the country, to guard the planet]186. All in all it creates a cycle 
reaffirming the success of the industry, on a national level as discussed earlier, but also at a 
local level. 
 Yet within Puerto Gaitan there are pieces of reality that do not match the local 
success narrative. However subtle these instances may be, they are irrefutably real. And 
though they may not constitute the majority, they are important because they reveal the 
shortcomings of the industry, and highlight areas that require support, which the oil industry 
is fundamentally incapable of addressing.   
 
5.1.1. Impactos y Cambios a la Comunidad Indigena: El caso de Pueblo Siquani 
While the oil industry impacts all facets of local society regardless of age, gender, 
sex, religion, race, class, or ethnic affiliation, the most striking instances can be found among 
indigenous communities. Thus, it is appropriate to begin with an explanation of the 
indigenous experience. 
The Siquani indigenous community is one of 9 small communities, or resguardos, 
home to Meta, though the Siquani number the largest in the area, around 2,300187. The 
Siquani are part of the resguardo Unuma – the collective name given to the community 
meaning ‘trade, work, union, or partnership’188. Of the nine indigenous resguardos, three 
                                                
186 Ecopetrol, 2012 
 
187 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, September 2013.  
The 9 indigenous resguardos in the area include: Unuma Alto Meta (2372 people), Domo Planas (1980 
people), El Tigre (1500 people), Awaliba (820 people), Vencedor-Piriri (740 people), Walianai (370 people), 
Wacoyo, Corozal-Tapaojo, and Iwiwi. 
188 Ibid.  
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have been “directly influenced by the oil industry,” but because the Siquani are the largest 
group they have experienced many of the most radical changes first hand, and have thus led 
the way in forming a collective organization - Escuela Unuma - to represent indigenous 
interests to the industry and local government189.  
Founded in 1972, Escuela Unuma was a direct response by the community to 
mistreatment from the government, from guerillas and paramilitaries, and the industry – 
illustrating how the present social problems compound suffering from the area’s violent past. 
It is an independent “administrative center for the indigenous community,” representing 
indigenous community interests to protect their autonomy. The primary areas of concern for 
Escuela Unuma involve protection of indigenous derechos [rights], territorio [territory], and 
qualidad de vida [quality of life]190. 
As one Siquani leader explains, the arrival of the oil industry in 2001 brought about 
“a dramatic change in life”191. The Canadian company Pacific Rubiales, represented by its 
subsidiary Meta Petroleum, led the infiltration into the oil-rich Colombian south during this 
time192. Shortly thereafter the community agreed to sell their ancestral territory after a long 
                                                
189 Ibid.  
  
190 Ibid. 
 
191 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013.  
 
192 There are also other, smaller, companies operating in the region which offer support and are contracted 
by the larger corporations responsible for the fields – UPECOL AND CARACOL in particular were pointed out 
in interviews. 
Additionally, there is little recorded history, at least in English, in regards to oil exploration in the way it is 
being discussed here prior to the 21st century. One indigenous community explains, however, that, “Before the 
international oil companies there was LATROCA (1970-74). During this time the indigenous population was 
practically enslaved. Women were raped and they mistreated the men. Then between 1999-200/2001 the 
international oil companies began arriving. During this time oil companies did not go through consulta previa 
[previous consultation] with the indigenous communities. They claimed they came here legally, but negotiated 
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and arduous consultation process, in which the community and the industry – represented by 
Ecopetrol and Pacific Rubiales – came to an accord. As such, the Siquani’s experience with 
the industry has been touted as a success, though many community members view the picture 
as much less rosy, and much more complicated.  
Some claim that, “the oil companies and the mayors office have always consulted 
indigenous communities,”193 while others argue that “the companies didn’t adhere to 
consulta previa”194. Indeed, the companies are only required to consult with communities 
whose territories directly overlap with extractive projects – surrounding communities are not 
legally protected: 
“The oil companies think that they are not doing anything against the law because 
the equipment is outside the boundaries of the indigenous territories and that there are 
no impacts, that its not affecting the territories, that they have nothing to do with 
indigenous communities. But there are environmental and social effects, and the 
indigenous communities claim that they should have been consulted”195. 
But even if consulta previa is fulfilled, there are still a number of problems during and 
after the process. One of the most common predicaments, a Siquani representative explains, 
is that company and government representatives come to the indigenous communities to “talk 
to people in areas they are not specialized in, so they arrive and make deals with the 
                                                                                                                                                  
with ‘white people’ here in the government or in the town instead, even though the 1991 [previous consultation] 
law existed” (Ibid).   
193 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013.  
 
194 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
 
195 Ibid. 
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indigenous population – who are not prepared to make deals – so they make unequal 
exchanges”196.  
Thus, although consulta previa represents an unprecedented acknowledgement of 
indigenous rights, it in no way ensures a fair and equitable resolution in the long-term. As the 
Siquani representative explained, indigenous communities are often culturally, legally, and 
technologically ill-equipped to fully understand the intricacies of extraction, and the far-
reaching, permanent changes it brings.  
For example, one EcoPetrol representative explains that during the consultation 
process one of the biggest challenges the company faces is that indigenous communities are 
typically unfamiliar with the legal boundaries of their territory: “many don’t understand the 
boundaries of the community, legally. They don’t recognize it,” largely because there has 
never been any restrictions or boundaries delineated to the communities197. This discrepancy 
in legal knowledge echoes back to our previous discussion regarding the state’s absence. 
Many indigenous communities in the Llanos previously lived their lives unconstrained by 
legal property boundaries. It is only with the arrival of the oil companies that, seemingly 
overnight, fences were put up and representatives arrived claiming land rights and delineated 
legal territory boundaries. Given not only language barriers, but these cultural and knowledge 
barriers as well, challenges to negotiations thus arise at almost every turn.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that while consulta previa ensures an open forum for 
discussion regarding extractive processes, there is absolutely no enforcement mechanism to 
                                                
 
196 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
 
197 Confidential interview by author, EcoPetrol, Bogota, Colombia, October 2013. 
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guarantee that agreements will be adhered to – compounding the likelihood of inequity in the 
long-term. This will be further discussed later in the paper, but suffice to say here that one of 
the most common complaints among indigenous community members is that the oil 
companies fail to deliver on their promises – whether lack of employment opportunities for 
local residents, or subpar infrastructure projects and training programs. But the challenges 
posed by extraction only just begin with consultation, and the impacts transpire regardless of 
consulta previa simply due to the physically disruptive and transformative nature of 
extractive processes. Here, the stories and experiences shared by Siquani members truly gets 
at the heart of Political Ecology’s emphasis on the interrelated nature of society, politics, 
economics, and the environment.  
Before the arrival of the industry Siquani life was characterized by a subsistence, 
hunter gathering and fishing lifestyle. But with the oil exploration process all but a few of the 
wildlife have fled the area due to noise contamination: “The noise from drilling and from 
seismic activities has driven away the animals. Where the indigenous communities used to 
collect fruit and animals, now they are not able to”198.  
Additionally, dust kicked up in the air from the oil tank trucks clouds the river water 
where many used to fish. The pictures below illustrate the extent of the dust. While Ecopetrol 
and Pacific Rubiales acknowledge dust and noise as inevitable ‘impacts’, during the 
consultation process these points are downplayed, and negotiations revolve around the 
unrealistic mitigation of these side effects instead of acknowledging the radical cultural and 
livelihood changes that are generated as a result of the noise and dust pollution.  
                                                
198 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
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Figure 16. Dust Over Rio Manacais, Puerto Gaitan 2013 
 
Source. Photos Taken by Author  
The result is that indigenous communities agree to terms without realizing the extent of 
the changes that will occur. The example of the dust is a prime example. Without hundreds of 
oil take trucks kicking up dust it is nearly impossible to imagine the cloud that engulfs the 
town and clouds the river, as such it becomes a minor point. In reality, however, the sheer 
volume of dust kicked up and carried over the town altars the ability and willingness of the 
Siquani to carry out traditional ways of obtaining food for their families.  
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Furthermore, in terms of pollution of the river, though the oil company will tell us 
that the river is not chemically contaminated, the Siquani no longer fish from the river for 
fear of contamination: “they dare not eat the fish anymore, they are afraid to eat them. You 
cannot see the physical damages on the bodies, but they are afraid of the contamination”199.  
Another Siquani member explained similarly how, “since [the exploitation] started 
they have been seeing environmental changes. The small water ways coming from the 
mountain are contaminated by crude and many fish died. From this the fishing activities were 
affected. On the Domo Planos there is also contamination from a crude explosion that 
contaminated the savannah, and from this also many cows died from lands and plants 
polluted by oil. We have tried to talk to the authorities, but when someone has the money 
they don’t care”200.  
To the Siquani these environmental changes culminate in the cultural degradation of 
the community, who are no longer able to adhere to their traditional practices. The 
indigenous coordinator at the Alcadia [Mayor’s office] explains it as such: “The population 
Siquani used to be based on fishing and hunting, but oil changed this way of life. Now they 
are getting used to white people behavior - they are entering a consumer and capitalist 
lifestyle. [They] lost their ways of living, lost the characteristics that had allowed them to 
exist as something different”201.  
Here we begin to understand the applicability of the Political Ecology lens, which 
again stresses how, “oil production has generative impacts and that in addition to the well-
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200 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
 
201 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
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known economic and environmental consequences of resource extraction, there are also 
social consequences that are embodied by socio-structural shifts in land use, labor, and social 
relations.”202. These ‘consequences’ can be equated to what Robbins identifies as ‘costs’, and 
how, Political Ecology acknowledges that these costs exist in a dynamic where “social actors 
exploit other people and environments for limited gain at collective cost”203. In this situation 
both the Siquani community and the environment are baring a collective cost, and 
additionally, changes in the environment generate socio-cultural changes. 
But the problem with these environmental changes extends far beyond the sadness of 
loosing one’s cultural practices; these environmental changes not only disrupt the lifestyles 
and livelihoods of communities, but deeply affect the sense of security and stability of 
indigenous men and women who are now forced to conform to a foreign monetary-based 
system of consumption and living: “Now everything is bought. They live more of a white 
lifestyle, try to own a little store, or work with the oil companies”204. This also requires 
indigenous to enter the workforce and become dependent on employment, though many 
Siquani enjoy only a basic education and often experience language and cultural barriers in 
their interactions, which often results in discrimination that is hidden just below the surface 
of the bustling little oil town.  
For example, since 2011 there are regular gatherings of elected townsfolk, referred to 
as the Mesa Social or Social Tables, who are charged with the responsibility of allocating 
additional social investments from Pacific Rubiales to areas most in need. There exists eight 
                                                
202 Anthony Bebbington and Jeffery Bury, Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Oil, Mining, and Gas 
in Latin America, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013, 4. 
 
203 Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 12. 
204 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
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different representatives that are charged with directing these funds. The representatives 
come together regularly to discuss investments at the collective Mesa Social [Social Table], 
with each person representing one of the following eight areas: cultura y artes [culture and 
arts], deportes [sports], capacidad [capacity], educacion [education], salud  [health], 
ambiente [environment], vendedores [vendors and local business], and indigena 
[indigenous]. 
 During one meeting of the Mesa Social the topic came up of allocating some of these 
funds to the indigenous communities. Most of the seven or so members seemed to 
demonstrate a tacit agreement with the proposal. One woman, however, abruptly remarked, 
“Why should we give them anything? They already have a lot of help from the government 
and from Pacific Rubiales. Why should they get more when they don’t even know how to 
handle the money? Their leaders just steal it all!”205. The topic was quickly put off the table 
and the group moved on to discuss other areas of investment, as there was no indigenous 
representative present.  
This stereotype about indigenous communities being money hungry or greedy, 
however, is one that thoroughly pervades the little oil town. Another community leader 
commented how “The problem with the indigenous is that they are always willing to sell 
themselves for any money”206. And there are other preconceptions about the indigenous 
communities as being backward or not wanting help, which quietly leads to a pattern of 
dismissiveness and social exclusion – whether from access to certain investments made by 
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the oil companies, or in other instances, such as healthcare. The Director of Health at the 
local medical center explains how noticeably high mortality rates among indigenous children 
“is because of their culture, they don’t want to access the health center even for most simple 
problems”207.  
These kinds of statements demonstrate how non-indigenous community members 
blame the problems that afflict indigenous communities on their culture, which is implicitly 
viewed as backwards and non-compatible with the western-consumption and monetary based 
system, which replaced traditional systems. The dismissiveness of these statements overlooks 
the fact that there are no medical centers in the former indigenous territories, and indigenous 
communities didn’t manage huge finances up until very recently. These things are thus, 
understandably, something completely unfamiliar.  
Likewise, indigenous communities very much view money and western medicine as 
something completely foreign, commonly referred to as ‘white people behavior’. One 
Siquani references this cultural confrontation when he explains that, “when the white man 
came they started changing the religion, the culture, everything”208. Another speaks of how 
when the oil companies came they only “negotiated with ‘white people’ in the government or 
in the town instead, even though the 1991 [consulta previa] law existed”209. He goes on to 
explain how indigenous communities “stopped their natural ways of life and more or less 
entered into capitalism… They live more of a white lifestyle, try to own a little store, or work 
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with the oil companies” and “now they are getting used to white people behavior; they are 
entering a consumer capitalist lifestyle”210.  
These statements demonstrate how the indigenous communities very much feel the 
cultural differentiation. The effects of which are not merely psychological, but results in 
indigenous being forced to operate in areas that “they are not specialized” in where they end 
up making “unequal exchanges”211. Contrarily, many Puerto Gaitanians do not see this 
cultural divide and dismiss the indigenous communities for not being able to easily transition 
into the new socio-economic system. As such, not only are many Siquani and other 
indigenous now living in a community that does not fully understand their culture or 
circumstances, but the Siquani now live in a state of constant worry and uncertainty, or 
preocupacion [worry]212.  
But preocupacion is more than just a fleeting moment of worry. It is an “atmosphere 
of uncertainty that that is produced, reproduced, and reinforced by what is conceptualized as 
rights violations, manifested through the economic, social, cultural, environmental, and 
political impacts” on local communities; and it is an awareness that this atmosphere is 
intimately linked to and created by the “physical manifestations that reproduce it, such as the 
elefantes blancos [white elephants – a reference to costly development projects with little 
utility], the disappearance of flora and fauna, and the loss of land and means for economic 
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support, but also the constant failure of many who, despite their lucha [fight], fail to succeed 
in obtaining what they need”213.  
While these circumstances and the atmosphere of preocupacion impeccably describe 
the experiences and concerns conveyed here by the Siquani in Puerto Gaitan, in truth 
Ferrero-Botero is describing Puerto Gaitan’s Northern counterpart – the Wayuu indigenous 
community of La Guajira, who coexist with the Cerrejón Coal Mine – the largest export 
open-pit coal mine, and one of the largest in the world214. Indeed, Cerrejón is the coal 
equivalent of the Pacific Rubiales oil field in Meta; it should be no surprise then that the 
experiences and impacts on indigenous communities mirror each other almost without 
exception.  
And in the same way the Wayuu experience a preocupacion created by “the physical 
manifestations” produced by the “economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political” 
conditions, the physical conditions that the Siquani experience also contribute to an 
atmosphere of preocupacion. In other words, the physical living conditions that the Siquani 
are resigned to contributes to the atmosphere of preocupacion in the Colombian south, in 
addition to the circumstances discussed above.  
For example, with the selling of the Siquani territory most community members now 
live in state-manufactured camps, which began being constructed in 2009. Before the camps, 
however, there were no alternative residences designated by either the state or the oil 
companies, and the Siquani were more or less completely landless after having negotiated 
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their territory away. The largest camp in Puerto Gaitan now houses some 450 Siquani and 
lies just on the periphery of Puerto Gaitan, yet still within the city limits - ironically and 
almost mockingly across the way from the mayor’s house, which enjoys at least a block of 
manicured flora and well structured edifices. Comparatively, in 2013 when this field research 
was conducted the camps were still being constructed. And despite the influx of plata from 
the industry, these housing units, designated specifically for the indigenous community, are 
generally considered to be subpar – and it is not difficult to understand why.  
Most buildings remain unfinished after 4 years of construction, and most if not all are 
built with plastic tarp to cover the walls. On some houses wooden paneling seem to have 
been haphazardly put together to form makeshift houses, some with scrap tin for roofs. There 
is also no pavement in the camp, and piles of construction material remain scattered. Nor is 
there proper sanitation infrastructure, or running water – though almost all of Puerto Gaitan 
enjoys these luxuries, particularly in the town center where the mayor’s office resides.  
Figure 17. Siquani Indigenous Reserve, Puerto Gaitan 2013 
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Source: Photos Taken by Author  
Inside the community camps most children spend their days playing, as the school that 
was being built by Pacific and the local government – like the houses – remains incomplete. 
In fact, one Siquani explained how the oil company had recently tried to present the school to 
the indigenous community, though it was clearly unfinished and much smaller than agreed 
upon. As such the indigenous community refused to accept the school as is. As of this writing 
the school, and the camps are still being constructed after 3 years.  
And like the ecological degradation from production activities discussed earlier, there 
are generative psychological and emotional impacts that result from living in such precarious 
conditions. One Siquani member commented on the camps as follows: “Anteriormente era 
libre [We used to be free]. Free to travel in the territory… With the companies, now the 
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indigenous communities feel they are enclosed, trapped. They have little territory, where they 
view their ancestral lands from afar that they no longer have”215.  
Another Siquani explains in regard to the enclosure, “We need territory. We are so 
many inhabitants, we are too many in too little space. And we are wanting to grow in the 
future, but have been given so little territory from the government. And people have lost 
loads and loads of territory… Even with a small portion of the land that is not being used [by 
the oil companies] so much could be done… But we are here”216.  
These living conditions not only reproduce the atmosphere of preocupacion, as there 
is a constant and quiet battle being waged by the community leaders to ensure that the local 
government and oil companies fulfill the promises made to the community, but additionally, 
these very much impoverished circumstances reinforces the view of indigenous communities 
as inept, greedy, and incompatible with the new ‘modern’ Puerto Gaitan – particularly in the 
eyes of Puerto Gaitanians, but also possibly (and sadly) among the indigenous themselves.  
A related issue, and one that is perhaps most interesting, is that in addition to the 
dismissiveness towards the indigenous community and the lack of care that seems to have 
been put into construction of their housing, the erection of a cement wall dividing the camp 
and the residents of Puerto Gaitan is in the process of being built for the ‘cultural 
preservation’ of the Siquani community217. Now this may be true, but the use of walls has a 
dubious history throughout the world – in terms of gated communities, the Berlin Wall, the 
                                                
215 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
 
216 Confidential interview by author, Puerto Gaitan, Colombia, October 2013. 
 
217 Ibid.  
  
137 
U.S.-Mexican border, and walls dividing Palestinians and Israelis. Many Siquani tend to 
share this suspicion, and it would seem likely that the wall is more meant to hide the half-
constructed indigenous reservation – in a phrase – out of sight out of mind. 
Figure 18. Wall Under Construction Surrounding Siquani Reserve, 2013 
 
Source. Photos Taken by Author  
Regardless of the intention, however, the construction of the wall is significant because it 
physically reinforces the idea of a cultural divide and relieves the government and Puerto 
Gaitanians of any attempt to understand, integrate, and assist the indigenous community; it is 
perhaps the final step in granting full ‘autonomy’ to the indigenous community, while 
simultaneously relieving the municipality of any responsibility for their wellbeing.  
While there are undoubtedly a great number of issues we have not identified here 
including: quality of education, family relations, domestic abuse, alcoholism, indigenous 
employment, abuse in the work place, and indigenous relations with armed groups and the 
police force - not to mention the experiences of indigenous communities living in the rural 
areas, all of which were beyond the scope and ability of this research project, the image that 
is presented here is distressing in itself.  
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Furthermore, this discussion illustrates how the Colombian government’s hands-off 
approach to oil development projects and Consulta Previa process has legitimate impacts on 
indigenous wellbeing – both physically in terms of housing, and psychologically in terms of 
the uncertainty in which they live.  
And similarly to how the Siquani are directly impacted by the government’s 
neglectful attitude towards Consulta Previa and their overall wellbeing, the Siquani also exist 
with these ‘new’ problems compounded with the historical memory of decades of conflict. 
For example, one Siquani explains as follows: 
“Before the international oil companies came we had LATROCA218 from 1970-
1974. During this time the indigenous population was practically enslaved. Women 
were raped and they mistreated the men. Then between 1999-2001 the international 
oil companies began arriving. During this time oil companies did not go through 
Consulta Previa with the indigenous communities. They claimed they came here 
legally, but negotiated with ‘white people’ here in the government or in the town 
instead, even though the 1991 law existed. Then after the companies started coming 
there were many problems. There were armed groups, paramilitaries, and strange 
people came from the outside world. All actors got involved, people started claiming 
territories because of the exploitation of the oil, they systematically reduced the 
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tribes’ territories; then the military forces got involved, who were well-known for 
mistreating indigenous people”219.  
Thus, from an indigenous perspective the problems that the present day oil companies 
brought with them are not viewed in isolation. For the Siquani, they have lived through 
constant struggles as outlined above, even getting caught up in the violence between the 
FARC and various paramilitaries. And this is how historical memory of suffering gets 
replicated and compounded, and it illustrates how Colombia’s history of conflict cannot be 
viewed as separate from the experiences and problems that exist in the present time with the 
hydrocarbons industry. This is true both for indigenous, and non-indigenous alike - and it is 
to their experiences that we now turn to in order to gain a holistic image of the full depth and 
width of impacts the oil industry has brought to Puerto Gaitan.  
 
5.1.2. Impactos y Cambios a la Comunidad General de Puerto Gaitan 
Outside of the wall, life appears notably different as residents bustle about their daily 
lives amid the dust and never-ending procession of oil tank trucks. But Puerto Gaitanians, 
though they are able to proceed with their lives fairly comfortably, question the efficacy of 
the investments from the oil industry.  
 
Figure 19. Puerto Gaitan During the Day, 2013 
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Source. Photos Taken by Author  
 
For example, much money has been invested in the local medical center. They have 
new equipment, and there is set to be another sum of money invested in the coming year. The 
problem is, however, not the lack of equipment, but the lack of doctors. In Puerto Gaitan 
people typically make fun of the medical center for being just that – a medical center. There 
are actually no doctors to serve the town of now 30,000 (possibly 40,000 when including 
transient workers). One social leader explains: “They don’t even have professional doctors, 
just students who go to finish their residency training!”220.  
The current Director of the medical center explains similarly how, “It is not really a 
hospital, it is health center - we promote prevention. This place is for basic care, not specialty 
care.  If specialty care is needed you to go Villavicencio,” three hours away221. She explains 
further how the medical center has at least ten doctors (who serve on a rotational basis) and 
sixteen beds, which serve an average of 18-20 people per day – just barely stretching the 
resources. The hospital is largely funded by the national government, but receives a small 
amount of extra funds from Pacific Rubiales via the Mesa Social as discussed earlier. Some 
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of the hospital is also under construction, but there are still important things missing: “If this 
center is going to stay a health center we need more space and equipment and things to make 
the patients more comfortable – for example air conditioning. Here there is no air 
conditioning so the patients get uncomfortable” in the 80-90 degree heat222.  
Figure 20. Puerto Gaitan Medical Center 
 
Source. Photos Taken by Author 
 
Now again, there have been some apparent improvements in the medical center. But 
it is also notable that while the hospital remains very small and clearly under resourced, a 
number of ‘development’ projects have sprung up around town – earlier referred to as ‘white 
elephants’ – in a very timely manner.  
These include, as previously mentioned, the Mayor’s office, which does by chance enjoy air 
conditioning all throughout; but also included are the local church, the local convention 
center/theatre, a library and a decorative archway-fountain at the entrance to the city. The 
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photo to the right depicts the medical center building, while the photos below offer a visual 
of the other aforementioned projects in the order that they were listed.  
Figure 21. Puerto Gaitan ‘White Elephants’: Church, Convention Center, Library, 
& Archway, 2013 
 
 
Source. Photos Taken by Author  
 
These constitute some of the most noticeable, ‘positive’, impacts from the arrival of 
the industry. Shiny new buildings, and decorative structures give the impression of a modern 
city. Residents of Puerto Gaitan, for example, feel extremely proud that there are paved 
roads, and that the ‘town’ has turned more or less into a ‘city’: “Before the oil companies this 
was a very poor area. Just houses, but now it is a city in large part thanks to the oil 
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companies. And it has mainly changed the life of everyone. Before they couldn’t afford to 
buy a car or a motorcycle or a house, but now they can. It has changed from a rural town to a 
city”223.  
But alas, far from signaling a substantive development, the cosmetic modifications to 
the cityscape remain hollow. For one, most all of these development projects are not being 
kept up, or do not function properly at all. While signs decorate the inner walls of the library 
and theatre/convention center, detailing how much money Pacific or Ecopetrol invested in 
the project (ex. “Pacific Rubiales invertió $2,000,000 pesos”), the floors of the convention 
center stage are deteriorating, sprinkled with holes. A gaggle of wires hangs from the ceiling 
with no apparent purpose. One maintenance worker explains briefly how events here are very 
uncommon, maybe once every few months, and the 400 some odd seats are never filled all 
the way. Similarly, the library, though three stories tall, is notably lacking books. Partially 
intended as a study space for students, the library is rarely – if ever – filled after school, 
though a few younger children frequent the children’s section. Again, a conspicuous amount 
of dust coats the floors, the walls, and the tables. Upon entering the silence and the stillness 
give an undisputable feeling of hollowness. 
Now these things may change. The city is undeniably in a period of transition. But 
while the construction of a select few fancy edifices transpired almost immediately, and with 
quality, the majority of the population are left in tenuous circumstances as the environment 
transforms far faster than the quality of their lives. In fact, in many ways the influx of wealth 
has exacerbated inequity in ways that may not be easy to notice from the outside, but are 
commented on frequently.  
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Many local women and men, for example, come to Puerto Gaitan looking for work 
with the oil companies. Pacific Rubiales’ Corporate Social Responsibility Representative, 
William Jaimez, explains how “One of the effects of the oil companies is that this town was 
supposed to be planned for ten thousand people, but because of oil, thousands more people 
arrived. Now people cannot get jobs fast… families come looking for work but haven’t found 
it”224. 
It is a story all too familiar, repeated time and time again in conversations. Oil 
companies promise to bring employment and development, to increase the quality of life for 
local people: “Our aim is that countries and communities in which we operate should benefit 
directly from our presence through the wealth and jobs created, the skills developed within 
the local population and the investment of our time and money in people rather than in 
things, so that we create sustainable human progress”225. But by nature the oil industry is 
technologically intensive and requires only a select number of trained professional 
technicians – usually brought in from major cities. The representative explains further that, 
“There is not enough work, there are way more people living here than there are supposed to 
be. They come with the dream to get a job, but many are unqualified and we only have 
certain jobs for qualified or specialized people - I need ten people, but twenty people come, 
and I need a person with experience. This is the illusion of the region”226.  
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His point is bolstered by a 2008 report released by the UNDP entitled Frente a los 
Objetivos de Desarollo del Mileno [“Meeting the Millennium Development Goals”] which 
reveals the employment statistics of the department. In 2008, 67 percent of the department of 
Meta was employed in the informal sector or in temporary work. And while neighboring 
Villavicencio registered an unemployment rate of 10.3 percent in 2013, because of the large 
number of migrants the rate in Puerto Gaitan is estimated to have a much higher rate, though 
no studies have been conducted227. The popular magazine Semana, however reported in that 
in 2010 at least 44 percent of the population lived in poverty, while according to the index of 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs some 65 percent of the population in Puerto Gaitan live in poverty, 
lacking access to housing, health services, education, and income228.  
These numbers hint at an ongoing phenomenon in the department, and in Puerto 
Gaitan in particular, that in light of remarkably high investments into the municipality, 
poverty, inequality and social problems not only remain prevalent, but thrive: “And you can 
see the poverty… When you see poor places its because of the people coming here recently – 
hoping to get a job with the oil companies”229. This could, on one hand be viewed as a mini 
‘resource curse’, but at this local level the impacts become more conspicuous and emotive as 
people describe how the industry has impacted their lives and community. The promises of 
oil elude local residents and, without assistance from the state or local government, many are 
left in dire conditions. Indeed the problems that have come to afflict Puerto Gaitan lie just 
beneath the statistics and are echoed throughout the community in more than one way. While 
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the city center enjoys sturdy cemented buildings, the migrant communities exist on the 
outskirts of the town in makeshift abodes of collected scrap metals, wooden debris, and 
plastic tarp. They come seeking work, only to find poverty. 
It should be noted here, that the makeshift housing units on the outskirts of town 
were, however, not established solely by migrant workers seeking work in the fields. Many 
of these residences house people who have settled in the town feeling the violence from the 
previous decade – they are just a few of the 1.4 million internally displaced peoples who 
continue to survive in precarious situations. The fact that these displaced peoples are mixed 
and intermingled with the ever-increasing inflow of migrant workers easily allows the 
continuities of violence to appear lost in the metamorphosing town, though for those 
displaced their living conditions serve as a continual reminder of a history that cannot be 
separated from their present circumstances.  
For migrant workers, their situation is just as precarious. Given the lack of work 
many wait for months for a potential contract that in the end lasts no longer than three to four 
months, leaving them in a cycle of precariousness. One woman who used to work for the oil 
companies, but now receives assistance from the Church, recounts how, “The contracts are 
typically three to four months. The deal is usually for two years, but we are always released 
after the trial period of three to four months. It is the way they evade responsibilities, paying 
us benefits, etc. and it is a way to keep the turnover”230. Then there are those who haven’t 
been hired at all, but distinctly remember being promised jobs, being put on a list of sorts but 
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never receiving the call: “Pacific promised us that they would have more jobs with the traffic. 
But it’s a lie!”231.   
These accusations are supported by the findings in a public hearing against Pacific 
Rubiales’ activities in Colombia “regarding the impacts of Canadian investments on the 
armed conflict in Colombia, especially since the entry into force of the CCFTA in 2011”232. 
The accompanying report finds that, “To a large extent, PRE avoids hiring employees 
directly by contracting with other companies. These companies then hire “subcontractors” 
who are, in all but name, employees on 28-day renewable contracts. The result is a 
precariously employed workforce”233. Furthermore, the report finds that Pacific is cited for 
unethical behavior, including the use of contractors and employment agencies as a strategy to 
avoid liability under labor laws.  
And there are other stories too, of women working for the companies who are treated 
unfairly, or who do not get the benefits they were promised. One woman explains: “I used to 
work at one of the oil companies, and I got pregnant. When they found out I was pregnant 
they fired me. I know its illegal, but what could I do”234. Another woman chimes in, “I used 
to work at one of the oil companies. When I used to work there my daughter got shot. She is 
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now handicapped because of that. I was supposed to get benefits from the company for this, 
but they told me I needed to write a letter, and then they fired me”235.  
The same PASC report discussed above supports the claims of these women in its 
findings that, “Working and living conditions at Campo Rubiales do not meet the basic 
international standards prescribed by the International Labor Organization”236. Furthermore, 
the report’s analysis of “these companies’ [Pacific and its subsidiaries, Pacific Straus and 
Meta Petroleum] activities in the mining and petroleum sectors” reveals patterns of, 
“violations of human rights, labor standards, trade union rights, [and] social and territorial 
rights”237.  
But even outside the realm of employment with the oil companies, many community 
members are quick to identify the negative changes to the community that are not outlined by 
reports of this nature, chief among them prostitution, drug use, and disintegration of the 
family – all of which were commented on in nearly every interview. A local government 
official comments how, “The proliferation of the sexual industry is a big problem. Many 
people now come from far away and it has grown a lot”238; A local businesswoman also 
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points out that, “Many people have arrived and prostitution has increased a lot, and also drug 
addiction”239.  
In Puerto Gaitan, “Prostitution is legal… but there are norms to regulate it,” the 
Tennant commander of the local police station explains. For example, “there are only special 
places where they can work and they have to get medical tests often”240. Regardless of its 
legality, however, many “people from the town complain about the prostitutes because the 
industry has grown, it is very visible now and it sets a bad example for the children”241.  
The Director of the medical center explaining also that, “prostitution is an especially 
big problem. People come to work, to find opportunities and they end up being far from their 
families, so prostitution has grown a lot. Many [sex workers] become pregnant and have 
problems with STDS, especially with HIV, and HPV. It is a big problem, many don’t know 
about these problems and it is difficult to detect.”242.  
The proliferation of the sex industry in communities adjacent to or impacted by 
resource extraction constitutes a deeply neglected phenomena, though it is certainly not 
limited to Colombia. In fact, similar findings have surfaced in the North American Midwest 
where hydraulic fracturing projects are booming. According to representatives of 
Minnesota’s Citizen Action Network, Native American women and girls have been coerced 
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and recruited as prostitutes in recent years to service the mass of workers migrating to the 
fracking fields243.  
Yet In addition to prostitution, many community members in Puerto Gaitan express 
concern over what they perceive as the disintegration of the family. The police tenant 
reminisces how, “Before when we had no companies at all it was very peaceful. When the oil 
companies came the crime and alcoholism rate increased… many people now come from 
other regions and there are more problems with alcohol. Now there are more drunk fights 
with people not from this town. And there are social problems - children are left at home 
now, while parents leave to work in the camps”244. 
In a joint interview with a legal advisor from the mayor’s office, his wife, and a local 
social leader the three angrily echoed the same concerns: “Since the company came there is 
much more social disintegration, and disintegration of the family… the people now invest 
much money in liquor… Fathers don’t have responsibilities anymore and it is common to see 
children on the street without anyone caring for them. And prostitution… It was not seen 
before, but since the oil companies have arrived they are more open to the outside world…. 
Of course the oil companies bring much, but it is only for the people with money”245.  
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While there are no actual studies or numbers reflecting the prevalence of prostitution, 
alcohol, drug use, or domestic violence246 in Puerto Gaitan, these types of impacts from 
extractive industries are all too common characteristics of extractive societies, though they 
hardly - if ever - make it into the environmental and social impacts assessment surveys that 
companies are required to produce; yet they constitute some of the most structural and deep-
seeded changes that communities endure as a result of extraction – as evidenced by the 
interviews here and reports in other communities. As one community member commented, 
“the oil companies think that they are not doing anything against the law… but there 
environmental and social effects. Our lives have changed because of it”247. 
This discussion is not meant to serve as a value judgment against sex workers or the 
sex industry. On the contrary, from an outsider’s perspective, the problem with the 
proliferation of prostitution in Puerto Gaitan is that it signals a deficiency of alternative 
economic, employment, or educational opportunities.  In other words, the problem is not 
simply that there are prostitutes, but that there are no jobs. Indeed, this assertion is consistent 
with the discussion earlier regarding the lack of employment opportunities with the oil 
industry. And of course, from local residents’ perspectives the problem with prostitution is 
that is endangers the health of young girls and denotes social disintegration.  
These constitute some of the most important issues and problems that indigenous and 
non-indigenous residents of Puerto Gaitan have identified as consequences of the arrival of 
the oil industry. Furthermore, these experiences are validated by the report on the Hearing on 
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the Canadian oil company Pacific Rubiales Energy, which brings to light how Pacific 
Rubiales is culpable for what they detail as: 
 
“1. Lobbying for mining, energy, environment, and labor legislation to suit their own 
economic interests to the detriment of the country’s [Colombia’s] well-being and 
development 
2. Violating minimal standards of environmental preservation, given that natural 
resource exploitation… has damaged several Colombian ecosystems 
3. Causing major impacts on the ancestral communities living in the region where 
multinationals operate, as well as causing the physical and cultural extermination of 
these communities (ethnocide)”248. 
The report takes into consideration various operations that Pacific Rubiales and its 
subsidiaries are involved in, some in Meta, but also the neighboring departments, but all of 
which demonstrate these impacts249. But are there positive changes as well? When 
questioned about the positive changes that the oil industry has brought to Puerto Gaitan 
almost everyone during the interview process commented how, “There have been little 
changes, and it has meant a lot to this town”250. “There are good things… There is pavement 
on the streets and pipes for the water – things that we didn’t have before,” though it is always 
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qualified with an acute awareness that, “The bad things are more, for sure”251. But there is 
something else. As Bebbington aptly remarks in his book, “resource extraction often leaves 
footprints on individual and community consciousness that are not easily erased and become 
deeply embedded over time. Patterns of distrust emerge and are awakened during social 
movements”252. 
What Bebbington explains to us here has very important implications for Puerto 
Gaitan: when the negative changes that resource extraction levies on ‘individual and 
community consciousness’ become too great – far from passively enduring the negative 
changes – local people mobilize, and social movements are born – civil society is born. This 
is exactly what transpired in Puerto Gaitan in 2011 when a string of protests erupted in the 
little town. Ironically then, the negative impacts from the oil industry have also generated 
positive changes as well.  
 
5.1.3. Positive Impacts to Puerto Gaitan  
In light of the tremendous transformations to the indigenous and local community 
alike, two notable positive impacts can be identified with linkages to the arrival of the oil 
industry. Firstly, what can be considered a renewal of civil society in the form of more 
active social and political participation and civil disobedience; and secondly, the formation 
of a more democratic and inclusive process for managing financial impacts of the oil 
industry – namely, the mesa social [social table].  
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5.1.3.1. The People Rise, and Keep Rising: Puerto Gaitan’s Movimiento Social 
To turn to the first point: after the industry’s arrival and Pacific began increasing 
production outputs a string of both violent and non-violent protests erupted in Puerto Gaitan 
and rocked the municipality for nearly a year. To reiterate, prior to the industry’s arrival the 
town was made up of some 17,000 residents, and the necessity of civil disobedience was 
miniscule as life was, more or less, what some described as ‘simple’. However, with so many 
social and economic changes, and the population ballooning to nearly 40,000, 2011 
witnessed the birth of one of the most monumental social movements in the town’s history. 
Because this narrative has not been condensed thus far in any English language publication 
the following section makes clear the chronology, events, and perspectives of the protests, 
and then analyzes its significance, characterizing these as distinctly positive impacts.  
 
July 19, 2011  
Marking the first mass movement of oil workers in Puerto Gaitan, on July 19, 2011, 
5,000 of nearly 12,000 workers from the Pacific Rubiales oil field began a mass protest that 
halted the company’s production. The collective grievances of the workers included: 
demands for salary increases from roughly $297 (U.S.) per month, to about $1,100 per month 
– closer to the salary earned by EcoPetrol employees; and improved conditions in the field – 
including food, sanitation, and sleeping quarters253.  
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Many people complain particularly regarding the sleeping quarters. Field workers, 
who often work 3-4 month contracts and rotate between different companies, sleep in small 
units akin to shipping containers or mobile units that house between 6-10 men. The 
conditions are often cramped, and since the workers are confined to the rural fields, are 
limited to the food and sanitation provided by the company, which has also been described as 
subpar.  
In response to the mobilization the local police commander Juan Carlos Pinzo called 
upon the police department in the neighboring town to assist the situation, accumulating 
roughly 300 police to monitor the protests, who still maintained relatively peaceful activities. 
The following day, after Pacific Rubiales reported a complete stoppage to operations, the 
government sent in 100 new members from the Bogota Police and 110 members from the 
National Army to provide additional support and quell the ‘disturbance’. After a series of 
escalations due to heavier police presence the resulting clashes left one dead, ten wounded, 
and five cars incinerated254.  
In response to the violent clashes between security forces and protesters, Pacific 
agreed to sit down and discuss working conditions with employees, along with 
representatives from the national Union Sindical Obrera (USO) – the largest workers’ union 
and most vocal advocacy group for workers’ rights, the national military, government 
officials, and local police. For the time being, protests were quelled.  
 
August 18, 2011 
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However, less than one month later on August 18, 2011 another massive protest 
erupted. This time, however, the protest was made up of a group of unemployed residents of 
Puerto Gaitan who had been seeking employment with Pacific Rubiales. The protestors took 
to the roads blocking the passage of oil tank trucks, effectively halting all transportation to 
and from the fields. Their main grievance: that Pacific and its subsidiaries continued to 
contract workers from outside the area as opposed to local residents, not only breaking the 
company’s promise upon its initial arrival to bring jobs to the people, but also violating the 
agreement that had been reached in the aftermath of the previous protest255.  
In response, President Santos issues a statement explaining that, “there is no reason 
for new protests in Puerto Gaitan”256. He continued noting that: 
“El Gobierno ha diseñado un plan de trabajo para atender las más de 115 inquietudes y 
necesidades expresadas por la comunidad en el encuentro celebrado el pasado 3 de agosto 
en Puerto Gaitán, Meta. 
En lo que respecta a los temas laborales, el Ministerio de la Protección Social ha llevado 
a cabo más de 160 visitas y está próximo a entregar un informe exhaustivo sobre el respeto a 
los derechos laborales de los empleados del sector petrolero de la region”  
… 
“El próximo 25 de agosto se reunirán dichas dependencias para evaluar y coordinar las 
acciones pertinentes y posteriormente, el 1° de septiembre, se adelantará una reunión con el 
Comité de Seguimiento, conformado por la Alta Consejería, la Vicepresidencia de la 
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República, el Ministerio del Interior, el Gobernador del departamento, el Alcalde de Puerto 
Gaitán y el Párroco del municipio, tal como se acordó el 3 de agosto” 
[The government has designed a work plan to address over 115 concerns and needs 
expressed by the community at the meeting held on August 3 in Puerto Gaitan, Meta. 
With regard to labor issues, the Ministry of Social Protection has carried out more than 
160 visits and is about to deliver a comprehensive report on the respect for labor rights of 
employees of the oil sector in the region 
… 
On August 25 such units will meet to assess and coordinate relevant actions and 
subsequently a meeting with the Monitoring Committee, made up of the High Council, the 
Vice-President, the Ministry will come on September 1st, Inside, the governor of the 
department, the Mayor of Puerto Gaitan and the pastor of the town, as agreed on August 3].  
 
The President’s message kept Puerto Gaitan calm for the time being, as he urged patience 
and to allow time for diplomacy to unfold. But after the August 25th meeting – which resulted 
in a plan for a series of additional meetings to be held at a national level from September to 
October257 – another massive wave of demonstrations took hold of the city once more. 
 
September 18, 2011  
Amidst criticism of a breach of the August 3rd contract involving the mass dismissal 
of workers from Pacific, on September 18, 2011 4,000 workers again gathered at the 
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Rubiales field to urge the Santos and Pacific executives to find an immediate solution to the 
workers’ grievances258.  
Union leaders told national media reporting on the protest that at least 200 workers 
from the Rubiales field were fired, while an additional 1,200 were compensated without 
contract renewal. Union representatives further explained that these dismissals were believed 
to be a retaliatory acts for workers’ participation in the previous protests259.  
This time, protests escalated quickly, with hundreds meeting security forces head-on 
armed with sticks and stones, and lighting debris on fire to create barricades. The clashes 
effectively halted oil production for two days and drew unprecedented international attention. 
Bruno Moro, the UN delegate to Colombia commented on the events at the Rubiales field 
noting that, “when situations like Campo Rubiales occur it is because the conditions for 
dialogue have not been created”260. Moro called for the Colombian government and Pacific 
to devise an early solution to the problem, emphasizing that, “it is time to reflect on the social 
responsibility of foreign companies coming to Colombia” and “we must strive to reach a 
decision around a table as soon as possible”261.  
Not everyone approached the protests so favorably though. Pacific executives 
complained that, “this is not a labor protest… this is a hostile takeover of our 
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installations!”262. Additionally Pacific executives and government officials accused the 
protests of being influenced, motivated, and infiltrated by FARC – though this is has been a 
“convenient excuse for officials and executives in Colombia to peg demonstrators as 
traitors”263. 
The volume and consistency of the protests paid off in the end despite disgruntled 
executives and FARC-fearsome officials. After several days of initial negotiations and nine 
consecutive workshops, the community and Pacific reached an accord. The agreement 
involved the purchase of 30 acres of Pacific’s territory to build 3,000 low-cost housing units 
for oil workers, along with an investment of some $1 million USD to be put into 
improvements at the local hospital.  
The most important part of the agreement, however, included a provision that Pacific 
and each of its subsidiaries are mandated to hire 100% of their employees from the local 
unskilled workforce. On October 3rd, a Pacific spokesman made the announcement that, 
“100% of unskilled labor will be hired from people of the region, and that extends to 
contractors with Pacific,” so that any contractor “who wants to work with Pacific must work 
with labor in the region 100%”264. He followed up with an announcement that Pacific would 
hire some 1,000-1,200 new employees from the local areas by the end of the year – a 
tremendous victory for the residents of Puerto Gaitan265. 
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While the efficacy and justification for the use of violence is a question of long-
standing debate, here the focus should be on the success of Puerto Gaitan’s social movement 
throughout 2011. The movement was notable in that it drew not only oil workers, but also the 
unemployed women and men from the community – both those who were life-long residents, 
and migrant workers. In several interviews, those who had participated in the protests 
frequently commented on the collaborative and sustained nature of the protests as positive 
developments266, emphasizing that, “people really came together during this time, everyone 
agreed that something needed to be done, to change”267. 
And indeed the protests served to bring the community together in new ways. Firstly, 
while the need for protests is one to be lamented, the actual phenomena itself is encouraging, 
especially when peaceful negotiations are reached as they had been in Puerto Gaitan. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the people of Puerto Gaitan have found a collective voice and 
refuse put up with labor rights violations that so many experience, and which corroborate the 
PASC Delegation’s report discussed earlier this thesis that found Pacific’s labor practices in 
violation of ILO standards268.  
In fact, the negotiations seemed to have been successful in that Puerto Gaitan at least 
for some time. Fortunately or unfortunately, in May of 2015 a smaller sect of disenfranchised 
workers staged demonstrations in and around the Pacific Rubiales field, again incinerating 
several cars and even a portion of the oil facilities. The protests reportedly have reemerged as 
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a result of another string of layoffs by Pacific which, which saw some 1,000 people 
dismissed between February-May of 2015269. Again, while it is deplorable that such actions 
are necessary, the most recent protests are a sign that workers will continue to hold 
government and Pacific officials accountable to the contracts that are agreed upon. And in an 
area such as Puerto Gaitan, where such a significant and decisive amount of oil is extracted, 
it is likely that any continued civil disobedience and domestic disturbance will not go without 
pushback and notice. 
 
5.1.3.2. The People Erect New Democratic Institutions: The Mesa Social   
 
A second positive result that has emerged out of the negative impacts discussed 
earlier, and a result of the protests listed above, includes the formation of the Mesa Social, 
which was briefly discussed earlier.  
After the 2011 protests, representatives of the Mesa Social explain that “everyone got 
tired of the oil companies” and, while the protests were productive, it was also harmful to 
local businesses that were destroyed, and to local people who got injured in the conflict270. 
They explained that while they thought the protests were necessary and productive, they 
would prefer not to see them return at that level271. In order to remedy the social discontent 
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and disturbances local business owners and social leaders got together with government 
officials and Pacific representatives to propose the formation of the Mesa Social.  
Since then, the Mesa Social – consisting of seven areas, each with their own 
representatives: cultura y artes [culture and arts], deportes [sports], capacidad [capacity], 
educacion [education], salud  [health], ambiente [environment], vendedores [vendors and 
local business], and indigena [indigenous] – holds regular gatherings.  
Each representative is voted in by local residents during regular municipal elections. 
The meetings take place at the local church, and are facilitiated by Puerto Gaitan’s pastor, 
Padre Eilson, who has also been involved in local politics and mediation matters with Pacific 
and the government. The idea behind the Mesa Social is that the people from the community 
have a say in directing financial support to the areas deemed most in need – which Pacific or 
the government may have been unaware of or uninterested in. The Mesa Social’s 
recommendations are then forwarded to the local mayor’s office and to Pacific 
representatives for approval.  
During several meetings that were attended whilst conducting research in Puerto 
Gaitian, several areas for investment were being considered, including: directing financial 
support to elderly residents with chronic diseases, as well as disabled residents; and 
allocating some 5,000,000 pesos for the hospital and rural health brigades, which provide 
rural residents with a temporary post to obtain medical care in the outskirt of town. 
Additional funds were also being considered to sponsor cultural arts and sports.  
Examples of previous projects that the Mesa Social handled include, for example, 
allocating an additional $85,000 USD to the five best students in Puerto Gaitian, which 
covers all they need to maintain their studies in whichever university they choose to attend; 
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and allocating money for children who are passionate about sports. As the representative for 
sports at the Mesa Social explained, “since then we have been in both national and 
international competitions and we have professional equipment to practice with – not even 
Villavicencia [the larger neighboring city] has that!”272 
What is unclear and represents a possible shortcoming of the Mesa Social includes a 
point which was discussed earlier in this research project – the indigenous reserves. For 
example, if the Mesa Social decides that they want to direct money towards improving the 
indigenous reserves, how much jurisdiction would the Mesa have in that matter? 
Furthermore, does the Mesa Social have the capacity or the authority to address more 
structural issues, such as access to sanitation, clean water, or education - whether in 
indigenous communities or among the general population? And if so, how effective or how 
much follow through and oversight does the Mesa Social actually have once funds are 
allocated to particular areas? These are just a few questions that remain unanswered, and that 
may prove to pose significant limitations to the role of the Mesa Social when considering the 
long-term, equitable, and sustainable development of Puerto Gaitan.  
However, this is not to say that the Mesa Social is to be thrown out. On the contrary, 
the democratic nature of this new, notably local, institution is one to be upheld, adjusted, 
possibly replicated or expanded as time goes on – after all, the formation of effective 
institutions is an ongoing project that requires constant assessment and adjustment in order to 
adapt fully to the community’s needs, and the Mesa Social represents an unprecedented 
collaboration between community members, government officials, and oil companies. While 
previously oil companies operated mostly on their own, with minimal government 
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involvement, the present situation attempts to move beyond that anachronistic structure to 
bring the local community into the development dialogue. The representatives at the Mesa 
Social fully acknowledge this reality emphasizing that, “we know this is only the start, and 
this can and will be more as it develops over time”273. 
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VI. Chapter 6: Conclusion, Significance, Implications 
 
6.1. What is the meaning of it all anyways? 
Now that we have arrived here at the end, the question must be posed – what does it all 
mean? In order to understand the significance of this discussion and all the evidence that has 
been presented, it is necessary to highlight the key points from the previous chapters, and 
strand together the main arguments. This will, in turn, answer the questions posed at the 
beginning of this thesis and show how the Colombian context offers important lessons and 
insights for developing communities facing extraction.  
 
6.2. How we got here: Reviewing the Arguments  
To reiterate, the questions this thesis initially set out to answer are as follows: 
From a theoretical perspective - what is it about Resource Curse theory that has failed to 
allow for an effective solution to the myriad of problems, such as corruption and 
transparency, that plague resource-rich developing countries like Colombia? What are the 
limitations of RCT, and how can more interdisciplinary frameworks such as Political 
Ecology offer insight into the complex social, political, economic, and ecological set of 
problems that arise in extractive contexts?   
Then, when considering the particular case of Colombia this thesis asks: What is the 
nature of Colombia’s oil-led development given the discrepancy between the ‘successful’ 
development narrative of the hydrocarbons industry and the political figures in support of it, 
and those who continue to experience violence, poverty, displacement, and human rights 
abuses in relation to extractive project? What does developmental “success” actually look 
  
166 
like on the ground in an area greatly impacted by the physicalities and economics of the oil 
industry? Furthermore, beyond the economic impacts of resource extraction, what are the 
different ways in which the expansion of the oil industry in the Colombian South has 
impacted local populations and environments, and how are these impacts interpreted and 
viewed by local residents?  And lastly, how can negative impacts be mitigated and positive 
impacts be enhanced and replicated, both in the specific context of Los Llanos, in other parts 
of Colombia, and potentially communities in other extractive countries? 
 
6.2.1.  How the Colombian Context Negates the Efficacy of Resource Curse 
Theory 
To answer these questions Chapter 3 turned to examine the relevant literature, 
covering specifically Modernrity, Eurocentricity, Resource Curse Theory, and Political 
Ecology. While Resource Curse Theory is viewed as, and in certain regards is, considered a 
useful tool for assessing the viability of resource extraction as a development mechanism and 
the overall impacts of extraction, here I argue that Resource Curse Theory is insufficient in a 
number of ways. Firstly, RCT is limited in its focus on macroeconomic level changes, 
emphasizing the shrinking of less lucrative or enticing sectors, such as agriculture, that 
accompanies the expansion of extractive industries. This, I argue, also stems from RCT’s 
roots in Eurocentric conceptions of Modernity that emphasize economic development, and 
neglects other forms and indicators of development. This is not only true of Resource Curse 
Theory, but of resource extraction as well. Thus, not only is Resource Curse Theory 
insufficient to understand the full scope of impacts that extraction levies on communities, but 
resource extraction itself – which is said to bring economic benefits like employment to local 
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populations –also falls into this Eurocentric modernity paradigm. This perspective negates 
the characterization of extractive industries as something ‘beneficial’. 
Furthermore, the limited pool of solutions to mitigate the Resource Curse and the 
subset of problems it presents are themselves to some degree unrealistic – imagining a sort of 
self-regulation among government institutions and private companies. For example, under 
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
oil companies and governments are both required to track social spending in communities 
and related financial dealings. But what incentive or enforcement mechanisms exist in 
actuality that would guarantee these programs are effective? Additionally, both of these 
initiatives still largely exclude or reduce (a) local communities from the oversight procedure, 
and (b) fail to take into account, again, the wide array of impacts that communities feel and 
experience. As such the Resource Curse Theory itself and  
Now, one caveat of this assessment may reside in Kaplinsky’s argument that the 
government use financial gains from hydrocarbons to support other industries, like the 
service industry. From the evidence demonstrated throughout this thesis, however, this would 
only be successful if programs to receive financial support were targeted and customized to 
meet the needs of local, largely unskilled, populations. For example, if the service industry 
were to be earmarked for support, but involved heavy computer usage the initiative may not 
be successful if vast swaths of rural populations, such as Puerto Gaitan, don’t have computer 
skills. Auxilary training programs would be a necessary prerequisite, and would require far 
more human resources in addition to financial resources (ie. people to conduct vocational 
trainings).  
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And of course, in considering Kaplinsky’s proposition there lies perhaps one of the 
most unpredictable risks: more intimate linkages with processes of globalization. To unpack 
that statement, we can go back to the theoretical example of providing supplemental financial 
support from the hydrocarbons industry to the services industry as discussed above. Even if 
this was successfully achieved and Colombia were able to boost the performance of that 
industry, the jobs are then thrust into the global sphere where Colombian companies, and 
thus workers, are forced to compete with other countries, which may or may not involve a 
‘race to the bottom’. Enhancing the service industry worked, for example, in India because 
outsourcing became a viable option for companies. But that also means that Colombian 
service companies and workers would have to compete with Indian companies who already 
have a strong hold on the outsourcing market. And then another considerable drawback of 
such an endeavor, is that it would also expose Colombia to any national or international level 
financial fluctuations, such as the 2008 financial crisis that impacted the U.S. and Europe. 
Now again, it is beyond the scope of this research paper to assess how much of a risk a 
scenario like this would pose to Colombia in actuality, but rather, suffice to say here that this 
is a point requiring further research from the development community, or Colombia itself 
should the country embark on such a program.  
Moving on, the take-home point from the above discussion is that Resource Curse 
Theory and the proposed solutions are insufficient at addressing both macroeconomic 
challenges, and the wide array of social, political, and ecological impacts discussed in 
Chapter 5. Alternatively, I make the case for Political Ecology as an effective lens to 
examine resource extraction. Political Ecology itself is concerned with tracing the linkages 
between the social, economic, political, and ecological spheres - “predicated on the 
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assumption that any tug on the strands of the global web of human-environment linkages 
reverberates throughout the system as a whole”274. The discipline itself is more apt to 
examine resource extraction for precisely this reason: its priority is to, “query the relationship 
between economics, politics, and nature,”275 elucidating “the condition of the environment 
and the people who live or work within it”276 and the power relations that are formed and 
reformed between them.  
The vast amount of ways that resource extraction levies changes on individual and 
community consciousness’s via initial transformations of the environment in addition to 
Chapter 5’s case study of Puerto Gaitan, was also illustrated by the brief discussion of several 
separate scenarios in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia.  These scenarios illustrate perfectly the 
applicability of Political Ecology and make evident the benefits of doing so.  
 
6.2.2.  Political Ecology Connects the Dots: Social, Political, Economic, and 
Ecological Linkages and Impacts from Resource Extraction  
Arellano Yanguas’ discussion about the Rio Blanco copper project in Peru, for 
example, illustrates the immense underlying socio-structural shifts of extractive projects 
characterized by changes in fundamental social relationships and the traditional social 
contract. In his case study he focuses on the Peruvian government’s move to establish 
agreements that protect the interests of companies at the expense of the citizens: “people feel 
that the presence of powerful mining companies erodes their capacity to control the local 
                                                
274 Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 12. 
 
275 Ibid. 
 
276 Ibid. 
 
  
170 
institutions that have traditionally provide them with stability and protection”277. This 
scenario clearly demonstrates how changes to the environment via extraction fundamentally 
alters social relationships and structures.  
 Then, Michael Taussig in Colombia and June Nash in Boliva both examine the 
psycho-social changes that result from extractive changes to the environment. In both 
instances resource extraction fundamentally altered miners and plantation workers’ 
conception of their understanding of their place in this world in relation to the supernatural. 
In Colombia Taussig explains how sugar plantation workers viewed their social 
circumstances as the result of having “entered into pacts with the devil, trading wages on 
earth for an early death,” 278 while in Bolivia Nash explains how miners “related to the devil 
figure, El Tio [Lord of the Underworld], giving him offerings to protect their safety and 
ensure their productivity”279.  While indigenous and traditional cosmology generally 
understands humans’ relationship with the spirit world as more interrelated and 
interdependent than the dominant framework of Christianity, our goal here is not to qualify 
or judge the belief systems. Rather, what is important to note is that both Taussig and Nash 
bring to light the ways in which resource extraction fundamentally, deeply, and many times 
invisibly altars the lives of individuals. Thus, though Yanguas, Taussig, and Nash each 
operate from different academic lenses, each illustrates the different ways in which a Political 
Ecology lens can elucidate the ways in which extractive industries also impact the lesser 
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discussed realms of psychology and the well being of individuals. Indeed, regardless of the 
religious framework a turn to the ‘dark side’ or collaboration with ‘the devil’ are often 
indicators of unsavory or precarious physical living situations here on the earthly plane: ie., 
those who feel they have no other recourse in this world, whether voluntary or involuntary, 
may turn to these sources for assistance that is not available to them otherwise. In this way, 
extractive scenarios have direct impacts on individual consciousness, world views, senses of 
well being, and – in a larger framework – phycology. Furthermore, each of their individual 
case studies, though distinct, demonstrate important parallels to the Colombian context.  
 For example, similar to Yanguas’ discussion of changes in social relationship, in 
Puerto Gaitan the sustained mass protests that transpired over 2011 and reemerged in 2015 
indicate the community’s discontent with their relationship with both the government and oil 
companies. Esteban Ferrero-Botero’s discussion regarding preocupacion also fits well into 
this discussion, when he discusses the indigenous Wayyu community in La Guajira and their 
experiences with the Cerrejon open-pit coal mine. In this case the Ferrero-Botero brings to 
light the many voices who feel betrayed by their government and left alone to defend 
themselves against the companies. Almost directly mirroring the Wayyu, the indigenous 
Siquani community also experiences this preocupacion: they are worried for their access to 
food, they are worried for their financial stability; they are worried for the survival and 
integrity of their cultural heritage “that allowed them to exist as something unique”280; they 
are worried for the safety and health of their families living in the resguardos; and of course, 
they are worried for the future survival of their people. Throughout conversations with 
indigenous community members many made comments that bolster the existence of 
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preocupacion and abandonment by their government representatives, such as “when 
someone has the money they don’t care”281 – illustrating the view that the government may 
‘on the side of’ the industry and is neglecting the interest of its citizens.  
Furthermore, the formation of the Mesa Social in Puerto Gaitan is a direct example of 
the reformation of the social contract and social relationships between citizens and the local 
government similar to the scenario that Yanguas identifies in Peru. Having felt that the 
government was incapable of effectively manage or direct the influx of oil plata coming into 
the Puerto Gaitan, citizens demanded a new decision-making process where the people are 
able to hold the government more accountable, as they had felt that this accountability had 
somehow deteriorated. Thus in both the Peruvian and Colombian cases social relationships 
are clearly significantly altered under extractive circumstances. The implications of this, of 
course, are significant: in both the Peruvian case and in Puerto Gaitan, when citizens felt the 
government was no longer representing their interests social movements were born, protests 
were had, often times involving violence, and the people pushed back. 
 Now, the process of listing additional scenarios that parallel the Colombian case is an 
endeavor beyond the scope of this research project, though one that would be absolutely 
valuable in furthering solutions to these problems. Suffice to say here though, that regardless 
of additional parallels, it is clear from our discussion on Puerto Gaitan in the preceding 
chapter that there are myriad of ways in which extractive changes to the environment yields 
far-reaching social, political, and economic shifts and problems that pose very real and 
immediate consequences.    
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Now, these precise scenarios and linkages may not be replicated in every context – 
naturally, each community and each extractive project will produce varying results based on 
the community itself, the landscape, and the type of extraction. However, what the discussion 
above does demonstrate is several important things: (1) Research in Puerto Gaitan indicates 
that the scope and depth of impacts from resource extraction are actually far more varied, and 
facilitate significant shifts beyond the economic sphere to also the social, political, and 
environmental realms, thus impacting a far greater segment of communities than is 
articulated under Resource Curse Theory; (2) as illustrated by this thesis’ findings in Puerto 
Gaitan, Resource Curse Theory is thus fundamentally insufficient to address the vast, varied, 
deep, and oft hidden impacts that resource extraction yields; (3) Political Ecology, intimately 
concerned with the interrelationships between the social, political, economic, and 
environmental spheres, offers an ideal lens by which to assess impacts of resource extraction. 
 
But what is the significance of this discussion? 
 
6.3. Significance of these research findings for Colombia 
Within Colombia these findings hold important implications. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
between 2011-16 the Colombian government and ANH will hold another set of bidding 
round meant to auction off additional exploration and production rights to companies. The 
areas in question are expansive. At present oil and gas production, although expanding, are 
still relatively confined to some main key areas. Exploitation rights to most of if not all these 
areas, or blocks as they are referred to, occurred during the 2007-2014 bidding rounds, which 
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saw the signing of 236 contracts and a total of 643 blocks offered for exploitation rights282. 
The map in Appendix I illustrates the culmination of these numbers visually: blocks in red 
are areas under production, and blocks in yellow indicate areas under exploration. It should 
be noted that not all blocks in yellow may not have been auctioned off yet, and could very 
well be any under stage of exploration including those that are less invasive, such as seismic 
readings. The blocks in yellow are however areas that are hoped to be producing within the 
coming years. To prep for this Colombia announced in 2014 a second bidding round to take 
place between 2015-2021, specifically targeting those blocks in yellow delineated on the 
map.  
Now, while it will inevitably take Colombia years to auction off all the exploratory 
territory, it is notable just how much of the country is actually targeted for extractive 
projects. Looking at the map, that would mean extractive projects could be spread out over at 
least one-third of the entire country – an area roughly half the size of California. This has 
important implications for all actors involved.  
First and foremost, if more territories are granted production rights, then more 
communities will undergo similar transformative experiences, at the very least, comparable 
to Puerto Gaitan, though perhaps worse in some cases as Colombia’s diverse ecology also 
includes sensitive Amazonian and Caribbean areas. On a basic level, this is important 
because it means that many more people will have their lives altered in, presumably, negative 
ways. In the worst of circumstances, this also leaves Colombia open to much more social 
                                                
282 “Colombia Oil and Gas Industry 2014: An Overview,” PricewatershouseCoopers International Limited, 
2014, http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/oil-gas-energy/publications/assets/pwc-colombia-oil-gas-industry-
2014.pdf. 
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strife as a result of extractive activities. As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 5, Puerto 
Gaitan and the Pacific Rubiales block are pointed to as an example of a ‘success’, partly 
because the Consulta Previa case was concluded relatively smoothly and quickly – yet still 
resulted in violent outbursts. This is absolutely contrary, however, to other areas undergoing 
Consulta Previa in Colombia.  
For example, one of the most notable cases include the U’wa indigenous community 
living in the remote Andes of northeastern Colombia – including the departments of Norte de 
Santander, Santander, and Boyacá, all of which include areas targeted for oil exploration and 
production283. While the U’wa only make up some 6,200 individuals, they are renowned for 
their stewardship of the environment: “The U'wa, known as the "people who know how to 
think and speak," consider themselves guardians of the forest and the species therein. For 
centuries, they have protected large tracts of forest by prohibiting all human access – 
including their own… hold[ing] that ‘Oil is the blood of Mother Earth ... to take the oil is, for 
us, worse than killing your own mother. If you kill the earth, then no one will live’… The 
U'wa are so careful that photos from the air cannot detect where they have planted crops”284. 
The U’wa have, however, been at odds with mining and extractive industries for over 
twenty years, beginning with a conflict in 1988 with Oxy Petroleum, and continuing now 
with EcoPetrol:  
“Natural resource extraction and the construction of mega-projects in the U'wa 
territory has already contributed to a climate of violence which is likely to lead to a 
                                                
283 Annex I.  
 
284 “The U’wa People of Colombia’s Cloud Forrests,” Amazon Watch, 2015, 
http://amazonwatch.org/work/uwa. 
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human rights and environmental disaster… Ecopetrol, is advancing gas extraction in 
the Gibraltar platform (immediately outside the Reserve borders, but on an U'wa 
sacred site) and building a gas pipeline that will have social and environmental 
impacts on the U'wa… Since 2007, there has been an influx of heavy machinery, 
equipment, and oil workers into the area. With the discovery of gas, a processing 
plant is under construction at Gibraltar, in addition to a gas pipeline running westward 
toward Bucaramanga”285 
As one may guess, the U’wa are not open to Consulta Previa and are unwilling to 
compromise their territory against repeated attempts by the government and oil industry 
alike. The U’wa also hold regular protests, the latest of which occurred in 2014 and gained 
international attention for its success in shutting down the Caño Limón oil pipeline for an 
entire month and costing the government upwards of $130 million as the Caño line transports 
one-fifth of the country’s daily output286. Thus, as is evident from the U’wa, certainly not all 
extractive projects are welcomed.   
 And the U’wa are most definitely not the only group to oppose extractive industries. 
The most recent U’wa protest discussed above offers important insights into the dynamics 
and complexities of the extractive industries and its relationship with different social actors. 
This most recent shut down of the pipeline was actually the result of the FARC’s287 bombing 
of the Caño Limón oil pipeline that resulted in oil spillage on U’wa territory: Following the 
                                                
285 “Colombia’s U’wa Face New Threats,” Amazon Watch, 2010, http://amazonwatch.org/assets/files/uwa-
issue-brief-2010.pdf.   
 
286 “Colombia’s U’wa Indians Continue Oil Protests After Talks Fail,” The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579524270467468710.  
 
287  According to the Wall Street Journal, the Colombian government believe FARC to be responsible for 
this particular bombing, though U’wa representatives contend that the ELN is actually responsible – another 
rebel group not currently involved in any peace negotiations.  
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bombing, more than two dozen members of the indigenous group, angry over what they say 
are repeated spills from the pipeline, surrounded the area where the pipeline was damaged, 
and, 30 days later, are yet to allow EcoPetrol workers into the area to repair it so oil pumping 
can resume”288. This illustrates how not only the U’wa are opposed to extractive projects, but 
how the FARC targets extractive projects to meet its wider goals – viewing extractive 
projects as a symptom of much deeper structural problems it seeks to address. And of course, 
the actions of the FARC, also have a serious effect on the U’wa, who in turn can impact 
whole production activities. Thus, Colombia’s extractive projects are also some of the most 
challenging and complex social projects.  
 While it is unclear how much oil was spilled during this particular attack, the 
frequency of attacks on pipelines is also something to be concerned about in environmental 
terms. According to the U’wa Defense Working Group, a 2001 study found that in the twelve 
years since Oxy Petroleum’s arrival in 1988, “Oxy's Cano Limon pipeline has been attacked 
more than 600 times, spilling more than two million barrels of crude oil into the forest and 
rivers (eight times the amount spilled by the Exxon Valdez)"289. These statistics are of course 
older, though the oil spills themselves remain highly relevant and continue to impact both the 
surrounding environment and communities.  
 And while FARC remains in dialogue with the government, disagreements and 
inconclusive peace talks have resulted in more pipeline bombings, the most recent of which 
                                                
288  “Colombia’s U’wa Indians Continue Oil Protests After Talks Fail,” The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579524270467468710. 
 
289 Rebeca Izquierdo, “The Thinking People: The U’wa Battle Oxy,” Cultural Survival, Fall 2001; 2014, 
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/colombia/thinking-people-uwa-battle-
oxy.  
 
  
178 
is believed to be, “the worst environmental disaster in the country’s history”290. The bombing 
resulted in, “more than 10,000 barrels of oil to spill into rivers and streams in Nariño 
province, threatening to contaminate the Bay of Tumaco on the Pacific Ocean. The spill left 
150,000 residents of Tumaco without access to water and trucks were supplying the port city 
with water shipped from other parts of the country… [that] same day as the spill in Nariño, 
FARC fighters forced oil tanker drivers to dump nearly 5,000 barrels of crude on the 
road”291. Thus, not only does the expansion of extractive projects risk replication of social 
conflicts such as that characterized by the U’wa – and even FARC – but it also poses 
tremendous risks for the environment, which in turn serve to fuel further social conflicts.  
 And while, the U’wa indigenous community represents perhaps a more extreme 
opposition to extractive projects, they are certainly not the only communities resisting 
extractive projects and demonstrating the social conflict that arises as a result: 
the expansion of the hydrocarbons industry also has implications for other 
disenfranchised social groups, such as the Afro-Caribbean populations, and the landless or 
displaced – all of which have endured compounded struggle and conflict over the years, and 
who will surely be further impacted by careless extractive activities.  
The Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina [Latin American 
Observatory of Mining Conflicts], or OCMAL, demonstrates for us the vast areas and groups 
that are being impacted by or experiencing social conflict as a result of extractive projects at 
present. The organization was formed to promote greater cohesion between resistance 
movements against extractive projects, but one of its most notable contributions is a physical 
                                                
290  Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Farc rebels bomb new section of Colombian oil pipeline,” The Guardian, June 29, 
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/29/colombia-farc-rebels-bomb-oil-pipeline. 
291 Ibid. 
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map tracking where social conflict has erupted as a result of extractive conflicts – including 
the U’wa in the northeast and the Wayyu in the Caribbean north. However, according to 
OCMAL’s database there are also 11 additional ongoing conflicts throughout the country – 
and this does not even include Puerto Gaitan discussed here, though there is certainly a trend 
of social conflict. Thus, if Colombia intends to continue expanding the extractive industry, it 
must contend with the reality that each and every case represents not only monumental 
social, political, economic, and environmental impacts for both individuals and community 
members alike, but the possibility of violent conflict should those impacts not be properly 
mitigated and addressed. In short, the scenario in Puerto Gaitan can and very well may be 
replicated in other parts of the country should extractive projects continue to expand and be 
handled as they are.  
 
6.4. Significance of these research findings for other countries and communities  
The implications for Colombia, specifically in Puerto Gaitan and throughout the country, 
also has major implications for other countries and communities across the world who are 
confronting extractive industries. Indeed, extractive industries are extremely common – 
especially after the 2003-2009 commodities super cycle. Many developing countries in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America have sought to develop not only oil and gas projects, but 
also coal, dams for hydroelectricity – such as the Three Gorges Dam in China292, and not to 
mention legal or illegal deforestation to develop timber industries.  
                                                
292 Jan Trouw, The Three Gorges Dam’s Impact on Peasant Livelihood, Books on Demand, Hamburg, 
Germany, 2014.   
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 The World Bank estimates that, “About 3.5 billion people live in countries rich in oil, 
gas or minerals,.. Non-renewable mineral resources play a dominant role in 81 countries, 
which collectively account for a quarter of world GDP, half of the world’s population and 
nearly 70% of those in extreme poverty”293. This is a huge number, and while not all these 
3.5 billion people may suffer, the evidence emerging out of extractive contexts does tend to 
indicate that there are in general more negative impacts than positive impacts resultant from 
extractive industries, particularly oil and gas projects.  
 Furthermore, the World Bank continues noting that, “Africa is home to about 30% of 
the world’s mineral reserves, 10% of the world’s oil, and 8% of the world’s natural gas”294, 
though, “Seventy-five percent of the world’s poorest countries are located in Africa, 
including Zimbabwe, Liberia and Ethiopia”295. This fact correlates with the reality that oil 
and gas companies have now started targeting some of the poorest countries with promising 
oil and gas reserves – such as Liberia, Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Papua 
New Guinea296. And while hydrocarbon companies, governments, and even some 
international organizations continue to argue that oil and gas development can reduce poverty 
and increase the ‘shared benefits’ of said industry, history and new research has shown time 
and time again unreliability of these aims by means of oil and gas exploitation. Despite the 
World Bank’s history of funding development projects related to oil and gas, in 2015 even 
the international financial institution publicly declared that, “coal was no cure for global 
                                                
293 “The World Bank: Extractive Industries Overview - Context”, The World Bank, April 2, 2014, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/overview#1.  
294 Ibid.  
 
295 “10 Poverty Facts,” The Borgen Project, November 7, 2014, http://borgenproject.org/10-quick-facts-
about-poverty-in-africa/.  
 
296 “The World Bank: Extractive Industries Overview - Results”, The World Bank, April 2, 2014, 
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poverty… rejecting a main industry argument for building new fossil fuel projects in 
developing countries”297. As such, this study has important implications for countries across 
the world seeking to extract and exploit their natural resources, and the message is clear: 
there are substantial risks for not only increased social conflict, but the petro-led 
development route in many cases actually works against long-term sustainable growth 
objectives by generating far more detrimental impacts to individuals and communities alike, 
as demonstrated in this thesis.  
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks  
 The lucrative nature of oil and gas in combination with the far reaching, deep, and 
generative risks it produces requires that all actors involved in extractive projects – local 
communities, local governments, national governments, extractive companies, and even 
international organizations - reassess our conventional understanding of the nature of the 
impacts of extractive industries.  
 In 2014 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) on Climate change, fundamentally altering the climate discourse 
by shifting the discussion from one focused on mitigation, to adaptation – an indication that 
human civilization had already bypassed its opportunity to reverse the causes and effects of 
Climate Change. The IPCC AR5 explains that, “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond 
those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will 
lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high 
                                                
 
297 Suzanne Goldenberg, “World Bank rejects energy industry notion that coal can cure poverty,” the 
GuardianJuly 29, 2015,  
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confidence)… [and] Many aspects of climate change and its associated impacts will continue 
for centuries, even if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped”298. 
Furthermore, a 2013 study published in the Journal of Climactic Change found that, “The 
climate crisis of the 21st century has been caused largely by just 90 companies, which 
between them produced nearly two-thirds of the greenhouse gas emissions generated since 
the dawning of the industrial age… [and] the vast majority of the firms were in the business 
of producing oil, gas or coal”299. Thus, there is consensus that not only is Climate Change a 
very real and immediate threat, but that extractive hydrocarbons industries are largely 
responsible; in other words, oil and gas industries have complex, generative environmental 
impacts detrimental to human survival. 
 This thesis supplements this now very much conventional wisdom, by adding that oil 
and gas industries also have complex, generative social impacts that are ultimately 
detrimental to human wellbeing. Without these complimentary assessments, without 
considering both the environmental and the social, companies and governments in the short-
term and human civilization in the long-term place survival and stability at risk – both for 
individual women, men and children, and for communities across the world that make our 
human species so unique. Thus, this thesis implores actors at every level to engage with and 
consider the profound implications of resource extraction.  
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